United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
OPINION AND ORDER
L. ELLIS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Ryishie Bailey, a former inmate at Cook County Department of
Corrections (“CCDOC”), brings this suit against
Defendant Thomas J. Dart under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
that Dart acted with deliberate indifference to Bailey's
health and wellbeing in violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights arising from the conditions of his
incarceration at CCDOC from April 9, 2012 through April 25,
2014. Bailey also brings a state law indemnification claim
against Cook County pursuant to the Local Government and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 10/9-102. Defendants move to dismiss Bailey's First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on the basis that it is
barred by the statute of limitations and because it is
insufficiently pleaded with respect to Dart. The Court grants
Defendants' motion to dismiss  because the applicable
statute of limitations bars the FAC.
was a pre-trial detainee at CCDOC from April 9, 2012 through
April 25, 2014, at which time the State transferred him to
Sheridan Correctional Facility.
detained at CCDOC, Bailey was exposed to excessive amounts of
mold and mildew in areas of the facility, including the
showers and empty cells. The presence of the mold and mildew
went unaddressed by Dart throughout Bailey's detainment.
As a result of his exposure to the mold and mildew, Bailey
developed a variety of health issues, including difficulty
breathing, wheezing, coughing, and migraine headaches. He
continues to experiences these issues to this day.
detained at CCDOC, Bailey, along with 40 other inmates, filed
grievances regarding the conditions at the jail. Bailey never
received a response to his grievances and CCDOC never
remediated the mold and mildew during his time there. Bailey
also notified CCDOC staff on several occasions of the mold
Dart is the Sheriff of Cook County and the head of CCDOC.
Dart has supervisory responsibility for CCDOC. During the
relevant period, Dart took no actions to remedy the mold and
filed his original complaint in this case on July 5, 2016. He
filed the FAC on November 23, 2016.
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the
sufficiency of the complaint, not its merits. Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510,
1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all well- pleaded facts
in the plaintiff's complaint and draws all reasonable
inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor.
AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th
Cir. 2011). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint
must not only provide the defendant with fair notice of a
claim's basis but must also be facially plausible.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct.
1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d
929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
Statute of Limitations
argue that Bailey's claims are barred by the statute of
limitations because he filed his initial complaint more than
two years after his April 25, 2014 departure from CCDOC. The
statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that need
not be anticipated in the complaint in order to survive a
motion to dismiss. United States v. Lewis, 411 F.3d
838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005). But that is not the case where
“the allegations of the complaint itself set forth
everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense, such
as when a complaint reveals that an action is untimely under
the governing statute of limitations.” Id.;
see also Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir.
2009) (considering statute of limitations defense on motion
to dismiss where relevant dates were set forth in the
§ 1983 claim is governed by the forum state's
statute of limitations for personal injury claims, in this
case, two years. Henderson v. Bolanda, 253 F.3d 928,
931 (7th Cir. 2001); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-202.
Additionally, federal courts borrow the state's tolling