United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
M. YANDLE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
James Courtney, previously incarcerated at Menard
Correctional Center (“Menard”), filed this
pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 on September 21, 2016. Plaintiff's Complaint
(Doc. 1) was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. (Doc. 5). Plaintiff was given
leave to file a First Amended Complaint, which he did on
January 27, 2017. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted on May 30, 2017. (Doc. 10).
Plaintiff was given leave to file a Second Amended Complaint,
which he did on June 22, 2017. (Doc. 17).
Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that the
defendants violated his state and federal constitutional
rights by incarcerating him beyond the date he was eligible
for mandatory supervised release (“MSR”).
Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated. Therefore, this Court
will conduct a preliminary review of the Second Amended
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that
may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any
time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal
i. is frivolous or malicious;
ii. fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
iii. seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an
objective standard that refers to a claim that “no
reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.”
Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir.
action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross
“the line between possibility and plausibility.”
Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is plausible on
its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations
as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th
Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or
implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a
plaintiff's claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574,
581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not
accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a
cause of action or conclusory legal statements.”
Id. At the same time, however, the factual
allegations of a pro se complaint are to be
liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance
Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Second Amended Complaint
Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 17), Plaintiff makes the
following allegations: On October 4, 2013, he was told that
he was “violated” by Defendant Christianson, the
Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) and
“affiliates” and that he would not be allowed to
leave on MSR. (Doc. 17, p. 7). Plaintiff claims that he
immediately wrote to S.A. Godinez, the Director of IDOC, as
well as Defendant Butler, complaining about his illegal
incarceration and claiming that he had a parole site to which
to parole. Id. He also wrote grievances to IDOC and
its affiliates that “they [were] illegally holding
[him] past [his] MSR out date (10-4-13) and that [he had] a
good parole site” to parole to. (Doc. 17, pp. 7-8).
Plaintiff also wrote grievances to Field Services “for
not doing their jobs, ” claiming that he had a parole
site and requesting, in the alternative, to be sent to the
sex offenders' halfway house in East St. Louis. (Doc. 17,
p. 8). Plaintiff had written to Field Services three or four
months prior to his out-date informing them of his parole
site. Id. IDOC sent offenders who are not sex
offenders to the sex offender halfway house despite the fact
that they had out-dates after his. Id. “IDOC
and their affiliates [had] numerous halfway houses they could
[have] sent [Plaintiff] to. They chose not to. Because what
[Plaintiff] is labeled (child sex offender).” (Doc. 17,
November 14, 2013, Plaintiff had a hearing with the parole
board, which operates under the authority of Defendant
Christianson. Id. Plaintiff was not provided notice
prior to the day of the hearing. (Doc. 17, p. 10). A member
of the parole board informed Plaintiff that all he had to do
was write to field services and give them an address for
parole in order to be released. (Doc. 17, p. 9). Plaintiff
informed them that he had already done so in March or April
2013, but that he would do so again. Id. When
Plaintiff returned to his cell, he again wrote to field
services, giving them the same information. (Doc. 17, pp.
believes that each defendant along with IDOC and its
affiliates retaliated against him due to his classification
as a child sex offender and retaliated against him for
grievances he wrote against corrections officers and field
services “for not doing their jobs.” (Doc. 17, p.
10). Plaintiff alleges that he was held for an entire year
past his MSR out date of October 4, 2013. (Doc. 17, p. 13).
He requests monetary damages from the defendants.
on the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint, the Court
will consider the counts it previously designated in this
action that have not yet been dismissed with prejudice, as
Plaintiff has brought the same claims in his Second Amended
Complaint as he brought in previous iterations of his
complaint. The parties and the Court will use these
designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion
regarding their merit.
Count 1 - Defendants subjected Plaintiff to
cruel and unusual punishment contrary to the Eighth Amendment
by failing to release him ...