United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
DONALD W. TERRELL, Plaintiff,
PHIL MARTIN, SLICHENMYER, and HEAP Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MICHAEL J. REAGAN U.S. Chief District Judge
Donald Terrell, an inmate in Robinson Correctional Center,
brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional
rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks
compensatory damages. This case is now before the Court for a
preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, which provides:
(a) Screening - The court shall review,
before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as
practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal - On review, the
court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint-
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an
objective standard that refers to a claim that any reasonable
person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209
F.3d 1025, 1026- 27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of
entitlement to relief must cross “the line between
possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At
this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se
complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v.
Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir.
careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits,
the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its authority
under § 1915A; this action is subject to summary
April 10, 2017, Plaintiff received notice from the State of
Illinois Health Services Administration advising him that his
medical information was released for use in a proposal. (Doc.
1, p. 5). The letter further advised him that the information
was compromised and deleted. Id. It was signed by
Phil Martin, the Health Care Administrator. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that Slichenmyer and Heap also have access
to his medical records. Id. Plaintiff has HIV/AIDS
and does not want his medical information disclosed.
Id. He discussed this incident with the defendants
but they told him that he had no rights in this situation,
and that they had the authority to release his medical
records without his consent. (Doc. 1, pp. 4-5).
alleges that he filed a grievance on this incident. (Doc. 1,
p. 4). The grievance is “still pending final
Court will not analyze the substance of Plaintiff's
Complaint at this time because it is apparent from the
Complaint itself that he has not exhausted his administrative
remedies prior to filing suit. The Seventh Circuit has been
clear that the proper step in that situation is to dismiss
the case without prejudice, even if a plaintiff exhausts his
remedies while the suit is pending. Perez v. Wisconsin
Dept. of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999).
The purpose of this requirement is to “keep the
courthouse door closed” while the administrative
process runs its course in order not to undercut the
administrative process. Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d
395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004).
to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and while typically the
issue is one for defendants to raise, the Court may invoke an
affirmative defense on behalf of an un-served defendant if it
is clear from the face of the complaint that the defense
applies. Walker v. Thomspon, 288 F.3d 1005, 1009
(7th Cir. 2002); Gleash v. Yuswak, 308 F.3d 758, 760
(7th Cir. 2002); see also Franklin v. McCaughtry,
110 F. ...