United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Springfield Division
LOREN D. PETTIT, Plaintiff,
CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, a municipal corporation, KENNY WINSLOW, Chief of the Springfield Police Department, individually and in his official capacity, LIEUTENANT CHRISTOPHER MUELLER, individually and in his official capacity, and LIEUTENANT GREGORY WILLIAMSON, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants.
MYERSCOUGH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment on Count
II (d/e 13) filed by Defendants Kenny Winslow, Christopher
Mueller, and Gregory Williamson. The motion is GRANTED. The
undisputed material facts regarding Plaintiff's claim
against Defendants Winslow, Mueller, and Williamson brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 establish that
Plaintiff's claim is barred by the applicable statute of
March 16, 2016, Plaintiff filed a three-count Complaint
against Defendants. Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint-the
focus of the motion for summary judgment-asserts claims
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, presumably based on an
unauthorized search of Plaintiff's residence in violation
of Plaintiff's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. On February 22, 2017, the Court entered an Order
dismissing, without prejudice, Plaintiff's § 1983
claim against Defendant City of Springfield, Illinois.
Defendants Winslow, Mueller, and Williamson now move for
summary judgment on Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint,
arguing that Plaintiff's § 1983 claims are barred by
the applicable statute of limitations because the search on
which Plaintiff bases the claims took place on November 14,
2013, more than two years before Plaintiff filed his
having received a requested extension from the Court to
respond to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff has
not, as of this date, filed a response to the motion.
Plaintiff's failure to respond to the motion for summary
judgment is deemed an admission of the motion. CDIL-LR
7.1(D)(2); see also Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683
(7th Cir. 2003) (“We have consistently held that a
failure to respond by the nonmovant as mandated by the local
rules results in an admission.”). Accordingly, the only
factual allegations from Plaintiff's Complaint that the
Court will analyze in ruling on the motion for summary
judgment are those adopted by Defendants Winslow, Mueller,
and Williamson in the motion. Further, the Court sets forth
only those facts relevant to its determination as to whether
a genuine dispute of material fact exists with respect to
Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Defendants
Winslow, Mueller, and Williamson.
November 14, 2013, Monica Johnson filed a domestic battery
charge against Plaintiff. Mueller Aff. (d/e 13-1),
¶¶ 3-4. On that same date, Defendant Winslow, the
Chief of Police for the Springfield Police Department,
informed Plaintiff, an officer with the Springfield Police
Department, that Plaintiff was being temporarily suspended
and placed on administrative assignment pending the
completion of an internal affairs investigation. Complaint
(d/e 1), ¶¶ 9-10.
of the internal affairs investigation, Defendant Mueller,
then an investigator with the Internal Affairs division of
the Springfield Police Department, searched Plaintiff's
residence in Springfield, Illinois, without Plaintiff's
knowledge or consent. Complaint, ¶ 11; Mueller Aff.,
¶¶ 3, 6, 9-10. Defendant Winslow authorized the
search of Plaintiff's residence, a search for which no
warrant had been issued. Complaint, ¶ 11. The actions of
Defendants Winslow and Mueller were taken within the scope of
their employment with the Springfield Police Department.
Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 7. Defendant Williamson,
another investigator with the Internal Affairs division of
the Springfield Police Department, was not present for the
search of Plaintiff's residence on November 14, 2013, and
at no time subsequent to that date did Defendant Williamson
search Plaintiff's residence. Williamson Aff. (d/e 13-2),
¶¶ 3, 5-6.
Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's
§ 1983 claims because they are based on federal law.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.”). Venue is proper in this district
because the events giving rise to Plaintiff's § 1983
claims occurred here. See 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b)(2) (stating that a civil action may be brought in
“a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim
judgment is proper if the movant shows that no genuine
dispute exists as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
The movant bears the initial responsibility of informing the
Court of the basis for the motion and identifying the
evidence the movant believes demonstrates the absence of a
genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A genuine dispute of
material fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact could find
in favor of the nonmoving party. Carroll v. Lynch,
698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). When ruling on a motion
for summary judgment, the Court must construe facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor.
Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir.
2008). A party opposing a summary judgment motion may not
rely solely upon the allegations in his pleading, but must
“set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Widmar v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 772 F.3d 457, 460 (7th Cir. 2014).
Court notes briefly that Plaintiff's admission of the
facts set forth in the motion for summary judgment does not
necessarily make a grant of summary judgment appropriate.
Indeed, the Court must still find that Defendants Winslow,
Mueller, and Williamson are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. See Wienco, Inc. v. Katahn Assocs., Inc.,
965 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1992). Because Plaintiff's
§ 1983 claims are ...