United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Robert Blakey United States District Judge.
Itemid Al Mater (“Plaintiff”) has brought various
constitutional claims against both individual Chicago Police
Officers and the City of Chicago, pursuant to Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Currently
pending before the Court is the City's motion to dismiss
Plaintiff's Monell claim.  at 1-13. The
motion is denied, for the reasons explained below.
4, 2015, Plaintiff passed several Chicago Police Officers on
the stairs of the train stop located at the intersection of
State Street and Lake.  at 2. After she had walked passed
the officers, they followed her up the stairs, threw her to
the ground, and ripped off her hijab and niqab. Id.
This use of force was unprovoked. Id. at 3.
Plaintiff claims that the individual officers are liable for,
inter alia, use of excessive force, failure to
intervene, false arrest, unlawful search, and violation of
her freedom of religious expression. See generally
 at 1-8.
respect to the City specifically, Plaintiff claims that it
“has failed to monitor, supervise or train [its]
officers, ” and that this “lack of supervision
and training fosters a climate in the ranks of Chicago Police
Department that if a citizen's rights are violated they
do not have to report it, can look the other way and maintain
a code of silence.”  at 9. Plaintiff additionally
alleges that the City has failed to adequately train its
officers regarding “the sensitivity of religious
expression and freedom.” Id. at 10.
support of these more general allegations, Plaintiff claims
• The individual officers involved in the July 4
incident “have over thirty-five (35) complaint
registers lodged against them, ” including one for
impermissible use of force against Defendant Borchardt that
• The jury verdict in Obrycka v. City of
Chicago, Case No. 07-cv-2372 (N.D. Ill.) and comments
from Mayor Rahm Emanuel confirm the existence of a
“code of silence” at the Chicago Police
• Since “2009, the Council for American-Islamic
Relations (CAIR) in Chicago has recorded and lodged into its
organization over 50 incidents against Chicago Police for
what appears to be Islamic targeting.”
Id. at 9-10.
concludes by alleging that the “persistent and defiant
code of silence was a moving force behind” the
constitutional harms she suffered, and as a “result of
the customs, policies and practices for the City of Chicago
and [its] failure to train, ” the individual officers
“ignored the rights of the Plaintiff, ” as
described throughout the Amended Compliant. Id. at
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “challenges the
sufficiency of the complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.” Gen. Elec.
Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074,
1080 (7th Cir. 1997). To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must first provide a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), such that the
defendant is given “fair notice” of what the
claim is “and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
the complaint must contain “sufficient factual
matter” to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570). That is, the allegations must raise the possibility of
relief above the “speculative level.”
E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs. Inc., 496 F.3d
773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). The plausibility standard “is
not akin to a ‘probability requirement, ' but it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Williamson v. Curran, 714
F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2013). The “amount of factual
allegations required to state a plausible claim for relief
depends on the complexity of the legal theory alleged,
” but “threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do