United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
G. Martin Magistrate Judge.
OPINION AND ORDER
H. LEFKOW U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
Outley's fourth amended complaint against the City of
Chicago and individual officials of its Department of Water
alleges discrimination on the basis of race, as well as
retaliation, in violation of Titles VI and VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, respectively 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d
et seq. and 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1983. He also asserts a claim of
negligent supervision in violation of Illinois
Defendants move to dismiss parts of the fourth amended
complaint on the bases that Outley has failed to state a
valid Title VI claim, his negligent supervision claim is
barred by Illinois law, and certain of his claims are
time-barred. For the reasons stated below, the motion is
court described the factual background in its Opinion and
Order of March 10, 2015 (Order) (dkt. 71) and will not repeat
it here. Where the fourth amended complaint has added
additional allegations that bear on the motion to dismiss,
they will be discussed as necessary.
The Title VI Claim
VI prohibits unlawful discrimination in all
federally-assisted programs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Outley
alleges that the City is a recipient of federal assistance in
a variety of public programs and it has discriminated against
African-American employees in the Water Department (as
alleged in support of his Title VII claims); therefore, the
City has violated Title VI. (Dkt. 118 ¶¶ 67-81.)
Outley fails to recognize that Title VI is not “another
way to reach discrimination in employment practices.”
Ahern v. Board of Educ., 133 F.3d 975, 977 (7th Cir.
1998). To the contrary, “Title VI [provides no]
judicial remedy for employment discrimination by institutions
receiving federal funds unless (1) providing employment is a
primary objective of the federal aid, or (2) discrimination
in employment necessarily causes discrimination against the
primary beneficiaries of the federal aid.” Id.
at 978 (quoting Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center,
Inc., 590 F.2d 87, 89 (4th Cir. 1978). Neither of these
exceptions is apparent within the fourth amended complaint.
At least, Outley has not alleged any logical connection
between his employment situation and the primary objectives
or beneficiaries of any of the City's federally-assisted
programs. See Commodari v. Long Island Univ., 89
F.Supp.2d 353, 378 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). Rather, Outley is
asserting a straightforward claim explicitly authorized by
Title VII of the same civil rights act. The Title VI claim
is, at best, superfluous in any event, as he could receive no
further relief than is available via his Title VII and §
count V must be dismissed.
The Negligent Supervision Claim
negligent supervision claim arises from his allegations of
race discrimination including failure to promote, disparate
treatment, and retaliatory harassment. (Dkt 118
¶¶ 82- 88.) The City argues that this claim should
be dismissed because (1) it is barred by § 2-201 of the
Illinois Tort Immunity Act (TIA), see 745 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 10/2-201; (2) the court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over the claim pursuant to the exclusivity
provision in the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA),
see 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-111(D); or (3) it is
preempted by the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act
(IWCA), see 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 305/5(a). Because
the argument that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction
under the IHRA is dispositive, the court does not address the
8-111(D) of the IHRA states that “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by law, no court of this state shall have
jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil rights
violation other than as set forth in this Act.”
Therefore, if Outley's negligent supervision claim seeks
redress for a “civil rights violation” as defined
by the IHRA,  before he can bring the claim in court, he
must satisfy the administrative procedures set forth in the
Act, which he does not allege that he has done. Garcia v.
Vill. of Mount Prospect, 360 F.3d 630, 640 (7th
Cir.2004) (“[T]he Act also limits the jurisdiction of
Illinois courts, mandating that any party seeking to pursue a
civil-rights claim in Illinois must first exhaust
administrative remedies under the Act . . . .”);
see also Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d
451, 458-59 (7th Cir.1994).
for negligent supervision falls within the bounds of the IHRA
where “the IHRA ‘furnish[es] the legal duty that
the defendant was alleged to have breached.'”
Bannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 503 F.3d 623, 630 (7th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444
F.3d 593, 604 (7th Cir. 2006)) (alteration in original).
Because Outley's allegations of negligent supervision are
based entirely on the City's duty to protect him from
racial discrimination and retaliation, he cannot
“establish the necessary elements of the tort
independent of any legal duties created by the [IHRA],
” Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21, 24,
177 Ill.2d 511, 227 Ill.Dec. 98 (1997), and, therefore, his
claim is preempted by that Act and must be dismissed.