United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. ROSENSTENGEL, United States District Judge
Stephen McCaskill, an inmate of the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), previously incarcerated at
Shawnee Correctional Center (“Shawnee”), has
brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff claims that the defendants
violated his federal constitutional rights by incarcerating
him beyond the date he was eligible for mandatory supervised
release (“MSR”). Plaintiff is no longer
incarcerated, though he was at the time he filed this
lawsuit, so this Court will conduct a preliminary review of
the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which
(a) Screening - The court shall review,
before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as
practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal - On review, the
court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint-
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an
objective standard that refers to a claim that “no
reasonable person could suppose to have any merit.”
Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir.
2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross
“the line between possibility and plausibility.”
Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is plausible on
its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations
as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th
Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or
implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a
plaintiff's claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574,
581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not
accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a
cause of action or conclusory legal statements.”
Id. At the same time, however, the factual
allegations of a pro se complaint are to be
liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance
Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits,
the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its authority
under § 1915A; certain claims in this action are subject
Complaint (Doc. 1), Plaintiff alleges the following: on
October 26, 2015, he informed the counselor that he had
submitted parole plans for two different parole sites every
week for almost three months. (Doc. 1, p. 6). Plaintiff told
Counselor Nance this information, and Nance looked at the
computer only to find that no new sites were recorded, only
Plaintiff's brother's house, which was pending, and
another in Cicero, Illinois, that had been denied in July.
Id. The sites Plaintiff had submitted plans for were
St. Leonard's House and CG&G Associates, in Chicago
and Chicago Heights, Illinois, respectively. Id.
Plaintiff's parole date was on November 6, 2015, so he
believes Field Services employees were unprofessional,
deliberately indifferent, biased, hateful, and careless, as
well as in violation of IDOC policies, in their failure to
log the proposed sites submitted by Plaintiff. Id.
The counselor did not attempt to help Plaintiff after he made
this discovery, despite Plaintiff's request that he call
Field Services to resolve the issue.
also wrote to Nolen in Field Services and Counselor Lynn
about the issue, and he spoke to Bob Allard, the Supervisor
of Clinical Services, who wrote Plaintiff's name down and
stated he had seen something from Plaintiff. Id.
Allard told Plaintiff that he would send him the papers he
needed to fill out for a new parole site, but he never did.
Id. Counselor Seips also failed to respond to
several requests Plaintiff submitted to her regarding his
parole site and asking her to send him parole resident
request forms. (Doc. 1, p. 7). Defendant Nance did not
respond to a grievance that Plaintiff handed him on October
26, 2015. Id. Field Services similarly did not
respond to approximately fifteen request slips from Plaintiff
to be placed on their call line in order to get his parole
situation resolved. Id. On November 6, 2015,
Plaintiff's parole was considered violated by the
Springfield Prison Review Board (“PRB”) for his
failing to have a place of residency to parole to, though
Plaintiff believes this was due to Field Services failing to
enter Plaintiff's requested parole sites. (Doc. 1, p. 8),
On December 4, 2015, Plaintiff saw Counselor Reeder and
informed her that his parole date was passed and that he had
placed slips to Field Services to parole to a halfway house.
(Doc. 1, p. 7). Reeder told Plaintiff he could not parole to
a halfway house because he is a sex offender, which Plaintiff
knows to be false because the halfway houses he requested
accept sex offenders. (Doc. 1, pp. 7-8). Reeder then told
Plaintiff that he had been put in for a halfway house, and
when Plaintiff questioned why a murderer was approved to
parole to a halfway house before him, Reeder stated loudly,
in front of other prisoners, that it was because the other
inmate is a murderer, and Plaintiff is a sex offender. (Doc.
1, p. 8). This put Plaintiff in a very dangerous situation,
and several inmates called Plaintiff a rapist and pedophile
and looked at him “crazy.” Id. Plaintiff
believes Reeder's actions violated the Privacy Act.
December 3, 2015, Plaintiff received a Prison Review Board
Notice of Parole/MSR Violation Hearing. Id. On
December 9, 2015, the hearing was held, and Plaintiff was
served with a Parole Violation Report that was typed up by
Parole Agent Pate on November 6, 2015, and signed by the
Parole Supervisor Akpore on November 8, 2015. Id.
The report stated that Plaintiff had been charged with
failure to comply with MSB rule number 5, failure to provide
a host site for intensive supervision. (Doc. 1, pp. 8-9). The
report was false, as Plaintiff had provided host sites, but
they were never entered into the computer by Nolen. (Doc. 1,
p. 9). Plaintiff believes Pate and Akpore fabricated the
report to cover up the situation and deprive Plaintiff of his
constitutional right to be free. Id. Pate stated
that no suitable site could be found, and also stated that
the parole agency attempted to place Plaintiff at all of the
places IDOC would pay for, but these paid placements could
not accept Plaintiff for any number of reasons. Id.
As far as the residences of Plaintiff's family members,
Pate said these sites did not provide adequate, intensive
supervision and were not acceptable. Id. Plaintiff
claims that these excuses are lies often told to keep sex
offenders incarcerated. Id.
December 9, 2015, Plaintiff received a memorandum from Julie
Tanner in the Records Office telling Plaintiff to provide
Field Services with the information of any other parole site
Plaintiff wanted to be checked. (Doc. 1, p. 10). Plaintiff
submitted a site, Community Care Nursing Home in Chicago,
Illinois, that same day. Id. On January 12, 2016,
Plaintiff saw Counselor Reeder and asked her to check whether
Field Services had entered Plaintiff's new parole site
request into the computer. Id. Reeder showed
Plaintiff that they had not entered any that would accept
requests monetary damages from the defendants. (Doc. 1, p.
on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it
convenient to divide this pro se action
into four counts. The parties and the Court will use these
designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless
otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court.
Count 1 - Defendants subjected Plaintiff to
cruel and unusual punishment contrary to the Eighth Amendment
by failing to release him on his MSR date.
Count 2 - Defendants deprived Plaintiff of a
liberty interest without due process, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, when they failed to release him on his
Count 3 - Defendants violated
Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights
by treating prisoners who are not sex offenders differently
than sex offender prisoners, including Plaintiff.
Count 4 - Reeder violated the Privacy Act (5
U.S.C. § 552a(b)) by stating that Plaintiff is a sex
offender within ...