United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Robert Blakey United States District Judge
Arlington Heights Park District (“Defendant” or
“Park District”) employed Plaintiff John Kuehne
(“Plaintiff” or “Kuehne”) from July
21, 2008 to August 1, 2013. Plaintiff claims that his
termination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.,
and the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 42
U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Defendant moved for
summary judgment, and, for the following reasons, that motion
 is granted.
was employed by Defendant from July 21, 2008 to August 1,
2013 as a General Trades Worker.  at 2. In that capacity,
Plaintiff was responsible for maintaining plumbing, heating
and air conditioning units; swimming pool operations; and
general electrical and carpentry work. Id.
Plaintiff's most commonly performed job task was swimming
pool maintenance. Id. Plaintiff admits that his
“essential job duties” required him to, inter
alia, “lift up to seventy-five pounds without
assistance” and “climb and work on
ladders.”  at 9. At various times throughout the
employment period, however, the Park District placed
Plaintiff on “light duty, ” which did not involve
lifting heavy objects or climbing ladders. Id.
Defendant's Other Personnel
Welk (“Welk”), Defendant's Superintendent of
Parks, hired Plaintiff.  at 3. Throughout the employment
period, Plaintiff reported directly to Welk. Id.
Welk is responsible for managing the Park District's
trades division. Id. Plaintiff was diagnosed with
Type II Diabetes before he was hired, and Welk knew about
Plaintiff's diagnosis at the time of his hiring.
Id. at 6.
Aldrich (“Aldrich”) is the Superintendent of
Human Resources for the Park District. Id. at 4.
Aldrich administers the Park District's human resources
functions, crafting its leave policies and working to ensure
its compliance with applicable employment laws and
regulations, including the FMLA and ADA. Id. Aldrich
learned about the Plaintiff's diabetes shortly after his
hiring. Id. at 6.
Wilson (“Wilson”) is the Park District's
Director of Finance and Personnel, and she oversees the Park
District's human resources functions, policies and
practices. Id. at 4.
Park District has an explicit “FMLA Policy”
designed to protect employees' FMLA rights. Id.
at 5. The FMLA Policy informs employees that “if [FMLA]
leave was due to your own serious health condition, you will
be required to submit a fitness-for-duty certification”
from your health care provider. Id. Defendant uses
the “rolling” method of calculating FMLA leave.
Id. at 7. Under this approach, when the Park
District establishes the first date of the requested leave,
it then determines how much FMLA leave, if any, the
requesting employee took in the twelve months immediately
preceding the first date of the requested leave. Id.
If the employee has already taken twelve weeks of FMLA leave
within that period, the employee is not eligible to take
additional FMLA leave at that time. Id. at 8.
contends that, during the course of Plaintiff's
employment, he took FMLA leave on the following dates: July
7, 2009 to August 4, 2009; December 9, 2009 to December 12,
2009; June 1, 2010 to June 17, 2010; January 12, 2011 to
January 29, 2011; April 23, 2011 to June 30, 2011; February
22, 2012 to May 31, 2012; October 10, 2012 to October 17,
2012; January 15, 2013 to February 6, 2013; and April 25,
2013 to June 26, 2013. Id. at 6. On June 27, 2013,
Aldrich told Plaintiff that his FMLA leave was
does not dispute that he was on leave at those times, but
denies that he was ever informed which leaves were counted
against his FMLA entitlement.  at 8. Plaintiff
additionally concedes that many of his leaves were caused by
complications resulting from his diabetes, including the
leaves he took from December 18, 2008 to January 5, 2009
(foot surgery), December 22 to 30, 2010 (same), April 23 to
June 30, 2011 (two toes on his left foot were amputated),
January 15, 2013 to February 6, 2013 (foot infection), and
April 25, 2013 to June 26, 2013 (diabetic ulcer on his foot).
Id. With the exception of the leave from April 25,
2013 to June 26, 2013, Plaintiff acknowledges that he did not
suffer any retaliatory actions when he returned to work.
Id. at 9.
his leave from April 15, 2013 to June 26, 2013, Plaintiff
returned to work on June 27, 2013.  at 8. Plaintiff
claims that by June 27, he was fully capable of performing
his essential job functions.  at 13. Plaintiff's
contention is supported by his own deposition testimony, his
affidavit, and a note from his podiatrist, which provided, in
its totality, that “Patient may return to work
6/26/13.” Id.; see also [30-13] at 2.
Plaintiff first reported to Welk on June 27, Welk observed
that Plaintiff was limping.  at 12. Welk then directed
Plaintiff to report to Aldrich regarding his work status and
ability to perform the essential functions of his job.
Id. At their June 27 meeting, Plaintiff presented
Aldrich with his podiatrist's note. Id. Aldrich
explained that she needed more information regarding
Plaintiff's condition, and provided Plaintiff with an
additional form for his doctor to complete. Id. at
12-13. The parties agree that at the conclusion of the June
27 meeting, Plaintiff was placed on paid administrative
leave. Id. at 14. Plaintiff's paid
administrative leave was set to expire on July 6,
2013.  at 9.
2, 2013, Plaintiff's doctor completed the additional form
supplied by Aldrich, and sent her the same. Id. This
form indicated, inter alia, that Plaintiff was free
to “return to work with no restrictions on
6/27/13.” Id.; see also [30-14] at 1.
and Welk remained concerned regarding Plaintiff's
physical condition, and on July 3, 2013, Aldrich attempted to
contact Plaintiff to schedule a functional capacity exam
(“FCE”).  at 10. The FCE was designed to
determine whether Plaintiff could perform his essential job
functions. Id. On July 5, 2013 Aldrich left
Plaintiff a voicemail explaining that she was concerned that
Plaintiff could not safely do his job, and she had
accordingly scheduled the FCE for July 8, ...