United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
CHARLES P. KOCORAS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is Defendant Dr. Phyllis Tolley's (“Dr.
Tolley”) motion for summary judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Northern District of
Illinois Local Rule 56.1 against Plaintiff James Earl Allen
(“Allen”). For the following reasons, the Court
grants the motion.
following facts taken from the record are undisputed, except
where otherwise noted. On or around February 27, 2011, Allen
was involved in an altercation with his then cellmate, Eugene
Logan (“Logan”), at Stateville Correctional
Center (“Stateville”). According to Allen, this
incident caused him to have continued fears and anxiety over
another attack. In response to his fears, Allen sought mental
health treatment at Stateville beginning in September of
2011. After an initial evaluation, Allen was diagnosed with
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and depression. During
the relevant time period, there were two psychologists on
staff at Stateville, Dr. Tolley and former Defendant, Dr.
Charles Woods (“Dr. Woods”). Dr. Tolley and Dr.
Woods divided inmate cases based on the inmate's last
name. Woods examined inmates whose first letter of their last
name fell in the first half of the alphabet, while Dr. Tolley
examined inmates whose first letter of their last name fell
in the second half of the alphabet. Therefore, Dr. Woods and
psychiatrist, Jonathan Kelly, (“Dr. Kelly”)
managed Allen's treatment.
contends that during the fall of 2011 he wrote several
letters directed to the Mental Health Unit and Dr.
Tolley requesting a designation of
“vulnerable status.” Vulnerable status is a
mental health designation of an inmate who is deemed
vulnerable to attack or being taken advantage of by predatory
inmates. A mental health professional uses several different
factors when assessing an inmate for vulnerable status,
including: physical stature, the types of crime an inmate was
incarcerated for, disciplinary history, sexual orientation,
mental health history, and current medical condition. Inmates
designated as “vulnerable” are either assigned in
a single-cell,  or are housed with inmates who are also
designated with “vulnerable status.” According to
Allen, Dr. Tolley ignored his repeated requests to be
evaluated for vulnerable status.
about November 21, 2011, Stateville inmate, Brodie Young
(“Young”), moved into Allen's cell. Allen did
not know Young before they became cellmates. During their
time as cellmates Young never directed any threats at Allen.
However, on November 25, 2011, Allen contends he filed a
request to be transferred from the cell he shared with Young
due to Young's odd behavior and gang affiliation. On
December 1, 2011, Allen claims he wrote to correction
officials asking to speak with them about Young. On December
3, 2011, Young allegedly assaulted Allen while he was asleep.
Allen claims he suffered injuries to his eye and face due to
the attack resulting in hospitalization and fourteen stitches
on his face.
response to the alleged assault, Allen brought this lawsuit
against Dr. Tolley, Marcus Hardy (“Hardy”), Ralph
Burkybile (“Burkybile”), Ed Butklewicz
(“Butklewicz”), Ada Johnson
(“Johnson”), Frances Shievers
(“Shievers”), and Dr. Woods alleging failure to
protect (Counts I and II), and deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need (Count III). On August 8, 2016, all
parties except for Dr. Tolley reached a settlement with
Allen. Dr. Tolley now moves for, and this Court grants,
summary judgment on Counts II and III.
motion for summary judgment requires the Court to construe
all facts and to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Summary judgment is
appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). A genuine issue of material fact arises where a
reasonable jury could find, based on the evidence of record,
in favor of the non-movant. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court
considers the whole record. See Id. at 255-56.
District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1 requires the
“party moving for summary judgment to include with the
motion ‘a statement of material facts as to which the
moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that
entitles the moving party to a judgement as a matter of
law.'” Ammons v. Aramark Unif. Servs.,
Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting
N.D.Ill. R. 56.1(a)(3)). “The movant bears the initial
burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact
exists.” Genova v. Kellogg, 2015 WL 3930351,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2015). “The burden then
shifts to the non-moving party to show through specific
evidence that a triable issue of fact remains on issues on
which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial.”
Id. The non-moving party must respond to the
movant's Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement and may not rest
upon mere allegations in the pleadings or upon conclusory
statements in affidavits. N.D.Ill. R. 56.1(b); see
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The
non-movant must support her contentions with documentary
evidence of specific facts that demonstrate that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
Failure to Exhaust
corrections officials an opportunity to address complaints
internally before a federal suit is initiated, prisoners must
exhaust their administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. §
1997(e)(a) (the “PLRA”); Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). Accordingly, a
plaintiff must pursue all administrative remedies no matter
what relief is sought, including monetary damages. Pozo
v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002). The
exhaustion requirement applies to deliberate indifference
claims. Porter at 532. To exhaust administrative
remedies, a prisoner “must file complaints and appeals
in the place, and at the time, the prison's
administrative rules require.” Id. at 1025.
has created a three-step administrative process for inmates
to follow. Step one requires the prisoner to “first
attempt to resolve incidents, problems, or complaints ...
through his ... counselor.” See Ill. Admin.
Code, Title 20, § 504.810(a). If the inmate is unable to
resolve his problem through his counselor, the inmate must
proceed to step two, which requires him to “file a
written grievance on a grievance form ... within 60 days
after the discovery of the incident” which must be
addressed to the “Grievance Officer” and
“shall contain factual details ... including what
happened, when, where, and the name of each person who was
the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the
complaint.” See Ill. Admin. Code, Title 20,
§ 504.810(a), (b). The grievance officer and the chief
administrative officer then consider properly submitted
grievances. Id.; § 504.830(d). If the inmate is
unsatisfied with the chief administrative officer's
resolution, the inmate “may appeal in writing to the
director within 30 days after the date of the
decision.” Id., § 504.850(a). If the
director determines ...