United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
S. Shah United States District Judge.
Glenn Evans sues the City of Chicago and several employees of
the city's Independent Police Review Authority, alleging
First Amendment retaliation and various state-law claims.
Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them. For the
following reasons, the motions to dismiss are granted.
survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain factual
allegations that plausibly suggest a right to relief.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The
court must construe all factual allegations as true and draw
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, but
the court need not accept legal conclusions or conclusory
allegations. Id. at 677-79. A plaintiff's
failure to respond to an argument raised in a motion to
dismiss forfeits any argument on that issue. See Alioto
v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“[A] litigant effectively abandons the litigation by
not responding to alleged deficiencies in a motion to
attached to his complaint the ruling from his criminal trial,
[1-1], and he and one of the defendants have also attached
various documents to their briefs on the defendants'
motions to dismiss. See ; .
“[D]ocuments that are attached to the complaint,
documents that are central to the complaint and are referred
to in it, and information that is properly subject to
judicial notice” may be considered on a motion to
dismiss. Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436
(7th Cir. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c). The only documents
meeting these criteria are: (1) the ruling from Evans's
trial, [1-1], which is attached to the complaint; (2)
Evans's complaint to the inspector general, [58-3], and
the articles published by WBEZ, [58-6], which are central to
his complaint and referred to in it; and (3) the appointment
of Fairley to IPRA, [47-2], which is a public record subject
to judicial notice. The other documents and any unsupported
facts in Evans's response brief that were not alleged in
his complaint are not considered.
Glenn Evans is a Chicago police officer. In 2011, he assisted
in processing Rita King, an arrestee. King later sued Evans,
alleging that he pressed his hand against her nose for an
extended period of time. (King's lawsuit, King v.
Evans , Case No. 13-cv-01937 (N.D. Ill.), remains
pending.) The City of Chicago's Independent Police Review
Authority investigated King's allegations, and Evans gave
IPRA a statement in November 2013. IPRA recommended a
fourteen- day suspension for Evans, but the Chicago Police
Department declined to discipline him.
2013, Evans was the subject of another IPRA investigation.
Rickey Williams filed a complaint with IPRA, alleging that
Evans had shoved a gun down Williams's throat and held a
taser to his groin. IPRA investigators had Evans's gun
tested for DNA, and the results revealed Williams's DNA
on the gun. At the time, Martrice Campbell and Vincent Jones
were two of the IPRA investigators working on the Williams
matter. In May 2014, Jones, Campbell, and a Cook
County Assistant State's Attorney met with Williams,
showing him a series of photos to identify the officers
involved in his arrest. Williams misidentified several
officers and identified a “filler” photo, but he
did not identify Evans by photo. He did identify Evans by
name, saying that he found it by searching the Internet with
his girlfriend, who used to be a friend of Evans.
gave the DNA test results and other confidential materials
from the Williams IPRA file to WBEZ reporter Steven
“Chip” Mitchell. On July 30, 2014, Mitchell
contacted Evans for an interview and told him that he
received information from Campbell. The next day, WBEZ and
Mitchell began publishing stories about Evans and allegations
of misconduct, which were picked up by other media outlets.
During the summer of 2014, other allegations of police
misconduct had been highlighted in the media. In September
2014, Evans was indicted for aggravated battery with a deadly
weapon and official misconduct. Evans alleges that these
charges arising out of the Williams incident were “due
to the political pressures facing” the mayor of Chicago
and the Cook County State's Attorney “in light of
police misconduct in the media.”  ¶ 112. He was
placed on no-pay status in October 2014.
2015, Evans filed a complaint with the city's Office of
the Inspector General about IPRA. Evans “complained
about IPRA leaking confidential information to the media and
investigators Jones and Campbell being allowed to participate
in investigations against him despite conflicts of
interest.”  ¶ 116; [58-3]. (In 1999, when
Campbell worked in the administrative office for the Chicago
Police Department, she was suspended after Evans initiated a
complaint register against her for active insubordination.
 ¶¶ 27-30. Evans alleges that he and Jones had
“prior adversarial contact during other IPRA
investigations” but does not elaborate.  ¶ 54.)
bench trial in December 2015, Evans was acquitted of all
criminal charges. [1-1]. He returned to work in April 2016
but was assigned to the Medical Section against his wishes
and was denied back pay for the pendency of his criminal
case. After his return to work, Evans received up to thirty
phone calls from superiors, who pressured him to retire.
Senior Police Command Staff also personally delivered
retirement documents to Evans, but he refused to retire.
2016, Evans received notice that IPRA investigators Linda
Franko and Shannon Hayes alleged that he testified falsely at
his 2013 IPRA interview regarding the King investigation.
(Sharon Fairley had been appointed as Chief Administrator of
IPRA in early 2016. [47-2].) The investigation was reopened
and Evans was ordered to appear for a second interview (which
had yet to occur at the time he filed this complaint). Evans
heard that IPRA was seeking to change its recommendation from
the King investigation from suspension to termination.
after receiving notice that the King investigation was being
reopened, Evans filed this suit. . He brings claims for
retaliatory inducement to prosecute under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against Campbell (Count I) and Fairley, Franko, and
Hayes (Count V). He also brings Illinois state-law claims for
malicious prosecution against Campbell, Jones, and other IPRA
employees (Count II), false light against Campbell (Count
III), tortious interference against all defendants (Count
IV), civil conspiracy against Campbell and Jones (Count VI),
and respondeat superior and indemnification claims against
the City of Chicago (Counts VII and VIII).Defendants now
move to dismiss all claims against them.