United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Urbana Division
NEVIN L. LENTON, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
DARROW, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court is Petitioner Nevin Lenton's 28 U.S.C. §
2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, ECF
No. 3. For the foregoing reasons, Lenton's petition is
November 14, 2013, Lenton pled guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1),
attempted bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), and
attempted aggravated bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2113(a) and (d). Plea Agreement, Case No.
2:12-cr-20081, Cr. ECF No. 19. The Court accepted the plea and
entered judgment against him on November 15, 2013. Judgment,
Cr. ECF No .28. The parties agreed that Lenton was an armed
career criminal pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act
(“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), because he had three
prior convictions that counted as violent felonies under the
Act. PSR ¶ 45, Cr. ECF No. 26. Two of those felonies
were burglaries, one in Illinois and one in Georgia.
Id. at ¶¶ 50-51. The parties ultimately
agreed that with the ACCA enhancement, an offense level of
31, and a criminal history category of VI, the appropriate
sentence was 188 months-the low end of the guideline range.
16, 2016, Lenton filed his § 2255 petition, arguing that
due to the Supreme Court's holding in Johnson v.
United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), his predicate
offenses no longer count as violent felonies under the ACCA,
and that he no longer qualifies as an armed career criminal.
See Mot. Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, ECF
No. 3. The Government responded to Lenton's petition,
arguing that Lenton is not entitled to relief because
“his claim is (1) waived; (2) procedurally defaulted;
(3) untimely; and (4) barred by the concurrent-sentence
doctrine.” Gov't Resp., ECF No. 8. Lenton, via his
appointed counsel, then filed a response acknowledging that
the claim is time-barred due to Lenton's plea agreement
and therefore procedurally defaulted. Pet'r's Reply
2, ECF No. 10.
Legal Standard on a Petition Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”) governs the procedure by which a
federal prisoner may file successive habeas corpus petitions
challenging his criminal sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
AEDPA established a 1-year time period in which a federal
prisoner may file a federal habeas petition, running from the
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).