United States District Court, C.D. Illinois
MICHAEL M. MIHM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
proceeds pro se from his detention in the Shawnee
Correctional Center regarding alleged deliberate indifference
to a hand fracture he suffered while in the McLean County
Jail. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Inoue missed
diagnosing Plaintiff's fractured hand. Plaintiff further
alleges that three nurses (Defendants Brown, Payne, and
Sturgill) refused pain medication to Plaintiff.
(Merit Review Order, d/e 8.)
move for summary judgment, which is granted for the reasons
addressing the summary judgment motion, the Court addresses
Defendants' contention that Plaintiff admitted in his
deposition that he did not personally sign any of his
pleadings. Plaintiff did make this representation in his
deposition, stating that he had someone else sign his name
because he cannot use his right hand. (Pl.'s Dep.
137-38.) He appears to confirm this in his response to the
summary judgment motion, stating that he has not been able to
use his right hand “at all ever since the beginning
of this lawsuit.” (Pl.'s Resp., d/e 40, p. 10.)
However, in a later unsigned filing he asserts that he
did sign his filings, but with his left hand and
with help from others. (Pl.'s Notice, d/e 43, pp. 1-2.)
may rely on another inmate to write Plaintiff's filings,
but Plaintiff must read those filings before sending them to
the Clerk to ensure that the filings are factual. Filings
that contain false statements are grounds for sanctions,
including dismissal. Plaintiff must also sign all of his
filings, with his left hand if need be. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a).
At this point, the Court will accept Plaintiff's
representation that he did sign the filings and misunderstood
the question in his deposition.
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A movant may demonstrate the absence of a
material dispute through specific cites to admissible
evidence, or by showing that the nonmovant “cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the [material]
fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(B). If the movant clears this
hurdle, the nonmovant may not simply rest on his or her
allegations in the complaint, but instead must point to
admissible evidence in the record to show that a genuine
dispute exists. Harvey v. Town of Merrillville, 649
F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2011).
summary judgment stage, the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant, with material factual
disputes resolved in the nonmovant's favor. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
genuine dispute of material fact exists when a reasonable
juror could find for the nonmovant. Id.
Inoue has not numbered his proposed undisputed facts as
required by Local Rule 7.1(D)(1)(b). However, Dr. Inoue does
cite to attached exhibits to support each proposed,
undisputed fact, and the substantially the same proposed
facts are offered by the Nurse Defendants (Brown, Payne, and
Sturgill) as numbered facts. Requiring Dr. Inoue to number
his proposed facts is unnecessary because the facts are not
complex and doing so will only unnecessarily prolong this
case. Similarly, Plaintiff has not addressed each proposed
fact as required by Local rule 7.1(D)(2)(b), but he does
adequately set forth his reasons why summary judgment should
be denied. Thus, the Court finds the case ready for a
decision on the merits, even though technical compliance with
Rule 7.1 is lacking.
relevant events occurred during Plaintiff's detention at
the McLean County Jail. On September 11, 2015, Defendant
Nurse Brown saw Plaintiff for an injury to his right hand
that he suffered in a fight. Nurse Brown noted a good range
of motion, ordered ice packs as needed for two days, Motrin
as needed for seven days, and referred Plaintiff to the
physician. (Brown Aff. ¶ 10.)
received Motrin that day and the next three days before his
appointment with Defendant Dr. Inoue. (Nurse Defs.'
Undisp. Fact 11.) Plaintiff also received ice packs on those
days. (Nurse Defs.' Undisp. Fact 12.) To obtain medicine
prescribed on an “as needed” basis, an inmate
must submit a request one hour before medical rounds during
the day and two hours before the morning medical rounds.
(Nurse Defs.' Undisp. Fact 9.)
Inoue examined Plaintiff's hand on September 14, 2015.
Dr. Inoue ordered an x-ray, ice for three days, and ibuprofen
for one week. (Dr. Inoue Aff. ¶ 7; 9/14/15 progress
note, d/e 36-1, p. 4.) X-rays were taken that same day, with
the radiologist report stating that there was no evidence of
“acute bony injury” and “no acute bone
injury noted.” (9/14/15 imaging report, d/e 36-1, p.
3.) Plaintiff asserts that he did have an obvious
fracture on September 14, 2015, pointing to a later report by
an outside orthopedist. (Pl.'s Resp. d/e 40, p. 14.) But
the report he attaches is one page from a visit to the
orthopedist November 18, 2015, when x-rays of the first visit
with the orthopedist were compared to the follow-up visit
with the orthopedist on November 18, 2015. (d/e 38-7, p. 2;
d/e 38-7, p. 5.) Nothing in this report mentions the first
x-ray on September 14, 2015. Plaintiff alternatively asserts
that the radiologist misread the first x-ray but he offers no
evidence to support that conclusion.
received ibuprofen from September 15-21, 2015. (Nurse
Defs.' Undisp. Fact 18.) Plaintiff received ice packs on
September 14, 15, 17, and 21, 2015. (Nurse Defs.' Undisp.
September 22, 2015, Plaintiff saw a nurse for a purported
re-injury to his right hand, asserting that he had fallen
recently. (Defs.' Undisp. Fact 19.) That was a lie.
Plaintiff had made up the story about falling because he felt
desperate to obtain adequate pain medication for his original
injury. (Pl.'s Dep. 142.) Plaintiff received an ice pack
that day and was referred to a physician. (Nurse ...