United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Peoria Division
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
MYERSCOUGH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at Pontiac
Correctional Center brought the present lawsuit pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging excessive force, failure to
intervene, and deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need. The matter comes before this Court for ruling on
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 63). The
motion is denied.
filed a Motion to Correct a Technical Glitch and Motion to
Grant Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 67).
Plaintiff alleges in his motion that a technical glitch
unduly benefited the Defendants by allowing them additional
time to file a response to his motion for summary judgment.
Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a motion for summary
judgment in its Order entered August 8, 2016. (Doc. 62). For
reasons the Court cannot determine, Plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment was not docketed until December 5, 2016.
Once docketed, Defendants had 21 days to file a response.
Defendants filed a timely motion for an extension of time
that was later granted. See Text Order entered
January 6, 2017.
delay that may have occurred in this case is not attributable
to any actions Defendants took. For this reason, and for
those discussed below, Plaintiff's motion is denied.
judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). All facts must be construed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in his favor. Ogden v.
Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In order to be a
“genuine” issue, there must be more than
“some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “Only disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
was incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional Center
(“Pontiac”). Defendants were employed at Pontiac
in the following capacities: Defendant Pfister was the
Warden; Defendant DeLong was a correctional major; Defendants
French and Zook were correctional lieutenants; Defendants
Corley, Mathis, Riccolo, and Loverant were correctional
officers; Defendant Angus was a mental health professional;
and, Defendant Chicke was a medical technician. Outside of
this, the parties agree on very little.
support of his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff points
to several documents: (1) a Crisis Watch Record that states
that Plaintiff was placed on suicide watch on July 15, 2013
after he was seen on video attempting to tie a noose around
his neck and stated that he had “nothing to live
for” (Doc. 65 at 12); (2) medical records disclose that
Defendant Angus approved a stripped cell after Plaintiff
tried to cover his cell window with a smock, and that
Defendant Chicke checked Plaintiff's vital signs the same
day (Doc. 65 at 13-14); (3) the Cumulative Counseling Summary
indicates that Defendant Pfister saw Plaintiff during a
Warden's tour and that Plaintiff made no requests (Doc.
65 at 15); and, (4) a Mental Health Progress Note discloses
that, on July 17, 2013, Plaintiff complained of
“injuries that occurred during watch placement.”
includes an affidavit from another inmate that states the
inmate heard Plaintiff “begging the C/O to stop hitting
him and to allow the other C/O to cuff him up.” (Doc.
65 at 18). Finally, Plaintiff submitted a photograph of his
arm that apparently shows his injuries. (Doc. 65 at 17).
Defendants have not moved for summary judgment.
Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force, the relevant
inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (citation
omitted); see DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607
(7thCir. 2000) (applying Hudson). In
making this determination, the court may examine several
factors, “including the need for an application of
force, the relationship between that need and the force
applied, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible
officers, the efforts made to temper the severity of the
force employed, and the extent of the injury suffered by the
prisoner.” Dewalt, 224 F.3d at 619.
Significant injury is not required, but “a claim
ordinarily cannot ...