United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
TYRONE L. HENDRICKS N-21303, Plaintiff,
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Virginia M. Kendall Judge
Tyrone L. Hendricks brings six counts against Defendants Officer
Paul H Lauber, Detective Jacquelin Mok, Officer Michael A
Rodriguez, and Detective M. Fuller, for Hendricks'
arrests and detainment without probable cause. Defendants
move to dismiss Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) arguing that
Hendricks fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants
Defendants' motion to dismiss Count IV .
September 5, 2014, Defendants Lauber and Rodriguez arrested
Plaintiff, absent probable cause, for urinating on the public
way and possession of drug paraphernalia. (Second Amended
Complaint (“Compl.”) at ¶¶ 8-13,
22-32.) Defendants Lauber and Rodriguez subsequently detained
Hendricks until September 8, 2014 at the District 11 lockup
of the Chicago Police Department. Id. at ¶ 13.
Defendants Lauber and Rodriguez did not provide Hendricks a
phone call, and did not inform him of the charges against
him. Id. On September 8, 2014, Officers Lauber and
Rodriguez swore out complaints for Hendricks' public
urination and possession of a crack pipe, even though the
charges were untrue. Id. at ¶ 17. Detective Mok
then swore out a complaint against Hendricks for failing to
register as a sex offender, even though Plaintiff registered
after he was released from custody. Id. ¶ 16.
Then, on September 14, 2014, Detective Fuller testified that
Plaintiff failed to register as a sex offender in front of
the Grand Jury. Id. ¶ 18. On September 18,
2014, a true bill was delivered. Plaintiff was detained
without presentment to a magistrate until October 2, 2014.
Id. ¶ 19. Although Plaintiff never appeared in
front of a judge on bond, bond was set at $400, 000.
Id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff was eventually acquitted
on all three counts. Defendants now move to dismiss Count IV
under § 1983 for Malicious Prosecution against all
survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 6781949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In the complaint, a
plaintiff must include “enough detail to give the
defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests, and, through his allegations, show that
it is plausible, rather than merely speculative, that he is
entitled to relief.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich,
526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lang v. TCF
Nat'l Bank, 249 F.App'x. 464, 466 (7th Cir.
2007)). A plaintiff is required to allege “more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotations omitted). On a
12(b)(6) motion, “[C]ourts must accept as true all
material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the
complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Silha
v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015)
argue that Count IV of Hendricks' complaint, a Section
1983 malicious prosecution claim, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted and should thus be dismissed with
prejudice. Hendricks' Second Amended Complaint contains a
claim that Defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights both times they arrested him without
probable cause. “Federal courts are rarely the
appropriate forum for malicious prosecution claims.”
Ray v. City of Chicago, et al., 629 F.3d 660, 668
(7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
An individual does not have a “federal right not to be
summoned into court and prosecuted without probable cause,
under either the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment's Procedural Due Process Clause.”
Id. (citing Tully v. Barada, 599 F.3d 591,
594 (7th Cir. 2010).) While the Seventh Circuit permits
§ 1983 malicious prosecution suits when the relevant
state's law does not provide an avenue to pursue such
claims, Illinois recognizes tort claims for malicious
prosecution. Id. (citing Swick v. Liautaud,
662 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (1996).) Indeed, in Count III,
Hendricks charges Defendants with malicious prosecution under
Illinois State Law. (Second Amended Complaint, ¶¶
46-53.) The appropriate venue for Hendricks' malicious
prosecution claims, then, is Illinois state court.
Plaintiff concedes that Defendants correctly articulate the
current law, he asserts that a change in the law may be
imminent. (Dkt. 45 at p. 2). There is a circuit split on
whether a Fourth Amendment § 1983 claim is cognizable,
and the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the issue on
October 5, 2016. Manuel v. City of Joliet, -___U.S.
__, 136 S.Ct. 890, 193 L.Ed.2d 783 (2016). Because the
Supreme Court is set to decide whether there can be a federal
malicious prosecution claim that stems from a Fourth
Amendment violation, Hendricks requests the Court to reserve
its decision on the Motion to Dismiss Count IV.
possible “imminent change in law” is not a
sufficient basis to deny Defendants' motion, and
Hendricks does not cite to any case law suggesting that would
be an appropriate action. When faced with this exact issue in
White v. City of Chicago, 149 F.Supp.3d 974, 976
(N.D. Ill. 2016), appeal dismissed (July 25, 2016), the
district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and
noted that “unless and until the Supreme Court says
otherwise, ” Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment malicious
prosecution claims are not cognizable because Illinois allows
an avenue to pursue such a claim in tort. A district court
within the Fifth Circuit recently followed the same approach.
See Joseph v. City of Cedar Hill Police Dep't,
No. 3:15-CV-2443-K-BK, 2016 WL 1554270, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar.
21, 2016) (The court held that the recent grant of certiorari
by the United States Supreme Court in Manuel had no
impact in the court s malicious prosecution analysis unless
or until the Fifth Circuit or the Supreme Court hands down
new precedent.) Similarly, this Court will decide in
accordance with binding precedent, unless or until the
Supreme Court says otherwise.
reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint.