United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
STACI M. YANDLE U.S. District Judge.
before the Court for preliminary review is the First Amended
Complaint filed by Plaintiff Antoine Ford. (Doc. 8).
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional
Center. He brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against two co-chairs of Menard's
Adjustment Committee, Kent Brookman and Tracey Lee. Plaintiff
claims that they denied him credit for time he spent in
investigative segregation when they punished him with one
month of segregation for trafficking and trading in September
2015. (Doc. 8, p. 5). Plaintiff remained in segregation for a
total of fifty days instead of thirty. Id. The
conditions he encountered there were allegedly deplorable.
Id. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and a prison
transfer. (Doc. 8, p. 6).
First Amended Complaint is now subject to review under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening - The court shall review,
before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as
practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal - On review, the
court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint-
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an
objective standard that refers to a claim that any reasonable
person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209
F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of
entitlement to relief must cross “the line between
possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At
this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se
complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v.
Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir.
2009). The First Amended Complaint survives screening under
his incarceration at Stateville Correctional Center
(“Stateville”), Plaintiff was placed in
segregation under investigative status on August 2, 2015.
(Doc. 8, p. 5). He transferred to Menard Correctional Center
(“Menard”) two days later while still under
investigation. Id. Following the investigation and a
hearing before Menard's Adjustment Committee, Plaintiff
was found guilty of trafficking and trading and punished with
thirty days of segregation. Id.
date he received this punishment, Plaintiff had already spent
twenty-eight days in segregation. (Doc. 8, p. 5). He asked
Co-Chairs Brookman and Lee whether he would receive a credit
for the time he had already spent there. Id. He
complained that the conditions in segregation were
allegedly told the defendants that he was confined to a cell
in Menard's North 2 Cell House with a steel door and
virtually no air circulation. (Doc. 8, p. 5). For a week
after transferring there, Plaintiff could not clean himself.
Id. The prison did not issue him any soap, and he
had no access to his property or money. Id. He could
not purchase his own hygiene supplies. Id. The
faucet in his cell was covered in mold, and there was no
running cold water. Id.
allegedly soared during the same time period, with the heat
index exceeding 100 degrees (Doc. 8, p. 5). He developed
chest pains and was sent to the prison's health care unit
for treatment of heat exhaustion. Id.
he began using toilet water to clean himself and to cool
down. (Doc. 8, p. 5). He received only one shower per week.
Id. He was allowed to attend yard only once during
this time period. Id. Plaintiff claims that he
complained about these conditions and the fact that it
exacerbated his bipolar disorder to “authorities,
” including Brookman, Lee, and a
argued that the administrative code called for a credit of
the time he had already spent in segregation toward his
punishment. (Doc. 8, p. 5). Brookman agreed that Plaintiff
should receive a twenty-eight day credit against his
punishment. Id. However, Lee disagreed and indicated
that the punishment did not begin until the date Plaintiff
received his disciplinary ticket. Id. As for the
conditions that Plaintiff described, Lee told Plaintiff to
“man up, ” after stating that he heard Plaintiff
“didn't last” one hour “behind that
door” before crying. Id.
to Plaintiff's calculation, he should have been released
from segregation on September 2, 2015, but wasn't
released until September 20, 2015 (Doc. 8, p. 5). He now
asserts claims against both defendants for depriving him of a
protected liberty interest without due process of law in
violation of the Fourteenth ...