United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Johnson Coleman, United States District Court Judge
Burton, the defendant, is charged with robbing five banks in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Burton, in a
consolidated pre-trial motion that incorporates several of
his prior pro se filings,  now moves this Court to suppress the
evidence obtained during a search of his residence, to quash
his arrest, and to dismiss the indictment against him. For
the reasons set forth herein, Burton's motion  is
underlying circumstances of this case are set forth in this
Court's prior opinion addressing Burton's first
motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the
search of his residence. This Court incorporates that
description of the facts herein, and adds only those
procedural details that are necessary to the resolution of
the present consolidated motion.
first renews his previously denied motion asking this Court
to suppress all of the evidence obtained as a result of the
search of Burton's residence or, in the alternative,
asking this Court to hold a Franks hearing.
Fourth Amendment generally requires law enforcement to secure
a warrant, particularly describing the place to be searched
and the person or things to be seized, before conducting a
search. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Maryland v. Dyson,
527 U.S. 465, 466, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999).
The essential protection of the warrant requirement lies in
its mandate that the usual inferences reasonable people draw
from evidence must be drawn “by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). A magistrate's
determination of probable cause is given great deference on
review, and the Fourth Amendment requires no more than a
substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover
evidence of a crime. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).
defendant may request an evidentiary hearing to show that a
search warrant was invalid and that the search therefore was
not constitutionally conducted. Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). A
defendant is only entitled to such a hearing, however, upon
making a substantial preliminary showing that the warrant
affidavit contained a false statement or omitted a statement,
the affiant made or omitted the statement either
intentionally or recklessly, and the statement or omission
was material or necessary to the finding of probable cause.
Id. at 155-56.
initial matter, this Court notes that the government has
provided a properly executed copy of the Application and
Affidavit for a Search Warrant at issue in this case, mooting
Burton's argument that the Application and Affidavit was
never properly signed by Agent Doorley. Although Burton
contends that the properly executed search warrant
application “raises new questions” when compared
to the prior unsigned version, he fails to identify what
questions those might be. The version of the search warrant
application that Burton was previously provided with was
stamped “RECEIVED MAY 21 2015, ” was unsigned by
the agent, and appears to bear Magistrate Judge
Schenkier's stamped signature. The version that the
government has just provided, by contrast, was hand-signed by
the agent and Magistrate Judge Schenkier, and is stamped
“FILED MAY 21 2015.” There is no doubt in this
Court's mind that the document, which was fully executed
and filed, provides a valid basis for the search that
occurred in this case.
contends that the search warrant affidavit contains two false
statements. The search warrant affidavit states, in pertinent
CP Clear and Accurint are electronic databases that provide
law enforcement with information about individuals derived
from public records and proprietary sources. Law enforcement
routinely uses these databases to obtain home addresses and
other identifying information for individuals. A search of
these databases show that utility records and credit
reporting records identify BURTON as residing at the Subject
Premises since approximately October 2014.
however, asserts via a pro se affidavit that Agent Doorley
“committed perjury when she stated that a search of
utility bills showed defendant lived at 6741 S. Emerald since
October of 2014. No such bill exists.”
initial matter, this Court notes that the presumption of
validity of an affidavit supporting a search warrant
“cannot be overcome by a self-serving statement which
purports to refute the affidavit.” United States v.
Reed, 726 F.2d 339, 342 (7th Cir. 1984). Burton's
affidavit is therefore incapable of undermining the presumed
validity of Agent Doorley's sworn statement.
Doorley's affidavit, moreover, was not premised on the
existence of the utility bills but instead on the fact that
the CP Clear and Accurint databases showed that utility
records and credit reporting records identified Burton as
living at the subject premises. Burton does not challenge
this account of what the database showed and he does not
question the existence of the credit reporting records that
the agent identified. Therefore, even if Burton's
affidavit was sufficient evidence, Burton still ...