United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Rock Island Division
JOHN J. FRAZER, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
DARROW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court are Petitioner Frazer's application to vacate
his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, ECF No. 1, and his
motion to request counsel, ECF No. 6. For the reasons that
follow, his application and his motion to request counsel are
at some point in 2011, Frazer began accessing child
pornography on his laptop using peer-to-peer file-sharing
software. In August 2012, he took pornographic photos of a
minor and posted them on a Russian website. The Danish
national police discovered the pictures and notified the
United States Department of Homeland Security, which
identified Frazer. Homeland Security's investigations
unit obtained and served a search warrant for Frazer's
house. They found child pornography on Frazer's laptop,
including the photos he had taken and posted to the Russian
was charged with the conduct by criminal complaint on August
28, 2012. CR ECF No. 1. An indictment followed on September
19, 2012, CR ECF No. 11, charging Frazer with (I-V) five
counts of sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e); (VI) possession of child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
2252A(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2); and a forfeiture allegation.
Indictment 1-5. On February 6, 2013, Frazer pleaded guilty to
Counts V and VI (the government dismissed I-IV). Plea
Agreement, CR ECF No. 17; Feb. 6 2013 CR Minute Entry. On
June 20, 2013, the Court sentenced Frazer to 300 months on
Count V and 120 months on Count VI to run concurrently, with
a lifetime of supervised release to follow. Jun. 20, 2013 CR
Minute Entry. Written judgment entered on June 25, 2013.
Judgment, CR ECF No. 25. Frazer did not appeal. On May 15,
2014, the government filed a sealed motion. CR ECF No. 33.
After a telephone hearing, Dec. 18, 2014 CR Minute Entry, the
Court reduced Frazer's sentence to 255 months. Amended
judgment entered on December 23, 2014. CR ECF No. 38.
filed the instant § 2255 motion on December 30, 2016.
After being ordered to respond, the government filed a
Response on March 2, 2017. ECF No. 4.
Legal Standard on a Motion to Vacate Sentence Under 28 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 2255, “the federal prisoner's
substitute for habeas corpus, ” Brown v. Rios,
696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012), permits a prisoner
incarcerated pursuant to an Act of Congress to seek that his
sentence be vacated, set aside, or corrected if “the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States, or . . . the court was without
jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or . . . the sentence
was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack[.]” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(a). See Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d
1123, 1124 (7th Cir. 2015) (“As a rule, the remedy
afforded by section 2255 functions as an effective substitute
for the writ of habeas corpus that it largely
replaced.”). When presented with a § 2255 motion,
a district court must hold an evidentiary hearing on the
applicant's claim, and make findings of fact and
conclusions of law. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). However,
“[i]t is well-established that a district court need
not grant an evidentiary hearing in all § 2255
cases.” Martin v. United States, 789 F.3d 703,
706 (7th Cir. 2015). The court need not hold a hearing if
“the motion and the files and records of the case
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).
to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”), a federal prisoner seeking to vacate
his sentence has one year to do so, from the latest of:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the