United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Peoria Division
ANTHONY D. TAYLOR, Petitioner,
JEFFREY KRUEGER Respondent.
ORDER & OPINION
BILLY McDADE United States Senior District Judge
matter is before the Court on Petitioner Anthony Taylor's
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e). (Doc. 4). For the reasons described
below, Petitioner's motion is denied.
1996, a jury convicted Petitioner of conspiracy to distribute
and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and
two counts of distribution of crack cocaine. See
Order (Doc. 12), Taylor v. United States, No.
15-cv-1087-MJR (S.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2016). Petitioner was
found to be a career offender under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1 and was sentenced to a
total of 360 months of imprisonment and five years of
supervised release. Id. Petitioner has exhausted his
direct appeal and his first petition to vacate, set aside, or
correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
September 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit authorized Petitioner a second or successive
§ 2255 based on Johnson v. United
States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). Id. The
court denied Petitioner's second § 2255.
Id. at 20. In doing so, Judge Reagan analyzed
whether Petitioner's prior Illinois conviction for
aggravated battery still qualified as a predicate offense for
a career offender designation. Id. As part of his
analysis, Judge Reagan applied Mathis v. United
States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016). In Mathis, the
United States Supreme Court declared that if a state statute
sets out a single, or “indivisible, ” set of
elements to define a crime, then a court must use the
categorical approach to determine if the state statute's
elements match the elements of the federal generic crime. 136
S.Ct. at 2248. If the state statute lists alternative
elements, and is therefore “divisible, ” a court
may use the “modified categorical approach.”
Id. at 2250. The “modified categorical
approach” allows a court to consult a limited class of
documents to determine which crime and what elements were
used to convict an offender. Id.
order to determine whether Petitioner had a Johnson
claim, Judge Reagan dedicated almost ten pages of his opinion
to performing a Mathis analysis to determine whether
Petitioner's prior conviction was a proper career
offender predicate offense. See Order (Doc. 12),
Taylor v. United States, No. 15-cv-1087-MJR (S.D.
Ill. Sept. 29, 2016). Specifically, Judge Reagan applied
Mathis to Petitioner's 1994 Illinois conviction
for aggravated battery. Id. at 15. Judge Reagan
determined that the Illinois statute was divisible.
Id. He then consulted Petitioner's documents to
determine that Petitioner was convicted under the
“causes bodily harm” prong of the Illinois
statute, which qualifies at a crime of violence for career
offender purposes. Id. at 17. Because Judge Reagan
determined that Petitioner's prior aggravated battery
conviction was a crime of violence and, therefore, a proper
predicate offense for Petitioner's career offender
status, Judge Reagan denied Petitioner's second §
April 10, 2017, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1).
Petitioner argued that under Mathis, his prior
conviction for aggravated battery under 720 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/12-4(b)(8) could no longer qualify as a crime of violence
for career offender status. (Doc. 1 at 7). This Court denied
the Petition because Petitioner failed to meet the second
Davenport requirement. (Doc. 2 at 4). In In re
Davenport, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit established three requirements for a
petitioner to invoke the Savings Clause of 28 U.S.C. §
2255(e), which allows petitioners bring a § 2241
petition instead of a § 2255 motion. 147 F.3d 605,
609-10 (7th Cir. 1998). The second requirement is that the
petitioner must show that he relies on a retroactive decision
that he could not have invoked on his first § 2255.
Because Judge Reagan applied Mathis to conclude that
Petitioner's prior aggravate battery conviction was a
proper predicate offense, this Court found that Petitioner
could not show that he relied on a case that he could not
invoke during his previous § 2255 motion. (Doc. 2 at 4).
April 27, 2017, Petitioner filed this Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e). (Doc. 4). Petitioner argues that he could not have
invoked Mathis during his previous petition because
the Government argued that he lacked jurisdiction to raise it
during a § 2255 claim. (Doc. 4 at 2). Petitioner also
argues that Judge Reagan held that he could not decide
Petitioner's Mathis claim. (Doc. 4 at 2).
Therefore, Petitioner argues that his claim should still be
cognizable as a § 2241 claim.
request to alter or amend judgment filed pursuant to Rule
59(e) may only be granted if a movant clearly establishes
that the court made a manifest error of law or fact, or
presents newly discovered evidence. LB Credit Corp. v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir.
1995). A manifest error is the “wholesale disregard,
misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling
precedent.” Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224
F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A movant may not advance in a Rule 59(e) motion
arguments he should have raised before judgment was entered.
Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, Ill., 487 F.3d 506, 512
(7th Cir. 2007).
does not assert that the Court made a manifest error of law
or fact; nor does Petitioner present newly discovered
evidence. In ruling on his § 2255 motion, Judge Reagan
performed a Mathis analysis of Petitioner's
prior conviction; in fact, he performed the same type of
analysis that Petitioner is asking this Court to do in his
§ 2241 petition. The purpose of the Savings Clause is to
allow a petitioner to seek relief when “limitations
prevent the prisoner from obtaining relief/” In re
Davenport, 147 at 608. It is not to provide petitioners
a second bite at the apple if they do not like the
interpretation the first judge provided. In determining
Petitioner's § 2255 Johnson claim, Judge
Reagan performed the exact Mathis analysis that
Petitioner is currently asking this Court to perform. The
Court declines to give Petitioner a second bite at the apple.
Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show that he was unable
to invoke Mathis during his previous § 2255.
the Court finds it irrelevant Petitioner's argument that
the Government asserted that Petitioner could not present a
Mathis argument, because what the Government argues
is not the relevant inquiry. Furthermore, the Court finds
that Judge Reagan did not hold that Petitioner could not
bring a Mathis claim, as Petitioner so asserts.
Rather, Judge Reagan states that “to the extent that
[Petitioner's] motion to reconsider could be construed as
mounting a fresh collateral attack on his criminal judgment,
it would constitute a successive § 2255 proceeding which
he did not obtain authorization from the Court of Appeals to
pursue.” See Order (Doc. 20), Taylor v.
United States, No. 15-cv-1087-MJR (S.D. Ill. Sept. 29,
has failed to present new evidence or that Petitioner has
committed a manifest error of law or fact in determining that
Petitioner failed to show that he was unable to invoke
Mathis in his previous § 2255 motion.
Petitioner disagrees with the Mathis analysis
performed during his Johnson § 2255 motion; however,