United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Z. Lee United States District Judge.
Melvin Jordan, a prisoner at Stateville Correctional Center
(“Stateville”), brings suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Defendants David Grey, Devi Austin, and
Hector Quintero. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Defendants have filed a motion pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 seeking summary
judgment in their favor. For the reasons set forth below,
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in
part and denied in part.
with Local Rule 56.1
with Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1(a)(3),
Defendants filed a statement of facts alongside their motion
for summary judgment and accompanying brief. See
Defs.' LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt., ECF No. 156. Defendants'
statement complies with the rule's requirement that
“each paragraph [contain] specific references to the
affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting
materials relied upon to support the facts set forth in that
paragraph.” LR 56.1(a). Plaintiff was required to
submit a responsive filing pursuant to Local Rule
56.1(b)(3)(B), consisting in part of a “response to
each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement,
including, in the case of any disagreement, specific
references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other
supporting materials relied upon.” LR 56.1(b)(3)(B).
Plaintiff failed to submit such a responsive filing, instead
submitting only his own, separate statement of additional
facts. See Pl.'s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt., ECF No.
a party fails to comply with the local rule requiring a
response to a statement of undisputed material facts, the
court may rely on the opposing party's statement to the
extent that it is supported by citations to relevant evidence
in the record.” Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc.,
667 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing FTC v. Bay Area
Bus. Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 2005)).
Because Plaintiff did not properly respond to any portion of
Defendants' 56.1(a)(3) statement of facts, those facts
are deemed admitted where they are supported by the
underlying evidence submitted by Defendants. But
Plaintiff's failure to properly respond to
Defendants' statement of facts “does not, of
course, automatically result in judgment for
[Defendants].” Id. at 884 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Rather, Defendants must still demonstrate
that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and
the Court must still draw all reasonable inferences in
Plaintiff's favor. Id.
the time relevant to his lawsuit, Plaintiff was incarcerated
at Stateville, where Defendants Grey, Austin, and Quintero
were employed as correctional staff. Defs.' LR 56.1(a)(3)
Stmt. ¶¶ 1-2. Defendants routinely worked in
housing unit B, where Plaintiff's cell was located, in
their capacity as correctional officers. Pl.'s LR
56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 2.
maintains several policies relevant to the present
litigation. A prisoner at Stateville can access the
healthcare unit (HCU) for a medical appointment if he has a
healthcare pass. Defs.' LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶ 30.
There are two ways for a prisoner to obtain a healthcare
pass: he can request one directly from healthcare personnel
during daily rounds, or he can submit a written request for
review by HCU staff. Id.
March 11, 2009, Plaintiff was taken to the HCU after
sustaining an injury to his left knee while playing
basketball. Defs.' LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 7-9.
The examiner concluded that Plaintiff had sprained his knee,
though the knee exhibited no bruising, swelling, or bone
deformity at the time of the examination. Id.
¶¶ 10-11. Plaintiff was prescribed pain medication
and an analgesic balm, and he was told to return to the HCU
if he experienced increased pain. Id. ¶ 12;
Pl.'s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 3.
attests that six days later, on March 17, he awoke with
elevated pain and swelling in his left knee. Pl.'s LR
56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 4. Plaintiff sought a healthcare
pass for this pain, though he did not receive a pass that
day. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. Plaintiff consumed the
last of his pain medication on March 18. Pl.'s LR
56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶¶ 5-7. By March 19,
Plaintiff's pain had become severe, and his knee's
swelling made it difficult for him to climb into and out of
his upper-level bunk. Id. ¶ 6. He received a
healthcare pass on the following day, March 20, with an
appointment scheduled for March 21. Id. ¶¶
5-7. The healthcare pass did not specify a time for his
appointment. Id. ¶ 7. By March 21, the day of
the scheduled HCU visit, Plaintiff was visibly limping.
Id. ¶ 8.
time on March 21, Plaintiff informed Grey and Austin that he
had a healthcare pass for that day because of his knee
condition. Id. Shortly after these conversations,
Quintero came to Plaintiff's cell without warning and
said, “Healthcare.” Id. ¶ 9.
Plaintiff prepared to leave his cell by tucking in his shirt
and turning off all of his electronics, as Stateville's
rules require. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff asserts, and
Defendants deny, that Plaintiff's appearance at this time
made it readily apparent to Quintero that Plaintiff was in
severe pain and unable to move easily on his knee.
Id. ¶ 11; Defs.' Resp. Pl.'s LR
56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 11.
minutes after first arriving, Quintero muttered something
inaudible and walked away, leaving Plaintiff in his cell
without an escort to the HCU. Pl.'s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C)
Stmt. ¶ 10. A few minutes later, Plaintiff called out to
Quintero as he passed Plaintiff's cell, telling him that
he was in severe pain and insisting that he be taken to the
HCU for his appointment. Id. ¶¶ 12-13.
Quintero continued to walk away, saying only that Plaintiff
had already refused the appointment. Id. It is
undisputed, however, that Plaintiff had not refused the
appointment. Defs.' Resp. Pl.'s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C)
Stmt. ¶ 12. Plaintiff claims that he then attempted to
contact Grey and Austin to request help in getting to the
HCU. Pl.'s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 14. In support,
he claims that other inmates told him that Grey and Austin
were in earshot when he called out his requests to them.
See Id. ¶¶ 14-15 (citing Pl.'s LR
56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt., Ex. H (“Pl.'s Aff.”)
¶¶ 14-15). But neither Grey nor Austin appeared at
his cell or acknowledged his requests. Id. ¶
that day, Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance requesting
that Quintero be disciplined for leaving Plaintiff in his
cell, despite Plaintiff's healthcare pass and his reports
of pain. Pl.'s LR 56.1(b)(3)(C) Stmt. ¶ 16.
Plaintiff's counselor, Karen Rabideau, responded to the
grievance in writing, saying that Quintero had acted
improperly and that Plaintiff had not refused his
appointment. Id. Nevertheless, Quintero was never
formally disciplined or reprimanded for the incident.
was eventually seen by the HCU on March 26, 2009, five days
after his missed appointment. Defs.' LR 56.1(a)(3) Stmt.
¶ 14. At that time, the HCU confirmed the diagnosis of a
sprain in his left knee. Id.
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Shell v. Smith, 789
F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2015). To survive summary judgment,
the nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,
” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), and instead must
“establish some genuine issue for trial such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict in her favor.”
Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 674 F.3d 769, 772-73
(7th Cir. 2012). The evidence considered for summary judgment
“must be admissible if offered at trial, except that
affidavits, depositions, and other written forms of testimony
can substitute for live testimony.” Malin v.
Hospira, Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 554-55 (7th Cir. 2014). The
Court gives the nonmoving party “the benefit of
conflicts in the evidence and reasonable ...