United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Rock Island Division
DEANGELO D. DIXON, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
DARROW UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court are Petitioner DeAngelo Dixon's 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence,
ECF No. 1, and the Respondent the United States'
(“the Government”) Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 4.
For the following reasons, the Government's motion is
GRANTED and Dixon's motion is DENIED.
DeAngelo Dixon was charged with two counts of Bank Robbery by
Force or Violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)
and § 2113(d). Indictment, Cr. ECF No. 1. A jury found
him guilty on both counts. Cr. ECF No. 49. Because he had
multiple convictions for “serious violent
felonies” as defined by 18 U.S.C. §
3559(c)(2)(F)(ii), the Court sentenced Dixon to mandatory
life imprisonment on both counts, to be served concurrently,
in addition to five years of supervised release for each
Count, served concurrently, restitution totaling $36, 704,
and a $200 special assessment. Judgment 2-6, Cr. ECF No. 80.
Dixon appealed from the sentence, and the Seventh Circuit
modified the judgment to reflect that the offense conduct
fell under lesser-included offense § 2113(a) rather than
§ 2113(d). See United States v. Dixon, 790 F.3d
758 (7th Cir. 2015). Dixon's petition for cert to the
Supreme Court was denied on November 2, 2015. Dixon v.
United States, 136 S.Ct. 425 (2015). At all times
relevant to the present motions, Dixon was serving his
sentence at the Federal Correctional Complex in Coleman, FL
(“FCC Coleman”). He has since been transferred to
USP Lee in Jonesville, Virginia. 17-4024 Change of Address
Notification, ECF No. 3.
Court received and docketed Dixon's first § 2255
motion (Case No. 16-4250) on November 9, 2016. Dixon's
motion rests on various ineffective assistance of counsel
arguments and a claim under Johnson v. United
States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), see 16-4250 Mot.
Vacate 7- 13, ECF No. 1, and requests that the Court vacate
Dixon's sentence and conviction and remand the case for a
new trial or sentence. Id. at 13. The Motion
contains a declaration signed by Dixon under penalty of
perjury, stating that he placed the § 2255 motion into
the prison mailing system on November 1, 2016. Id.
at 6. The envelope was postmarked on November 4, 2016.
16-4250 Envelope, Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-1.
then filed another, second § 2255 motion (Case No.
17-4024) with the Court on January 24, 2017. The motion
appears to be identical to the first, though Dixon has added
a “Supplemental Brief” with an extra legal
argument for ineffective assistance of counsel. 17-4024 Mot.
Vacate 18, ECF No. 1. In this second case, he submitted a
letter motion on February 7, 2017, requesting confirmation
that the Court had received his first § 2255 motion, and
claiming that he attempted to file a motion for extension of
time around October 9 or 10, 2016, but had not received
confirmation that it arrived to the Court. See
17-4024 Ltr. Mot., ECF No. 3. The Court did not, in fact,
receive a motion for extension of time from Dixon. Dixon
alleges that he has been moved into and out of segregated
housing and had trouble accessing the jail mail system, but
that he was able to deliver his first motion to a prison
staff member, who would have made a written log of the date.
Id. at 1. Dixon also alleges in the letter motion
that he mailed his initial § 2255 motion on or around
October 26, 2016. Id. He does not specify which mail
system he used to send the first § 2255 motion. Though
the envelope has “Legal Work” handwritten across
it, there is no other indication on the envelope that a
specialized mailing procedure was used.
10, 2017, the Government filed a Motion to Dismiss and
Response to Dixon's motion, arguing that his initial
filing was procedurally barred due to untimeliness, both as
to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and his claim
based on Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551
Legal Standard for Timely Filing
U.S.C. § 2255, “the federal prisoner's
substitute for habeas corpus, ” Brown v. Rios,
696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012), permits a prisoner
incarcerated pursuant to an Act of Congress to seek that his
sentence be vacated, set aside, or corrected if “the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States, or . . . the court was without
jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or . . . the sentence
was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack[.]” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(a). The statute established a 1-year time period
in which a federal prisoner may file a federal habeas
petition, running from the latest of:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the