United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
JEREMIAH R. MILLER, 18175-026, Petitioner
T.G. WERLICH, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, District Judge
se Petitioner Jeremiah Miller, currently incarcerated in
the Federal Correctional Institution at Greenville, Illinois,
brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241 challenging the imposition of his federal sentence in
United States v. Miller, No. 12-cr-10071-MMM-JEH-3
(CD. Ill. Aug. 3, 2017) (“Federal Criminal
Case”). Petitioner contends that the sentencing judge
in his Federal Criminal Case mistakenly failed to give him
credit pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 for time served in
state custody for conduct related to his federal crime, even
after the judge expressed an intention to do so. (Docs. 1,
case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the
First Amended Petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts, which
provides that upon preliminary consideration by the district
court judge, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition
and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled
to relief in the district court, the judge must dismiss the
petition and direct the clerk to notify the
petitioner.” Rule 1(b) of those Rules gives this Court
the authority to apply the rules to other habeas corpus
17, 2012, Petitioner Miller was indicted for Conspiracy to
Manufacture Methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A). He entered a
guilty plea on December 4, 2012. Federal Criminal Case, Doc.
54. Paragraph 88 of Petitioner's Presentence
Investigation Report read:
The defendant is currently serving a term of imprisonment for
conduct on an offense that resulted from an offense that is
relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction and was
the basis for an increase in the offense level for the
instant offense. The Court shall adjust the sentence for the
instant offense for any period of imprisonment already served
on the undischarged term of imprisonment if the Court
determines that such period of imprisonment will not be
credited to the federal sentence by the Bureau of Prisons.
The defendant has served approximately 14 month [sic] on
related Case Nos. 11-cf-224 (Fulton County) and 11-cf-103
(McDonough County). Furthermore, the sentence for the instant
offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the remainder
of the undischarged term of imprisonment.
(Exhibit 1 Proposed in Doc. 3).
was ultimately sentenced to be imprisoned for 240 months on
June 13, 2013. Federal Criminal Case, Doc. 84. In the
judgment, the sentencing judge was “silent to
petitioner's jail credit.” (Doc. 3, p. 1). On July
23, 2014, Petitioner sent a letter to the sentencing court
requesting credit for the time he served in state prison for
possession of methamphetamine, a charge he claims was related
to his federal crime. Federal Criminal Case, Doc. 125. On
October 24, 2016, Petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification
of Sentence claiming that his judgment was entered in error
as “[i]t was agreed that [Petitioner] would be entitled
to [his] Earned Jail Credit from February 23, 2012, to the
date of sentencing.” Federal Criminal Case, Doc. 205.
This Motion was denied on November 23, 2016 for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
14, 2017, Petitioner's judgment was amended to reduce his
sentence to 180 months. Federal Criminal Case, Doc. 223.
Petitioner's judgment was again amended to reduce his
sentence to 81 months on August 3, 2017. Federal Criminal
Case, Doc. 227. Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend
Presentence Investigation Report on August 11, 2017,
requesting that the sentencing court review his Presentence
Investigation Report and sentencing transcript so as to grant
him “prior jail-time credit” that he never
received. Federal Criminal Case, Doc. 230. He also filed a
Motion to Supplement Motion to Correct in which he seeks to
support his request for a 5G1.3 adjustment of his sentence.
Federal Criminal Case, Doc. 231. These motions are still
pending in his Federal Criminal Case in the United States
District Court for the Central District of Illinois.
pursued administrative remedies on this issue, but his
request for an adjustment to his sentence was ultimately
denied because “the federal sentencing judge was silent
as to [Petitioner's] undischarged state sentence, causing
[his] federal sentence to be served consecutively to the
state sentence” pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 3584.
(Exhibit 4 Proposed in Doc. 3). The Administrator for
National Inmate Appeals also noted that, pursuant to 10
U.S.C. § 3585(b), his time spent serving another
sentence could “not be applied toward his federal
sentence” by the Bureau of Prisons. Id.
claims that at his sentencing hearing on June 11, 2013, his
sentencing judge agreed with the Presentence Investigation
Report to run Petitioner's federal sentence concurrent
with his related state cases. (Doc. 1, p. 8). However, due to
an error in his original state incarceration date in the
Presentence Investigation Report, the Judge asked the
probation officer to “get him the correct date”
so that Petitioner could receive proper credit for jail-time
served. Id. Petitioner contends that this was never
done, and the judgment in the case did not reflect the credit
the judge intended to give him for time served. Id.
Petitioner seeks to have his sentence adjusted pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 “to reflect 18 months Petitioner
spent in custody” on cases related to his Federal
Criminal Case. (Doc. 3, p. 1).
“argument challenges the imposition of his sentence,
which is a contention ordinarily raised only under §
2255, see Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214, 217 (7th
Cir.2003), whereas challenges to the execution of a sentence
are generally brought under § 2241, see Valona v.
United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir.1998).”
McCall v. United States, 304 F. App'x 449, 450
(7th Cir. 2008). Because Petitioner “attacks the
imposition, not the execution, of his sentence, he must
demonstrate that he falls within the ‘savings
clause' provided by § 2255, which permits a prisoner
to proceed under § 2241 if § 2255 was
‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.'” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §
2255; Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir.
2003); United States v. Prevatte, 300 F.3d 792, 799
(7th Cir. 2002)).
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that §
2255 is only inadequate or ineffective when three
requirements are satisfied: 1) the petitioner relies on a new
case of statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional
decision; 2) the case was decided after his first § 2255
motion but is retroactive; and 3) the alleged error results
in a miscarriage of justice. See Brown v. Caraway,
719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013); Brown v. Rios,
696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012). “‘Inadequate
or ineffective' means that ‘a legal theory that
could not have been presented under § 2255 establishes
the petitioner's actual ...