United States District Court, C.D. Illinois
MERIT REVIEW ORDER
BILLY McDADE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
proceeding pro se, pursues a § 1983 action for
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs at the
Pontiac Correctional Center. The case is before the Court for
a merit review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In
reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual
allegations as true, liberally construing them in
Plaintiff's favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d
645, 649-51 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements
and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to
“state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d
418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)(citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). While the pleading standard does not require
“detailed factual allegations”, it requires
“more than an unadorned,
Wilson v. Ryker, 451 Fed.Appx. 588, 589 (7th Cir.
2011) quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
had a pre-existing back injury dating back to 2014. He claims
that his back injury made it difficult for him to climb to
the top bunk in his cell. On June 22, 2016, Plaintiff met
with Defendant Ojelade, a Physician's Assistant. He
claims that Defendant Ojelade recognized his difficulty, told
him it would get worse but refused to give him a low bunk
permit. Plaintiff claims that on an unidentified date, he
fell and injured his knee while trying to climb onto the top
August 14, 2016 and August 17, 2016, Plaintiff submitted
medical request slips to be seen for his back and knee pain.
He claims that Dr. Tilden refused to see him and that his
condition deteriorated. On an unidentified date, Plaintiff
was given a direct order to climb to the top bunk. When he
was physically unable to do so, he was sent to segregation.
Dr. Tilden eventually issued a top bunk permit but refused to
treat the back injury. Plaintiff claims that, as a result of
Defendant Ojelade and Tilden's refusal to issue a low
bunk permit, he was often forced to sleep on the floor or
well established that deliberate indifference to the serious
medical needs of prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment.
Snipes v DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir 1996),
citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S.Ct.
285 (1976). A claim does not rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment issue, however, unless the defendant
“actually knew of an impending harm easily
preventable.” Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d
1422, 1427 (7th Cir.1996). Here, it appears that Defendants
allegedly knew of an impending harm in Plaintiff's
inability to access the top bunk and failed to easily prevent
it by issuing a low bunk permit. This refusal allegedly
resulting in Plaintiff falling, injuring his knee and further
injuring his back. Plaintiff pleads a colorable deliberate
indifference claim for Defendant Ojelade's refusal to
provide him a low bunk permit and Defendant Tilden's
refusal to provide the permit and treat his knee and back
claims that he wrote several grievances which he marked
“emergency” but which Warden Melvin denied as
emergencies. Plaintiff attempts to impute deliberate
indifference to Warden Melvin based on this denial. It is
well established, however, that “the alleged
mishandling of grievances by persons who otherwise did not
cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no
claim.” Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953
(7th Cir. 2011). Defendant Melvin is DISMISSED.
IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
case shall proceed against Defendants Tilden and Ojelade for
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical
needs. Any claims not identified will not be included in the
case, except in the Court's discretion upon motion by a
party for good cause shown, or by leave of court pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Defendant Michael P.
Melvin is DISMISSED.
Plaintiff files , a motion for recruitment of pro
bono counsel. The Court does not possess the authority
to require an attorney to accept pro bono appointments on
civil cases such as this. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d
647, 653 (7th Cir. 2007). The most that the Court can do is
to ask for volunteer counsel. Jackson v. County of
McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992). In
determining whether the Court should attempt to find an
attorney to voluntarily take a case, the question is whether
the plaintiff appears competent to litigate his own claims,
given their degree of difficulty. Pruitt at 655.
Here, plaintiff alleges deliberate in difference for the
failure to issue a low bunk permit and treat his knee and
back pain. These issues are not complex and involve facts of
which Plaintiff has direct, personal knowledge.  is
DENIED. Plaintiff's previously filed motion for
recruitment of counsel  is MOOT.
Plaintiff files , indicating that Pontiac was on lockdown
and he could not access his legal boxes. He requests a Court
order allowing access. This, the Court will not do. If,
however, Plaintiff is impeded in meeting a deadline, he may
request an extension of time in which to comply.  is
DENIED. Plaintiff files , a motion to suspend proceedings
and a subsequently filed , motion to resume proceedings.
 is GRANTED as  is rendered MOOT.
Plaintiff files  a renewed petition to proceed in
forma pauperis. Plaintiff has, however, already paid the
filing fee. See docket entry of June 19, 2007. 
is DENIED. Plaintiff's motions for status [15 and 18],
are rendered MOOT by this order. Plaintiff files ,
requesting leave to amend his complaint but does not include
a proposed amended complaint.  is DENIED, with leave to
Plaintiff files , a motion to compel which is actually a
request for an injunction ordering that he be provided the
requested heath care. He also files , requesting that the
Court order Pontiac to issue him an alternate cuffing permit
which Defendant Ojelade allegedly did not renew the permit as
an act of retaliation. Plaintiff claims that without the
permit his health will be in jeopardy, without further
explanation. The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly stated that a
preliminary injunction is an exercise of a very far-reaching
power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly
demanding it. Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v.
Girl Scouts of U.S.A., Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1085 (7th
Cir. 2008). A party seeking the injunction has the burden to
prove that he will suffer irreparable harm during the time
prior to final resolution of his claims, the inadequacy of
legal remedies available, and some likelihood of success on
the merits. Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group, Inc., 237 F.3d
891, 895 (7th Cir. 2001). Here, Plaintiff does not establish
that he will suffer irreparable harm if a preliminary
injunction is denied.  and  are DENIED.
Clerk is directed to send to each Defendant pursuant to this
District's internal procedures: 1) a Notice of Lawsuit
and Request for Waiver of Service; 2) a Waiver of Service; 3)
a copy of the Complaint; and 4) a copy of this Order.
7. If a
Defendant fails to sign and return a Waiver of Service to the
Clerk within 30 days after the Waiver is sent, the Court will
take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that
Defendant and will require that Defendant pay the full costs
of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(d)(2). If a Defendant no longer works at the address
provided by Plaintiff, the entity for which Defendant worked
at the time identified in the Complaint shall provide to the
Clerk Defendant's current work address, or, if not known,
Defendant's forwarding address. This information will be
used only for purposes of ...