United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MICHAEL J. REAGAN Chief Judge.
Edward Moore is an inmate with the Illinois Department of
Corrections (“IDOC”) at Menard Correctional
Center (“Menard”). Moore asserts in this lawsuit
that his constitutional rights were violated at Menard
because he was provided inadequate due process at a prison
disciplinary hearing. As a result of that disciplinary
hearing, Moore spent 90 days in the Menard segregation unit
and he argues that the conditions in segregation violated his
Eighth Amendment rights. The Defendants in this matter,
Robert Hughes, Christopher Roth and Virgil Smith, now seek
summary judgment. (Doc. 125). Plaintiff filed a three-page
opposition to the summary judgment wherein he reiterated his
request for counsel, and generally opposed summary judgment
(Doc. 135). For the following reasons, summary judgment is
GRANTED as to all Defendants.
morning of February 6, 2014, Moore was performing legal work
in the Menard prison law library. (Doc. 93-3, p. 7, Doc.
126-1, p. 3). Moore testified at his deposition that he was
reviewing legal documents for a case he was working on when
he noticed that some of his exhibits were missing. (Doc.
126-1, p. 4). Moore had submitted the documents and attached
case law exhibits to be copied by prisoner law clerks, but
the case law exhibits were never returned. Id. Moore
then stood up from his desk and walked over to the desk of
Tonya Knust, the prison law librarian, to inquire as to the
missing case law exhibits. Id. Knust told Moore that
the case law exhibits were removed because they were not
needed for his filing. Id. Moore then turned around
and began to head back to his seat. Id. At that
moment, correctional officer Travis Lindsey, the officer on
duty in the law library, called out to Moore and told him to
bring his Id. Id. Moore gave Lindsey his ID
and asked him “what did I do?” Id.
Lindsey did not respond and Moore sat back down. Id.
minutes later, Lieutenant Robert Hughes arrived in the law
library. (Doc. 126-1, p. 5). Hughes briefly spoke to Lindsey,
and then Hughes asked Moore to explain what had happened.
Id. Moore told Hughes that he did not know.
Id. At that point Hughes placed Moore in handcuffs
and escorted him to the segregation unit holding area.
Id. It was soon discovered that the segregation unit
was full, so Hughes was placed back in his normal cell.
Id. Later that evening, Hughes received a
disciplinary report for the events that occurred in the law
library. (Doc. 126-1, p. 6). The disciplinary report is
drafted and signed by Lindsey. (Doc. 93-3, p. 7). It
essentially states that Lindsey told Moore to sit down after
he approached Knust (a law library employee), and at that
point Moore became belligerent. Id. As a result,
Moore was charged with “intimidation or threats,
” “unauthorized movement, ” and
“disobeying a direct order.” Id. After
receiving the disciplinary report, Moore sent a letter to the
Adjustment Committee providing a “witness
statement” and requesting that Knust be present at the
disciplinary hearing. (Doc. 126-1, pp. 6-7).
February 10, 2014, the Menard Adjustment Committee held a
hearing on Moore's disciplinary charge. (Doc. 126-1, p.
5). The Adjustment Committee consisted of Hughes and another
Menard official named Jason Hart. (Doc. 93-7, p. 12). Moore
was allowed to present his written witness statement but the
Adjustment Committee did not allow Moore to call Knust as a
witness. (Doc. 126-1, p. 6). At the conclusion of the
hearing, Moore was found guilty of the three charges. (Doc.
93-7, p. 12). As punishment, Moore was given three months of
“C Grade, ” three months of segregation and a
three month commissary restriction. Id.
the hearing Moore was immediately escorted to the segregation
unit by Defendant Christopher Roth. (Doc. 126-1, p. 11). Upon
arriving at his new cell, Moore noticed that it was filthy.
(Doc. 126-1, p. 12). The cell lacked sheets or a pillowcase;
there was garbage on the cell floor; the toilet was caked
with urine and feces; the mattress was stained brown and
smelled of urine; the pillow was stained; and it appeared
that someone had smeared feces on the walls. (Doc. 126-1, pp.
13-17). Moore also noticed that the sink did not provide cold
water, and the hot water came out of the faucet at a very low
pressure (described by Moore as a “dribbl[e]”).
(Doc. 126-1, p. 17). As Roth removed Moore's handcuffs,
Moore asked him if he could have some bed linens and cleaning
supplies. (Doc. 126-1, p. 12). Roth told Moore that no
cleaning supplies or linens were available.
