United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
R. Herndon United States District Judge
Timothy Maggard, who is currently incarcerated in the Federal
Correctional Institution in Marion, Illinois, filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. (Doc. 1). In the Petition, he argues that under
the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Mathis v.
United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016), his enhanced
career-offender sentence is unconstitutional. (Doc. 1).
commenting on the merits of Petitioner's claims, the
Court concludes that the Petition survives preliminary review
under Rule 4 and Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section
2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.
criminal case in the Western District of Missouri, United
States v. Maggard, No. 6:96-cr-3049-DW (W.D.Mo. July 25,
1997), Petitioner was found guilty of conspiracy to
distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
846. (Doc. 1, p. 10). He was sentenced to 360 months
imprisonment. (Doc. 1, p. 10). The career-offender
enhancement was imposed pursuant to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”) at § 4B1.1,
based on two prior convictions for second degree burglary and
second degree assault. (Doc. 1, p. 13). As a result of the
career-offender determination, Petitioner's total offense
level was determined to be 38. (Doc. 1, p. 13).
appealed his conviction in 1998 and filed a § 2255
petition in 1999. (Doc. 1, p. 11). Both of these efforts
failed. Id. Petitioner also filed a motion to file a
second or successive § 2255 petition in 2016 under
Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), but
his claim was dismissed. Id. Petitioner now argues
that pursuant to Mathis, he should be resentenced
without enhancement because his underlying burglary
conviction does not constitute a crime of violence under the
reasoning in Mathis, as the elements of
Petitioner's underlying offense criminalize a greater
swath of conduct than the elements of the guidelines offense.
(Doc. 1, pp. 11-14).
of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases in United States
District Courts provides that upon preliminary consideration
by the district court judge, “[i]f it plainly appears
from the petition and any attached exhibits that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court,
the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to
notify the petitioner.” Rule 1(b) of those Rules gives
this Court the authority to apply the rules to other habeas
a person may challenge his federal conviction only by means
of a motion brought before the sentencing court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255, and this remedy normally supersedes
the writ of habeas corpus. A § 2241 petition by a
federal prisoner is generally limited to challenges to the
execution of the sentence. Valona v. United States,
138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998); Atehortua v.
Kindt, 951 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1991). Federal
prisoners may utilize § 2241, however, to challenge the
legality of a conviction or sentence in cases under the
“savings clause” of § 2255(e). The savings
clause allows a petitioner to bring a claim under §
2241, where he can show that a remedy under § 2255 is
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention. Id. See also United States v.
Prevatte, 300 F.3d 792, 798-99 (7th Cir. 2002).
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that §
2255 is only inadequate or ineffective when three
requirements are satisfied: 1) the petitioner relies on a new
case of statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional
decision; 2) the case was decided after his first § 2255
motion but is retroactive; and 3) the alleged error results
in a miscarriage of justice. See Brown v. Caraway,
719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013); Brown v. Rios,
696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012). “‘Inadequate
or ineffective' means that ‘a legal theory that
could not have been presented under § 2255 establishes
the petitioner's actual innocence.'” Hill
v. Werlinger, 695 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing
Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir.
2002)); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir.
instant Petition meets the first requirement as
Mathis is clearly a case of statutory
interpretation. See Dawkins v. United States, 829
F.3d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 2016) (Mathis “is a
case of statutory interpretation”); Jenkins v.
United States, No. 16-3441 (7th Cir. Sept. 20, 2016)
(“Mathis is not amenable to analysis under §
2244(b) because it announced a substantive rule, not a
Petition also meets the second requirement. As noted above,
the Seventh Circuit has indicated that Mathis is a
substantive rule. Jenkins v. United States, No.
16-3441 (7th Cir. Sept. 20, 2016). Controlling precedent
indicates that substantive Supreme Court rules are applied
retroactively. See Narvaez v. United States, 674
F.3d 621, 625 (7th Cir. 2011); Montana v. Cross, 829
F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2016).
Court, however, cannot ascertain whether the third
requirement is met. In Mathis, the Supreme Court
held that Iowa's burglary statute did not qualify as a
predicate violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act
(“ACCA”) because it was broader than the
“generic” offense of burglary in §
924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Thus, Mathis focused on what
constitutes a prior violent felony under the ACCA. Notably,
“[t]he Supreme Court's decision in Mathis
dealt with the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), not the
federal sentencing Guidelines.” United States v.
Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569, 574 (5th Cir. 2016). However,
Mathis is likely also applicable to the career
offender guidelines, in that the “decision in
Mathis clarified when and how the modified
categorical approach is applied in the context of federal
sentencing, ” and did not necessarily limit itself to
cases involving the ACCA. Id.
argues that Mathis applies to his case and enables
this Court to review the Western District of Missouri's
determination that his prior burglary offense could act as a
predicate for the career offender enhancement. He argues that
the statute underlying his second degree burglary offense,
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 569.170, is broader than the
“crime of violence” definition under § 4B1.2
of the Guidelines, as he argues was established in United
States v. Smith, 668 F. App'x 653 (7th Cir. 2016),
among other cases. (Doc. 1, p. 12). He further claims that
the facts ...