United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
HONORABLE THOMAS M. DURKIN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE .
Sorrentino, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) at Stateville
Correctional Center, alleges that Stateville staff and
medical service providers were deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. See R. 23. Specifically, Sorrentino has
sued Randy Pfister, Statesville's warden at all relevant
times; Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Statesville's
medical services provider; and doctors employed by Wexford,
namely Dr. Saleh Obaisi and Dr. Arthur Funk. See Id.
Wexford has moved to dismiss Sorrentino's claim for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See R. 25. For the following
reasons, Wexford's motion is granted.
12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of the
complaint. See, e.g., Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of
Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir.
2009). A complaint must provide “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), sufficient to
provide defendant with “fair notice” of the claim
and the basis for it. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This standard “demands more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). While “detailed factual allegations”
are not required, “labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The
complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
“‘A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.'” Mann v.
Vogel, 707 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In applying this standard,
the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
Mann, 707 F.3d at 877.
alleges that since early 2015, he has experienced severe pain
in his kidney area and blood in his urine. R. 23 ¶¶
15-16. In February 2015, Sorrentino saw a doctor from the
University of Illinois-Chicago. Id. ¶ 18.
Sorrentino alleges that the “doctor from UIC informed
[him] that the issue of blood in his urine must be addressed
by . . . Dr. Obaisi.” Id.
alleges that there was no follow-up on the UIC doctor's
diagnosis for “several months.” Id.
¶ 18. Sorrentino and his sister made “additional
requests” and “numerous communications”
attempting to have Sorrentino's condition addressed.
Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Eventually in response to
these requests, IDOC Medical Director Dr. Louis Shicker
directed Dr. Funk to examine Sorrentino. Id. ¶
19. Sorrentino saw Dr. Funk in June 2015. Id. ¶
19. Sorrentino alleges that Dr. Funk acknowledged that
Sorrentino likely suffered from a kidney stone or liver
damage but did not order further testing or treatment.
his allegation that Dr. Funk did not order additional tests
or treatment, Sorrentino also alleges that he received a
further examination the next month in July 2015 when he was
sent to a specialist at “Advanced Urology.”
Id. ¶ 25. The specialist diagnosed Sorrentino
with an enlarged prostate and bleeding, and recommended a CT
scan. Id. Sorrentino did not receive this CT scan
until November 2015. Id.
addition to these examinations, Sorrentino also saw Dr.
Obaisi “many times in 2015 and 2016.”
Id. ¶ 20. In December 2015, Dr. Obaisi informed
Sorrentino that the CT scan taken the previous month showed
an obstructed kidney stone. Id. ¶ 26.
Sorrentino alleges that Dr. Obaisi failed to order any
immediate treatment. Id. ¶ 27.
the CT scan, Dr. Obaisi's diagnosis, and “several
additional urgent requests for medical treatment, ”
Sorrentino did not receive any additional treatment until
April 2016 when he was given a second CT scan. Id.
¶¶ 27-28. That scan reconfirmed the presence of a
kidney stone. Id. ¶ 28.
wasn't until July 2016 that Sorrentino had a procedure to
remove the stone. Id. ¶ 29. Sorrentino alleges
that he was told that the stone was “severely impacted,
” meaning that the stone “was present for so long
that it had embedded in the kidney causing scar tissue to
form over the stone, ” such that a “temporary
stent” was necessary. Id. ¶ 29.
Sorrentino also alleges that the stent was supposed to be
removed within two or three weeks, but was not removed until
more than five weeks after the procedure. Id. ¶
30. Despite the stone's removal, Sorrentino alleges that
he continues to experience both kidney pain and blood in his
urine. Id. ¶ 31. He also alleges that ongoing
requests for treatment of the kidney pain and urine in the
blood have been ignored. Id. ¶ 31.
respect to Wexford specifically, Sorrentino alleges that
“Wexford was aware of Mr. Sorrentino's serious
medical conditions through the knowledge, acts, and omissions
of Wexford's authorized agents and employees acting
within the scope of their employment.” Id.
¶ 23. Sorrentino also alleges that “Wexford,
through the acts and omissions of its authorized agents and
employees within the scope of their employment, failed to
ensure that adequate medical care was provided to Mr.
Sorrentino.” Id. ¶ 10.
argues that the 18 month delay from his initial diagnosis in
February 2015 to the procedure to remove the kidney stone in
July 2016, “involves so many instances of delayed
treatment that it is sufficient to establish . . . . a
pattern of delaying necessary medical treatment” by
Wexford. R. 32 at 1, 4. “A local governing body may be
liable for monetary damages under § 1983 if the
unconstitutional act complained of is caused by: (1) an
official policy adopted and promulgated by its officers; (2)
a governmental practice or custom that, although not
officially authorized, is widespread and well settled; or (3)
an official with final policy-making authority.”
Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 604
F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Monell v. Dep't
of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690
(1978)). Like municipalities, “[p]rivate corporations
acting under color of state law may [also] . . . be held
liable for injuries resulting from their policies and
practices.” Rice v. Correctional Med. Servs. of
Ill., Inc., 675 F.3d 650, 675 (7th Cir. 2012); see
also Shields v. Ill. Dep't of Corrections, 746 F.3d
782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Most defendants under §
1983 are public employees, but private companies and their
employees can also act under color of state law and thus can
be sued under § 1983.”). To claim Monell ...