United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ROBERT BLAKEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Landale Signs and Neon, Ltd. (“Plaintiff”)
contracted to purchase a truck-mounted crane from Defendant
Runnion Equipment Company (“Defendant” or
“Runnion”). During the pendency of that sale, an
unknown third party (Defendant John Doe) intercepted
information related to the transaction, utilized that
information to pose as Runnion, and convinced Plaintiff to
wire the vehicle's purchase price to him. Plaintiff has,
at various points, alleged that Runnion is liable under
theories of negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach
of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract (both express and
implied).  at 5-14.
December 22, 2016, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint.  at 1-19. The dismissal of
Plaintiff's contractual theories, however, was without
prejudice, and Plaintiff re-alleged those same contractual
claims in its Third Amended Complaint.  at 1-13.
motions are currently before the Court: Plaintiff's
request that the Court reconsider its dismissal with
prejudice of Plaintiff's negligence claim,  at 1-4,
and Runnion's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Third
Amended Complaint,  at 1-5. As more fully explained
below, both motions are denied.
April of 2016, Plaintiff and Runnion executed a sales
contract for a truck-mounted crane worth $87, 625.  at 3.
During the preceding negotiations, Plaintiff and Runnion
communicated, at least in part, via e-mail. Id. On
May 12, 2016, Plaintiff received an e-mail, ostensibly from
Runnion, with instructions on how to wire the payment to
Runnion pursuant to the terms of the agreement. Id.
Plaintiff followed these instructions and remitted payment
for the agreed amount of $87, 625. Id.
subsequently informed Plaintiff that it never received the
payment. Id. In response, Plaintiff showed Runnion
the string of e-mails wherein an entity purporting to be
Runnion instructed Plaintiff on how to make payment for the
vehicle. Id. Plaintiff now alleges that
Runnion's computer network, database, and servers were
accessed by Defendant John Doe, who utilized the information
he or she intercepted from Runnion to pose as Runnion and
fraudulently instruct Plaintiff to wire him or her $87, 625.
Id. at 3-4.
further alleges that Runnion was aware or should have been
aware that its computer network, database, and servers were
being improperly accessed by Defendant John Doe. Id.
at 4. During the parties' negotiations, Plaintiff's
President, Mr. Darrell Brown, noticed that there was a delay
in receiving e-mails from Runnion's President, Mr.
Patrick Runnion. Id. Mr. Brown inquired as to the
cause of this delay, and Mr. Runnion indicated that he was
aware of potential interference with his e-mail account.
Id. Mr. Runnion further represented that an unknown
party had previously been intercepting his e-mails during a
prior transaction (though Runnion in that instance was able
to avert any potential theft). Id.
now alleges that, as part of the foregoing negotiations,
Runnion “agreed to complete the transaction with the
intent to safeguard any sensitive information from disclosure
to third parties, ” and the “parties' mutual
intent constitute[d] a meeting of the minds regarding
safeguarding sensitive information from disclosure to third
parties.” Id. at 12.
survive Defendant's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Third Amended Complaint must
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc., 722 F.3d
911, 915 (7th Cir. 2013). A “claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. This Court must construe the Complaint in the
light most favorable to Plaintiff, accept as true all
well-pleaded facts, and draw all reasonable inferences in its
favor. Id.; Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp.,
182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999). Statements of law,
however, need not be accepted as true. Yeftich, 722
F.3d at 915. Rule 12(b)(6) limits this Court's
consideration to “allegations set forth in the
complaint itself, documents that are attached to the
complaint, documents that are central to the complaint and
are referred to in it, and information that is properly
subject to judicial notice.” Williamson v.
Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2013).
motion for reconsideration, meanwhile, is made pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), which permits the
Court, in the exercise of its discretion, to relieve a party
from an order on the grounds of “mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect.” Relief under Rule
60(b)(1) is “regarded as an extraordinary remedy which
is granted only in exceptional circumstances.”
Longs v. City of S. Bend, 201 F. App'x 361, 364
(7th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff's Motion ...