United States District Court, C.D. Illinois
ORDER & OPINION
BILLY McDADE United States Senior District Judge
matter is before the Court on Petitioner Anthony Taylor's
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. For the reasons set forth below,
Petitioner's Petition (Doc. 1) is denied.
1996, a jury convicted Petitioner of conspiracy to distribute
and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and
two counts of distribution of crack cocaine. See
Order (Doc. 12), Taylor v. United States, No.
15-cv-1087-MJR (S.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2016). Petitioner was
found to be a career offender under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1 and was sentenced to a
total of 360 months imprisonment and five years of supervised
release. Id. In 1997, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed Petitioner's
conviction. Id. at 2. In 1998, Petitioner filed his
first petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied. Id.
In 2002, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his
§ 2255 petition. Id.
January 2015, Petitioner filed a motion in his criminal case
to reduce his sentence under Amendment 782 to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines, via 18 U.S.C. § 3582.
Id. While the motion was pending, the United States
Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, 135
S.Ct. 2551 (2015). Id. The district court allowed
supplemental briefing on Johnson. The court then
denied the Amendment 782 motion. Id. Within its
order, the court noted that based on the record before it,
Johnson did not provide a basis for a sentence
reduction for Petitioner. Id. However, the court
noted that the order would not preclude Petitioner from
filing a Johnson-based § 2255 motion, if he
received permission from the Court of Appeals. Id.
September 18, 2015, the Seventh Circuit authorized Petitioner
to file a second § 2255 motion based on
Johnson. Id. Petitioner did so and in it,
Petitioner argued that his aggravated battery conviction did
not have an element of violent force and therefore could not
count as a crime of violence. Id. Petitioner also
argued that his burglary conviction did not meet the criteria
for federal burglary. Id.
September 26, 2016, the court denied the second § 2255
motion. Id. at 20. The court found that
Petitioner's burglary conviction clearly counted as a
predicate offense for career offender purposes. Id.
at 10. Then the court examined whether Petitioner's
Illinois aggravated battery conviction was a proper predicate
offense. Id. The court analyzed Petitioner's
predicate offense under Mathis v. United States, 136
S.Ct. 2243 (2016), and found that Petitioner's aggravated
battery conviction was a crime of violence for career
offender purposes. Id. at 11-17. Therefore, because
both of Petitioner's convictions qualified as crimes of
violence for career offender purposes, the court denied
Petitioner's § 2255 motion. On October 27, 2016,
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. See
Motion (Doc. 14), Taylor v. United States, No.
15-cv-1087-MJR (S.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2016). On January 23,
2017, the court denied Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. See Order (Doc. 20), Taylor v.
United States, No. 15-cv-1087-MJR (S.D. Ill. Jan. 23,
2017). On February 1, 2017, Petitioner filed a notice of
appeal. See Notice of Appeal (Doc. 25), Taylor
v. United States, No. 15-cv-1087-MJR (S.D. Ill. Sept.
29, 2016). The appeal is still proceeding.
April 10, 2017, Petitioner filed this Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1).
Petitioner argues that under Mathis, his prior
conviction for aggravated battery under 720 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/12-4(b)(8) can no longer qualify as a career offender
predicate offense. (Doc. 1 at 7).
Court, in its discretion, applies the Rules Governing Section
2254 Cases in the United States District Courts to this case.
See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts, R 1(b). This includes Rule 4, which
requires that the Court “promptly examine” the
Petition and dismiss it if it “plainly appears . . .
that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.”
Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
in the United States District Courts, the Court has examined
the Petition and concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to
prisoners like Petitioner who wish to collaterally attack
their convictions or sentences ordinarily must do so under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640
(7th Cir. 2012). They may petition under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 only in the rare circumstance in which the remedy
provided under § 2255 “is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (which is often
referred to as “the Savings Clause”). The mere
fact that Petitioner's claim would be a second or
successive § 2255 motion does not render § 2255
inadequate or ineffective. See In re Davenport, 147
F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1998).
Davenport, the Seventh Circuit articulated three
conditions that a petitioner must meet in order to invoke the
Savings Clause on the basis of a change in law. Id.
at 610-612. These conditions were recently summarized in
Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2013),
another case in which a petitioner brought a § 2241
petition based upon a Supreme Court decision interpreting the
residual clause of the ACCA. First, a prisoner “must
show that he relies on a statutory-interpretation case rather
than a constitutional case;” second, he “must
show that he relies on a retroactive decision that he could
not have invoked in his first § 2255 motion;” and
third, “[the] sentence enhancement [must] have been a
grave enough error to be deemed a miscarriage of justice
corrigible therefore in a habeas corpus proceeding.”
Id. at 586 (citations omitted) (internal quotation
§ 2241 fails because he cannot meet the second
Davenport requirement, in order to invoke the
Savings Clause. The second Davenport requirement
requires Petitioner to show that he relies on a retroactive
decision that he could not have invoked during his first
§ 2255 motion. Petitioner is unable to meet this
requirement because Mathis was invoked during his
authorized second § 2255 motion. Judge Reagan spends
almost ten pages addressing Petitioner's conviction under
a Mathis analysis. See Order (Doc. 12),
Taylor v. United States, No. 15-cv-1087-MJR (S.D.
Ill. Sept. 29, 2016). Petitioner could have, and actually