(Id.). Roth also mentioned that there were no
open cells in the segregation unit, and so Moore could not be
moved to a different cell. (Doc. 7, p. 19). Moore spent the
next 90 days in the segregation cell, and he had no further
interactions with Roth while there. (Doc. 126-1, p. 12).
eleven days after being placed in the segregation cell, an
inmate worker delivered a bag containing Moore's personal
property. (Doc. 126-1, p. 13). Typically, personal property
was delivered to an inmate in segregation within 24 hours.
(Id. at 12). The bag included sheets, a pillowcase,
half a bar of soap, shampoo, rags and legal papers.
Id. Moore used an extra wash rag to clean up the
cell, but much of it remained dirty. (Doc. 126-1, p. 14). On
at least a couple of occasions Moore complained of the
conditions in the cell to his gallery officer, Defendant
Virgil Smith. (Doc. 126-1, p. 21). However, Smith told him
that he was unable to provide cleaning supplies or move him
to a new cell. (Doc. 126-1, pp. 15-16).
addition to the cleanliness issue, the overall conditions in
segregation were harsher than those in general population.
(Doc. 126-1, p. 9). Moore was locked in his cell for almost
24 hours a day. Id. Inmates in segregation do not
eat in the chow hall; all of their meals are delivered to
their cells. Id. Moore was also unable to take a
shower until ten or eleven days after he entered segregation.
(Doc. 126-1, p. 18). He was then allowed to take a shower
twice a week. Id. He was also able to do minimal
washing up with the water from his faucet. (Id.). As
a result of the unsanitary conditions, Moore testified at his
deposition that he developed a rash. (Doc. 126-1, p. 19). The
rash was red bumps mainly on his arms and legs. (Doc. 126-1,
p. 20). The rash afflicted multiple areas of his body,
including his legs, which never came into direct contact with
the mattress due to his jumpsuit, and eventually his sheets.
(Id.). The rash did not subside once he got his
sheets. (Id.). He was able to see a doctor for his
rash, though there was no discussion of the treatment he
received or any physician's recommendations. (Doc. 126-1
served the full 90 days in segregation and was then
transferred to general population. (Doc. 126-1, p. 9). On
January 29, 2015, Moore filed this lawsuit. (Doc. 1). Shortly
thereafter, Moore was granted leave to file an amended
complaint (Doc. 7) and Judge Gilbert screened the amended
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (Doc. 9). Judge
Gilbert held in the screening order that the failure to call
Moore's witness at the disciplinary hearing alone was not
sufficient to establish a due process violation, but that if
the conditions of confinement were sufficiently more severe
than general population, the situation may amount to a due
process violation. Moore also articulated a potential Eighth
Amendment claim against Defendant Smith based on the
conditions of confinement in the segregation cell. Defendant
Roth was added to the Eighth Amendment claim in Moore's
second amended complaint. (Doc. 93). The three Defendants now
seek summary judgment. (Doc. 125).
Moore's deposition, his testimony was largely consistent
with the allegations in his written filings. Of note, he
testified that he did not believe Defendants Roth or Smith
intended to harm him by failing to adequately respond to his
complaints about cell cleanliness. (Doc. 126-1 at 24).
Moore's deposition is the only evidentiary deposition or
affidavit in this case.
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Carroll v. Lynch,
698 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2012). When presented with a
motion for summary judgment the facts must be viewed in a
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all
reasonable inferences are to be drawn in their favor.
Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 826 (7th Cir.
2014) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). Summary judgment is appropriate if
“on the evidence provided, no reasonable juror could
return a verdict in favor of the [nonmovant].” Ball
v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir. 2013). In sum,
“the court has one task and one task only: to decide,
based on the evidence of record, whether there is any
material dispute of fact that requires a trial.”
Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920
(7th Cir. 1994).
proceeds on two claims in this lawsuit: that he was provided
inadequate due process at the February 10, 2014 disciplinary
hearing and that the conditions in the segregation cell
violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Starting with
Moore's due process claim, the Fourteenth Amendment
states in part, “[n]o State shall … deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law[.]” The Supreme Court has held that prisoners are
entitled to due process protections in certain situations,
such as when good time credits are revoked, see Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974), or the prisoner
is subjected to an “atypical and significant hardship,
” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
The violation of prison procedures or the lack of due process
in assigning an inmate to segregation does not constitute a
freestanding constitutional violation. See Sandin,
515 U.S. at 485-86. Instead, a constitutional violation
depends on the combination of these problems with enhanced
conditions in segregation. Id. The “atypical
and significant hardship” liberty interest often arises
when an inmate is placed in segregation, or another similarly
strict prison environment, for an extended period of time.
See, e.g., Marion v. Columbia Correction Inst., 559
F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. ...