United States District Court, C.D. Illinois
MERIT REVIEW AMENDED COMPLAINT
BILLY MCDADE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
currently at the Danville Correctional Center filed a 
motion for leave to file an amended complaint alleging
retaliation, deliberate indifference, negligence, violations
of privacy and failure to protect at the Sangamon County Jail
(“Jail”).  is GRANTED, as the Court
undertakes a merit review of the amended complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual
allegations as true, liberally construing them in
Plaintiff's favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d
645, 649-51 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements
and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to
“state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d
418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)(citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). While the pleading standard does not require
“detailed factual allegations”, it requires
“more than an unadorned,
Wilson v. Ryker, 451 Fed.Appx. 588, 589 (7th Cir.
2011) quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
November 24, 2015, Plaintiff was arrested by the Springfield
Police Department and taken to the Jail. Plaintiff alleges a
complex medical history of Lewey Body Dementia, organic brain
syndrome, brain tumor, Parkinson's disease, complex
partial seizure disorder and “WPW” heart disease.
The Springfield Police Department transported him with his
walker but when he got to the Jail, the walker was taken.
Plaintiff alleges that he went without any mobility aids from
November 25, 2015 to November 29, 2015.
complained daily to Defendant Nurses Williams, Waller and
Hammett, requesting a walker and a wheelchair. He was told
that walkers and wheelchairs were not allowed in the cell
block and that there were no beds available on the medical
cell block. On November 29, 2015, Defendant Hammett provided
Plaintiff with a walker, but allegedly had him placed in
solitary confinement in retaliation for his writing
complaints against her.
December 21, 2015, Plaintiff complained to Defendant Warden
Beck who had Plaintiff taken out of isolation, returned to
the ward and allowed to keep his walker. After being moved,
Plaintiff continued to ask Defendants Hammett, Waller and
Williams to put him on a medical ward where he would be
allowed a wheelchair. They were allegedly untruthful when
they told him there were no available beds. Plaintiff alleges
that in addition to the Nurses, Defendant Beck also knew he
needed placement on a medical ward but refused to provide it.
January 24, 2016, Plaintiff was exiting the shower using his
walker, when he fell. Plaintiff complained to Defendant Dr.
Abraham of migraine headaches, nausea, seizures, chest pains
and blackouts. It is not clear whether these were new
symptoms from the fall or preexisting. Regardless, Plaintiff
claims that Defendant Abraham was deliberately indifferent as
he refused to provide proper treatment or refer Plaintiff to
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee rather than convicted
prisoner, his § 1983 claim is reviewed under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the
Eighth Amendment. The standard of review, however, is the
same under the Fourteenth Amendment, as under the Eight
Amendment. Zentmyer v. Kendall County, Ill., 220
F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2000).
names the Sangamon County jail, which is not amenable to suit
under § 1983 which applies only to a
“person” who acts under color of state
law.” Dye v. Wargo, 253 F.3d 296, 299 (7th
Cir.2001). See Nava v. Sangamon Cnty. Jail, No.
14-3090, 2014 WL 1320259, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2014),
“The ‘Sangamon County Jail' is not a
‘person' that may be sued under § 1983.”
Wright v. Porter County, 2013 WL 1176199, * 2
(N.D.Ind. Mar. 19, 2013)(“Wright also sues the jail
itself, but this is a building, not a ‘person' or
even a policy-making body that can be sued for constitutional
violations.) As a result, the Sangamon County jail is
dismissed. Nawrocki v. Racine County Jail, No.
08-96, 2008 WL, at *1 (W.D. Wis. March 7, 2008).
alleges that Advanced Correctional Healthcare
(“ACH”) and the Jail, now dismissed, had an
unconstitutional policy of having a corrections officer
present when he met with medical or psychiatric department
personnel. Plaintiff alleges this is a failure to protect his
private health information, a right which may be asserted
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Adell v.
Hepp, 14-CV-1277-JPS, 2015 WL 6680237, at *5-6 (E.D.
Wis. Nov. 2, 2015). Prisoners, however, do not enjoy the
right to privacy of medical information as free citizens.
Simpson v. Joseph, 06-C-200, 2007 WL 433097, at *15
(E.D. Wis. Feb. 5, 2007), aff'd, 248 Fed.Appx.
746 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). The courts
have limited prisoners' constitutional privacy rights to
cases where “the medical information pertained to some
‘excruciatingly' or ‘intensely' private
circumstance, such as an HIV positive status or transsexual
identity.” Adell, 2015 WL 6680237, at *5.
Plaintiff makes no such allegations here. Furthermore, having
a guard present during a medical appointment has been found
not to violate a prisoner's privacy rights.
Adell, 2015 WL 6680237, at *5-6.
extent that Plaintiff's claims might be construed under
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”), they are also denied as there is no
private right of action under HIPAA. Doe v. Bd. of Trustees
of Univ. of Illinois, 429 F.Supp.2d 930, 944 (N.D. Ill.
2006). This claim, the only one against Defendant ACH, is
also makes an undeveloped argument that Defendants failed to
protect him. This claim, however, is more in the nature of
failure to intervene. A prison official may be liable under
§ 1983 for failing to intervene in the face of
unconstitutional conduct by another. “The Seventh
Circuit has recognized that where an officer has a realistic
opportunity to step forward and prevent a fellow officer from
violating a plaintiff's right but fails to do so, he may
be held liable.” Bey v. Pollard, 13-952, 2014
WL 5460439, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 27, 2014) (internal
citations omitted). To establish Defendants' failure to
intervene, plaintiff must establish that “(i) the
defendant knew of the unconstitutional conduct; (ii) the
defendant had a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm;
(iii) the defendant failed to take reasonable steps to
prevent the harm; and (iv) the plaintiff suffered harm as a
result.” Watkins v. Ghosh, No. 11- 1880, 2014
WL 840949, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2014) (internal citation
does not plead any of the particulars of this claim. He does
not identify the unconstitutional conduct of which Defendants
allegedly knew. He does not identify which of the Defendants
failed to intervene or indicate whether they had a realistic
opportunity to do so. If the court assumes that the failure
to intervene arose from Defendants' failure to transfer
him to a medical ward, this actually pleads deliberate
indifference. See Brooks v. Bukowski, 2015
WL 2265389, at *1 FN 1 (C.D.Ill. May 12, 2015) (construing
failure to intervene based on deliberate indifference as a
deliberate indifference claim). This claim is DISMISSED as
negligence claim is likewise DISMISSED, as mere negligence is
not sufficient to state a constitutional violation.
Pierson v. Hartley, 391 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir.
2004). “Negligence on the part of an official does not
violate the Constitution, and it is not enough that he or she
should have known of a risk.” Plaintiff states a
colorable deliberate indifference claim against Warden Beck,
Dr. Abraham and Nurses Williams, Waller and Hammett. He also
states a retaliation claim against Defendant Hammett. The