United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ST. EVE, District Court Judge
22, 2017, pro se Petitioner Shamonte Hall filed the present
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the following reasons, the
Court dismisses Petitioner's § 2255 motion as
untimely and declines to certify any issues for appeal.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253(c)(2), 2255(f). .
11, 2008, a grand jury returned a multi-count indictment
charging Petitioner and his co-defendants with multiple
offenses. (08 CR 386, R. 14.) More specifically, the
indictment charged Petitioner with one count of conspiring to
possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count One); one
count of attempting to possess with intent to distribute five
kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
846 (Count Two); one count of knowingly possessing a firearm
in furtherance of and in relation to a drug trafficking crime
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Three);
and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm
with an obliterated serial number in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (Count Four).
and his two co-defendants proceeded to trial on February 11,
2009. (R. 117.) On February 20, 2009, the jury returned its
verdict as to all three defendants. In particular, the jury
found Petitioner not guilty on Count One, but guilty on
Counts Two, Three, and Four. (R. 124.) On June 29, 2009,
now-retired District Court Judge David Coar sentenced
Petitioner. (R. 169.) In his sentencing memorandum,
Petitioner argued that the United States Sentencing
Guidelines range on Counts Two and Four were 78 to 97 months
and asked for a combined sentence of 120 months'
imprisonment, namely, 60 months on Counts Two and Four, and
60 months on Count Three. (R. 167, 6/24/09 Sent. Mem., at 9.)
After hearing arguments from the parties, the district court
agreed with the recommendation of the U.S. Probation
Department that the sentencing guidelines range on Counts Two
and Four was 110 to 137 months' imprisonment, and that
Petitioner faced a mandatory minimum 60-month sentence on
Count Three to be served consecutively to his sentence on
Counts Two and Four. (17 C 3892, R. 6, Ex. 1, Sentencing
Hr'g Tr., at 20:8-18.)
the sentencing court made these findings on the guidelines
range, Petitioner's attorney argued for a sentence at the
low end of the guidelines range. The sentencing court and
Petitioner's counsel had the following exchange:
The Court: I'm not quite sure how you get to - your
recommended sentence is 10 years.
Counsel: Judge, you would have to have accepted our
objections to get there.
The Court: Okay.
Counsel: So we're not there. I think we're pretty
much where probation recommended.
(Id. at 20:1-7.) The district court sentenced
Petitioner to a term of imprisonment of 115 months on Counts
Two and Four and 60 months on Count Three, to be served
consecutively to the term imposed on Counts Two and Four, for
a total of 175 months imprisonment. (R. 169.)
then appealed his conviction arguing that the district court
erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the affirmative
defense of entrapment. See United States v. Hall,
608 F.3d 340, 341 (7th Cir. 2010). Petitioner, however, did
not appeal his sentence. On June 17, 2010, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed Petitioner's conviction. See
Id. at 347. Thereafter, Petitioner did not file a
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
under [§ 2255] is available only in extraordinary
situations, such as an error of constitutional or
jurisdictional magnitude or where a fundamental defect has
occurred which results in a complete miscarriage of
justice.” Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d
870, 878-79 (7th Cir. 2013). In other words, to obtain relief
under § 2255, a petitioner must show that his
“sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States, the court lacked jurisdiction,
the sentence was greater than the maximum authorized by law,
or it is otherwise subject to collateral attack.”
Swanson v. United States,692 F.3d 708, 714 (7th
Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Accordingly, a § 2255
motion is not a substitute for a direct appeal nor is it a
means by which a defendant may appeal the same claims a
second time. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.
614, 621, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) (relief
under § 2255 “will not be allowed to do service
for an appeal”). If a § 2255 petitioner does not
raise a claim on direct appeal, that claim is barred from the