United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
CRAIG N. EVANS, Petitioner,
GREGORY SCOTT, Program Director, Rushville Treatment/Detention Center, Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HERNDON, United States District Judge
Craig N. Evans was civilly committed under the Illinois
Sexually Violent Persons (SVP) Commitment Act, 725 ILCS
207/1, et seq., in 2005. Ten years later, he filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254.
matter is now before the Court on respondent's Motion to
Dismiss Amended Habeas Corpus Petition. (Doc. 22). Petitioner
responded to the motion at Doc. 24.
Asserted for Habeas Relief
original petition sets forth four grounds for habeas relief:
1. The State was required to prove lack of ability to control
dangerous sexual behavior for this type of civil commitment.
Petitioner's lawyer “misinformed him that the State
‘could prove all requirements at trial' including
that ‘lack of control is implicit in the mental
disorder diagnosis from the DSM manual.'”
2. The State sought to prove that petitioner was
substantially probable to reoffend by the testimony of an
expert witness who relied on “risk assessment tools,
” but the risk assessment tools do not detect or
measure the presence of or the severity of a mental disorder.
His original commitment and annual continuance of commitment
are predicated on the use of these tools.
3. The state used a doctor who was a Psy.D, and not an M.D.,
to diagnose petitioner with a mental abnormality. “The
petitioner's liberty has been taken away from him based
on an unqualified diagnosis by an unqualified non-medical
doctor. Had appointed counsel at the 2005 proceedings been
effective and challenged the State's evidence, the
outcome would have been different.” Further, petitioner
“does not suffer from any acquired or congenital brain
abnormality as is absolutely required by the Act.”
4. Petitioner served six years imprisonment for his crimes,
and the State's use of the “same fact
pattern” to civilly commit him is a double jeopardy
Facts and Procedural History
was convicted of Aggravated Criminal Sexual Abuse, Aggravated
Sexual Abuse and Predatory Criminal Sexual Assault. He was
sentenced to six years imprisonment in the Illinois
Department of Corrections on each conviction, to be served
concurrently. See, Doc. 21, Ex. 1, p. 1.
of the docket sheet from the civil commitment proceeding,
In re Evans, Wabash County Circuit Court, Case No.
2005-MR-5, is attached to respondent's Motion to Dismiss,
Doc. 22, as Exhibit 1. This docket sheet was obtained from
the website judici.com. According to the docket sheet, the
State filed a Petition for Sexually Violent Person Commitment
in March 2005. The petition was granted on October 11, 2005.
Doc. 22, Ex. 1, p. 5.
six-month reevaluation was done and, in April 2006, the court
entered an order finding no probable cause to believe that
petitioner was no longer a sexually violent person.
Thereafter, annual reevaluations were done. Upon each annual
review, the court found there was no probable cause to
believe that petitioner was no longer a sexually violent
docket sheet attached to Doc. 22 goes through December 16,
2016. The most recent annual review reflected on that exhibit
took place in July 2016. Once again, the court found no
probable cause to believe that petitioner was no longer a
sexually violent person. Through counsel, Evans filed a
motion to reconsider.
online version of the docket sheet from petitioner's
civil commitment case reflects that his motion to reconsider
the July 2016 order was denied on March 28, 2017. See,
jsp?court =IL093015J&ocl=IL093015J, 2005MR5,
IL093015JL2005MR5D, visited on May 10, 2017. The docket sheet
does not indicate that Evans filed a notice of appeal.
to the original habeas petition, Evans has never filed any
state court action challenging his commitment because
“Under Illinois law [, ] post-conviction, relief from
judgment, and state Habeas are not available to me.”
Doc. 1, p. 6. See also, Doc. 1, p. 8 (“I have no state
court remedies to vacate judgment of commitment.”)
Court denied respondent's previous motion to dismiss as
untimely because, under applicable Seventh Circuit precedent,
a civilly committed person may bring a habeas petition
challenging a subsequent order continuing his commitment.
Each state order continuing the commitment “constitutes
a new judgment for purposes of AEDPA, and therefore starts a
new statute of limitations period.” Martin v.
Bartow, 628 F.3d 871, 874 (7th Cir. 2010). The Seventh
Circuit observed that “To hold otherwise would lead to
one of two absurd results; either [petitioner] could never
challenge an order continuing his commitment that was entered
more than a year after his initial commitment order or the
statute of limitations applicable to his initial commitment
order would never expire.” Ibid.
then filed a motion for more definite statement. The Court
granted that motion and ordered petitioner to file an amended
petition specifying which commitment order he is challenging.
Seeking to cover all bases, petitioner filed an amended
petition stating that he is challenging the ...