from the Circuit Court of the 13th Judicial Circuit, Grundy
County, Illinois Appeal No. 3-17-0144 Circuit No. 04-JD-52
Honorable Robert C. Marsaglia, Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE O'BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion. Justices Carter and Wright concurred in the judgment
1 B.G. appeals from the circuit court's dismissal of his
petition to terminate registration as a sex offender. We
reverse and remand.
3 On September 14, 2004, the State filed a four-count
petition for adjudication of wardship. B.G. subsequently pled
guilty to count III, which alleged that he had committed an
act of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(3) (West
2002)). The State moved to dismiss the remaining three
counts, and the court adjudicated B.G. delinquent on count
III. On September 29, 2004, the court sentenced B.G. to two
years' probation. In its order, the court did not
expressly impose the statutorily mandated 10-year sex
offender registration term. 730 ILCS 150/2, 3, 7 (West 2004).
However, defendant was subject to the registration period by
operation of law, and therefore, we infer that he first
registered in 2004.
4 On November 12, 2012, in case No. 12-CF-237, the State
charged B.G. with failing to register as a sex offender (730
ILCS 150/10(a) (West 2012)). On April 22, 2013, B.G. pled
guilty to the charge and was sentenced to 30 months of
5 On September 7, 2016, B.G. filed a petition to terminate
registration as a sex offender. 730 ILCS 150/3-5 (West 2016).
At a subsequent hearing, the State orally moved to dismiss
B.G.'s petition. The State argued that B.G.'s April
2013 conviction for failing to register initiated a
"new" 10-year sex offender registration period
under section 7 of the Sex Offender Registration Act (Act)
(730 ILCS 150/7 (West 2012)). Therefore, the State concluded
that B.G.'s section 3-5 petition was premature, as he had
to wait five years from the start of his "new"
registration period. 730 ILCS 150/3-5(c) (West 2016). The
five-year waiting period on B.G.'s original registration
expired in 2009. The court granted B.G. leave to file a
written response and continued the case for additional
6 After hearing the parties' supplemental arguments, the
court granted the State's motion to dismiss. The court
found that B.G. could petition to terminate his registration
no sooner than five years after his "new"
registration. B.G. appeals.
8 B.G. argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing his
petition on the grounds that it was premature. In response,
the State contends that the court's ruling was correct
because B.G.'s 2013 conviction started a "new"
registration period and B.G. could not file a section 3-5
petition until 2018, at the earliest. For the following
reasons we find that B.G.'s 2013 conviction did not act
to create a "new" registration period, and
therefore, his 2016 petition was not premature.
9 The parties' arguments raise a question of statutory
interpretation: at what point in time can an individual, who
has been subject to additional registration requirements
under section 7 of the Act, file a petition to terminate sex
offender registration, under section 3-5 of the Act? The
language of the operative statutes is the best indicator of
legislative intent, and we give that language its plain and
ordinary meaning. In re E.B., 231 Ill.2d 459, 466
(2008). We construe the statute as a whole and consider words
or phrases in light of other relevant provisions of the
statute. Id. We review an issue of statutory
interpretation de novo. People v. Beachem,
229 Ill.2d 237, 243 (2008).
10 B.G.'s petition for termination was filed under
section 3-5 of the Act. Section 3-5 specifies the rights and
obligations of juvenile delinquents who are subject to the
Act. 730 ILCS 150/3-5 (West 2016). Section 3-5 is intended
"to protect the rights of juvenile delinquents, who have
a greater likelihood of rehabilitation, by allowing them the
opportunity to petition the court to remove them from the sex
offender registry." In re Rufus T., 409
Ill.App.3d 969, 975 (2011) (reviewing the legislative history
of Public Act 95-658 (eff. Oct. 11, 2007) which added section
3-5 to the Act). Subsection 3-5(c) provides an individual,
who was adjudicated delinquent as a minor, with the statutory
right to petition the circuit court for termination of the
registration requirement. 730 ILCS 150/3-5(c) (West 2016).
Subsection 3-5(c) states:
"For a minor adjudicated delinquent for an offense
which, if charged as an adult, would be a felony, no less
than 5 years after registration ordered pursuant to
subsection (a) of this Section, the minor may petition for