United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
DARRIN W. SHATNER, Plaintiff,
JOSEPH COWAN, ROBERT DILDAY, CEDRIC MCDONNOUGH, DANIEL DUNN, and KEVIN FEDDERKE, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. ROSENSTENGEL United States District Judge.
the Court is a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction filed by
Plaintiff Darrin W. Shatner (“Shatner”) (Doc.
147). Shatner is an inmate with the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”), and Defendants are
employees of the IDOC. On June 23, 2013, Shatner filed a
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1). On
September 28, 2016, the Court granted partial summary
judgment (Doc. 128). The claims that survived summary
judgment relate to the confiscation of Shatner's personal
property at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”)
in September 2012 (Id.). Shatner was transferred
from Menard in January 2013, but returned to Menard in May
2016 (Doc. 96-1 at 83; Doc. 120 at 1). On March 15, 2017,
Shatner filed the instant motion for injunctive
to Shatner's motion, the following events occurred. On
March 8, 2017, Shatner was transferred from the Northern
Reception and Classification Center to Menard. Early the next
morning, Shatner was taken from his cell to be transported to
Peoria for a hearing related to his case with the United
States District Court for the Central District of Illinois.
By this time, Shatner had not slept for forty-eight hours and
had not received his psychiatric medication. Shatner agreed
to settle the case later in the day on March 9, 2017.
Shatner returned to Menard, two correctional officers
escorted Shatner to the segregation unit and assaulted him
with books and chairs. Shatner was then placed in a
segregation cell and informed that he was under
investigation. Shatner was denied access to pen and paper and
deprived of toiletries, bedding, and undergarments. On March
12, 2017, Shatner suffered two seizures as a result of
withdrawal from his psychiatric medication. Shatner was told
that Officer Nagel, who manages the property room for the
segregation unit, had Shatner's property and that Shatner
would receive his property as Officer Nagel saw fit within a
McCarthy and Major Childers drafted the document placing
Shatner under investigatory status on the same day and at the
same time that Shatner settled the case in the Central
District of Illinois. Shatner alleges that the events that
occurred upon his return to Menard constituted retaliation
for litigation and his religious practices and beliefs.
Shatner requests an order for placement into general
population, the return of his property and medication, and
the prohibiting of further assaults. Shatner also requests
that the Court enforce an order from the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Illinois, regarding access to the law library.
purpose of preliminary injunctive relief is ‘to
minimize the hardship to the parties pending the ultimate
resolution of the lawsuit.'” Platinum Home
Mortg. Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 722,
726 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Faheem-El v. Klincar,
841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988)). “In this circuit,
the standards for a TRO and a preliminary injunction are
functionally identical.” Crue v. Aiken, 137
F.Supp.2d 1076, 1082-83 (C.D. Ill. 2001). “In order to
obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show
that: (1) they are reasonably likely to succeed on the
merits; (2) no adequate remedy at law exists; (3) they will
suffer irreparable harm which, absent injunctive relief,
outweighs the irreparable harm the respondent will suffer if
the injunction is granted; and (4) the injunction will not
harm the public interest.” Joelner v. Village of
Washington Park, Illinois, 378 F.3d 613, 619 (7th Cir.
court issues a preliminary injunction in a lawsuit to
preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm until
the court has an opportunity to rule on the lawsuit's
merits.” Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470,
471 (8th Cir. 1994). “Thus, a party moving for a
preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a
relationship between the injury claimed in the party's
motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.”
Id. “A preliminary injunction is appropriate
only if it seeks relief of the same character sought in the
underlying suit and deals with a matter presented in that
underlying suit.” Welch v. Tritt, No.
15-CV-191, 2015 WL 6971312, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 9, 2015)
(citing Kaimowitz v. Orlando, Fla., 122 F.3d 41, 43
(11th Cir. 1997)). “[A] District Court does not have
jurisdiction to award a preliminary injunction for an injury
unrelated to any cause of action found in the
complaint.” Johnson v. City of Rock Island,
Ill., No. 4:11-cv-4058-SLD-JAG, 2012 WL 5425605, at *2
(CD. Ill. 2012) (citing Stewart v. U.S. I.N.S., 762
F.2d 193, 198 (2d Cir. 1985)); see also Lake v.
Robert, Case No. 13-cv-0198-MJR-SCW, 2014 WL 3610405, at
*1 (S.D. Ill. July 22, 2014); Jackson v. Welborn,
No. 12-cv-00961-JPG-PMF, 2013 WL 1287369, at *3 (S.D. Ill.
Mar. 6, 2013).
has not demonstrated a relationship between the allegations
in his motion and those in the complaint. Although the motion
for injunctive relief asserts a claim similar to those
remaining in this case, it focuses on conduct more than four
years removed from that described in the complaint. While the
motion and the complaint both pertain to events that occurred
at Menard, Shatner resided at other correctional facilities
in the interim, from January 2013 to May 2016. Moreover, the
instant motion asserts allegations against individuals who
are not parties to this case. Because the allegations in the
instant motion are unrelated to those in the complaint, the
Court denies Shatner's motion for injunctive relief.
For the reasons set forth above, Shatner's Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 147) is DENIED.
IS SO ORDERED.