United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Rojas brought this suit against X Motorsport, Inc., an
automobile dealership, alleging violations of the Truth in
Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601
et seq., the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq.,
and state law. Doc. 1. After X Motorsport moved for summary
judgment, Doc. 14, Rojas sought and was granted time to take
additional discovery, Docs. 18, 21, voluntarily dismissed his
ECOA and state law claims, Docs. 34-35, and cross-moved for
partial summary judgment as to liability on the TILA claim,
Doc. 41. During briefing on the cross-motions, X Motorsport
moved to strike several pieces of evidence that Rojas cited.
Doc. 45. X Motorsport's summary judgment motion is
granted, Rojas's motion for partial summary judgment is
denied, and X Motorsport's motion to strike is denied as
considering Rojas's summary judgment motion, the facts
are considered in the light most favorable to X Motorsport,
and when considering X Motorsport's motion, the facts are
considered in the light most favorable to Rojas. See
Cogswell v. CitiFinancial Mortg. Co., 624 F.3d 395, 398
(7th Cir. 2010) (“When the district court decides
cross-motions for summary judgment … we construe all
facts and inferences therefrom in favor of the party against
whom the motion under consideration is made.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Because granting X
Motorsport's summary judgment motion disposes of the
case, the following relates the facts in the light most
favorable to Rojas. See Garofalo v. Vill. of Hazel
Crest, 754 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 2014). On summary
judgment, the court must assume the truth of those facts, but
does not vouch for them. See ibid.
January 14, 2016, Rojas agreed to purchase a used Volkswagen
sedan from X Motorsport for $29, 142.67. Doc. 15 at
¶¶ 6-7; Doc. 52 at ¶¶ 6-7. The Standard
Buyers Order (“SBO”) that Rojas signed that day
called for a down payment of $9, 183; he paid $7, 000 in cash
and signed two promissory notes, one for $1, 500 due the next
day and the other for $683 due two weeks later. Doc. 15 at
¶ 8; Doc. 52 at ¶ 8. (Rojas did not make good on
either note. Doc. 15 at ¶ 34; Doc. 52 at ¶ 34.) To
cover the remaining $19, 959.67, and at the same time he
signed the SBO, Rojas signed a retail installment sale
contract (“RISC”), which required him to make 72
monthly payments of $460.34 payable to X Motorsport or its
assignee. Doc. 15 at ¶ 9; Doc. 52 at ¶ 9; Doc. 54
at ¶¶ 7, 10; Doc. 54-2 at 7. The RISC identified X
Motorsport as a “Seller-Creditor.” Doc. 54 at
contained the following clause, which conveyed that the SBO
would not remain binding if X Motorsport was unable to assign
the RISC to a third-party financer:
If purchaser is buying the Vehicle in a credit sale
transaction with Dealer evidenced by a signed [RISC], this
Agreement is binding when the [RISC] is signed, but will not
remain binding if a third party finance source does not agree
to purchase the [RISC] executed by Purchaser and Dealer based
on this Agreement.
Doc. 15 at ¶ 11; Doc. 52 at ¶ 11. The SBO also
contained this clause:
If for any reason you and we do not complete the Vehicle sale
and purchase, financing is not obtained, or this Agreement is
declared void, this section applies. You will return the
Vehicle to us. You will pay us on demand all reasonable
charges and expenses for any damage to the Vehicle.
Doc. 15 at ¶ 12; Doc. 52 at ¶ 12. And the SBO
contained a merger clause: “[T]his Agreement …
comprises, with any [RISC], the complete and exclusive
statement of the terms of the agreement relating to the
subject matters covered by this Agreement.” Doc. 54 at
¶ 6; Doc. 54-2 at 2.
addition to the SBO, the RISC, and the two promissory notes,
Rojas signed a “Sold As-Is Rider, ” agreeing that
the sale was final and that the vehicle could not be returned
for any reason, and an “Immediate Delivery Agreement,
” which allowed him to take possession of the vehicle
on the spot while specifying the circumstances under which X
Motorsport could repossess it-one of which was X
Motorsport's failure to assign the RISC to a third party.
Doc. 15 at ¶¶ 13-15; Doc. 52 at ¶¶ 13-15;
Doc. 54 at ¶¶ 11-12, 16.
left with the car, but on his way home it began making
worrisome noises. Doc. 15 at ¶ 16; Doc. 52 at ¶ 16.
He reported the problem to X Motorsport, which told him to
bring the car back. Doc. 15 at ¶ 17; Doc. 52 at ¶
17. Over the next few days, Rojas and X Motorsport's
finance manager, Zaia Rasho, tried unsuccessfully to arrange
a time for Rojas to bring in the car. Doc. 15 at ¶ 18;
Doc. 52 at ¶ 18. Rasho then asked if Rojas whether he
would prefer to “just … give the vehicle back,
” and Rojas responded, “Yeah, let me just get my
money back. Let's rip up this contract and I'll give
you your car back … .” Doc. 15 at ¶¶
18-19; Doc. 52 at ¶¶ 18-19. X Motorsport agreed to
allow Rojas to return the car and made arrangements for him
to do so on January 23. Doc. 15 at ¶¶ 20-21; Doc.
52 at ¶¶ 20-21.
January 23 appointment did not go smoothly. Rojas did not
have the car with him, and he balked at receiving his refund
as a check and not in cash. Doc. 15 at ¶¶ 26-27,
30-31; Doc. 52 at ¶¶ 26-27, 30-31. Confusion
ensued. Doc. 15 at ¶¶ 32-33; Doc. 52 at
¶¶ 32-33. Rojas eventually returned the vehicle to
X Motorsport on February 13, 2016, and got back his down
payment a few days later. Doc. 15 at ¶¶ 35-36; Doc.
52 at ¶¶ 35-36.
foregoing is all undisputed. The parties dispute only whether
X Motorsport secured third-party financing for Rojas's
purchase (in other words, whether X Motorsport assigned the
RISC to a third party)-Rojas says no, and X Motorsport says
yes-and, if not, whether X Motorsport told Rojas about the
rejection of his financing-Rojas says yes, and X Motorsport
says no. Doc. 15 at ¶¶ 10, 29; Doc. 52 at
¶¶ 10, 29; Doc. 54 at ¶¶ 25, 28; Doc. 57.
X Motorsport has moved to strike certain evidence adduced by
Rojas that is relevant to those factual disputes. Doc. 45.
The court will assume that the challenged ...