United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
M. Yandle, United States District Judge
currently incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional Center
(“Pontiac”), has brought this pro se
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His
claims arose while he was confined at Pinckneyville
Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”). Plaintiff
claims that Defendants violated his Fourteenth and Eighth
Amendment rights in connection with a disciplinary action
that was ultimately expunged. The Complaint is now before the
Court for a preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
§ 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner
complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss any portion
of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks
for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an
objective standard that refers to a claim that “no
reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.”
Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir.
action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross
“the line between possibility and plausibility.”
Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is plausible on
its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true,
see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir.
2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or
implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a
plaintiff's claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574,
581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not
accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a
cause of action or conclusory legal statements.”
Id. At the same time, however, the factual
allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally
construed. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751
(7th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance
Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
these standards, the Court finds that the Complaint is
subject to dismissal pursuant to § 1915A.
28, 2015, Heck and Myer conducted a hearing on a disciplinary
report filed against Plaintiff for “Damage or Misuse of
Property.” (Doc. 1, p. 2; Doc. 1-1, p. 2). They found
Plaintiff guilty of the infraction, and as a result,
Plaintiff lost 2 months of good conduct credits. He was also
punished with 4 months in segregation, 4 months' demotion
to C-grade and ordered to pay restitution. (Doc. 1, pp. 2-3).
alleges that Heck and Myer failed to afford him procedural
due process in the disciplinary hearing. (Doc. 1, p. 2).
During all times relevant to these events, Plaintiff was
“on crisis and designated Seriously Mentally Ill”
by the IDOC and prison mental health officials. (Doc. 1, p.
3). However, mental health staff were not informed of the
charges against Plaintiff or summoned to participate in
Plaintiff's disciplinary proceeding, as Plaintiff claims
is required by IDOC departmental rule 504.80. (Doc. 1, p. 4).
the disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff was transferred from
Pinckneyville to an inpatient psychiatric acute care unit at
Dixon, and was on “mandatory suicidal
observation.” (Doc. 1, p. 3). He never received the
summary report of the disciplinary committee during his stay
31, 2015, he filed a grievance over the disciplinary action.
On approximately March 16, 2016, the IDOC's
Administrative Review Board recommended that Plaintiff's
ticket be expunged and his good conduct credits restored.
(Doc. 1, p. 4). Plaintiff attaches a copy of the final
summary report showing that the disciplinary matter was
expunged, and states that his sentence credit was restored to
him. (Doc. 1, p. 5; Doc. 1-1, p. 2). However, Plaintiff
complains that his “suffering for months in segregation
could not be restored[, ] neither the pain and suffering he
experienced at that time.” (Doc. 1, p. 5).
asserts that Heck and Myers' actions subjected him to
cruel and unusual punishment, in that he was placed in
segregation while he was mentally ill. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5). He
states that he “endured days of mental distress, pain
and suffering” while in segregation. (Doc. 1, p. 5). He
further asserts that the Jane Doe Warden and the John/Jane
Doe “Designee”violated his rights by finalizing the
disciplinary report before ensuring that “safeguards
and departmental rules were respected.” Id.
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as
compensatory and punitive damages. (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7).
Review Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it
convenient to divide the prose action into
the following counts. The parties and the Court will use
these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The
designation of these counts does not constitute an opinion as
to their merit. Any other claim that is ...