United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
B. Kim United States Magistrate Judge.
Brooks, Sr. brings this action against the City of Chicago,
Officers Daniel Solis and Peter Spain, and Sergeant Albert
Perez (collectively, “Defendants”) pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Brooks alleges that he was arrested
during a traffic stop without probable cause and detained in
police custody for an excessively long period and in
unreasonable conditions of confinement. Before the court is
Defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the
following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied
filed his complaint in April 2015 naming the City of Chicago,
Officers Daniel Solis, Jeffrey Coleman, and Peter Spain, and
Sergeant Albert Perez as defendants. (R. 1, Compl.) After the
parties consented to this court's jurisdiction, (R. 24);
see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the court dismissed
Officer Coleman from this action because there were no claims
made against him, (R. 39). The parties then proceeded with
discovery on the claims against Defendants.
filed the current motion for summary judgment on December 23,
2016. (R. 66.) The court ordered Brooks to file a response by
January 30, 2017. (R. 65.) On January 30, 2017, Brooks filed
a motion requesting an extension of time to respond, which
the court granted with a new deadline of February 20,
2017.(R. 69; R. 71.) The court cautioned Brooks
that if he ignored the deadline, the court would “rule
on the pending motion for summary judgment without the
benefit of Plaintiff's opposition.” (R. 71.) Brooks
did not file a response opposing the motion.
Rule (“L.R.”) 56.1(a)(3) requires the party
moving for summary judgment to provide “a statement of
material facts as to which the moving party contends there is
no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a
judgment as a matter of law.” The statement should
consist of short, numbered paragraphs that are supported by
citations to admissible evidence. L.R. 56.1(a)(3); see
also Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 682 (7th Cir. 2003).
The opposing party must then “file ‘a response to
each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement,
including, in the case of any disagreement, specific
references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other
supporting materials relied upon.'” Cracco v.
Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009)
(quoting L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B)). “All material facts set
forth in the statement required of the moving party will be
deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement of
the opposing party.” L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(C). Here,
Defendants' L.R. 56.1 undisputed material facts are
deemed admitted because Brooks did not oppose the current
undisputed facts show that this lawsuit stems from an April
18, 2013 incident in Chicago, Illinois, when Brooks was
pulled over for multiple driving infractions. (Defs.'
Statement of Facts (“DSOF”) at ¶¶ 3,
6.) On that date at approximately 5:44 p.m., Officers Solis
and Spain were patrolling in a marked patrol car when they
observed Brooks driving with an inoperable taillight while
talking on a mobile phone. (Id. at ¶¶
7-9.) The officers then stopped Brooks's car near the
intersection of Perry Street and 69th Street. (Id.
at ¶ 12.) As they approached Brooks's car, the
officers observed Brooks's son in the back seat.
(Id. at ¶ 14.) The officers asked Brooks to
roll down his window. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Brooks did
not comply and refused to exit his vehicle until a sergeant
arrived on the scene. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-17.)
When Sergeant Perez arrived on the scene about 10 minutes
later, he identified himself as a sergeant and asked Brooks
to exit his car. (Id. at ¶¶ 20, 22.)
Brooks complied with the sergeant's request.
(Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.) Upon exiting, Brooks
was immediately handcuffed and then transported to the
Seventh District police station. (Id. at ¶ 26.)
At the police station, one of the officers started on the
requisite paperwork and Brooks was taken to a small room
where he spent eight hours handcuffed to a bench. (Id. at
¶¶ 28-30.) He never complained to the officers
about the handcuffs and never sought medical treatment for
any injury. (Id. at ¶¶ 33, 35.)
Eventually, Brooks was taken to lockup to be processed.
(Id. at ¶ 36.) The next morning, Brooks
appeared before a judge and later that day was released on a
recognizance bond. (Id. at ¶¶ 37-38.)
was charged with driving while using a mobile phone, driving
a vehicle with an inoperable taillight, failing to properly
restrain a child, endangering the life of a child, driving
under the influence of drugs, and obstructing an officer.
(Id. at 42, 44.) He contested his criminal charges
and a bench trial was held on those charges. At the close of
the state's case, the trial judge granted Brooks's
motion for a directed finding, dismissing all charges except
for the two that caused Officers Solis and Spain to make the
traffic stop-driving while using a mobile phone and driving a
car with an inoperable taillight. (Id. at
¶¶ 43-44; see also id., Ex. D at 49-50.) Brooks was
convicted of those two charges. (Id. at ¶ 43.)
judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows
“that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In considering a motion for
summary judgment, this court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all
reasonable inferences in his favor. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A genuine
issue of material fact exists where “the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id. at 248. Summary judgment
should be entered “against a party who fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In general,
a Section 1983 plaintiff must show that a person
“acting under color of state law deprived [him] of a
right, privilege, or immunity secured by either the
Constitution or federal law.” Shelton v.
Wright, No. 09 CV 6413, 2013 WL 212910, at *6 (N.D.Ill.
Jan. 18, 2013) (citing Lugar v. Edmondsun Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982)).
False Arrest Claims Against Officers Solis and Spain
alleges that Officers Spain and Solis falsely arrested him
because, according to him, they lacked probable cause. (See
R. 1, Compl. at ¶ 18.) To prevail on a false arrest
claim, a Section 1983 plaintiff must show that an officer
made an “unreasonable seizure prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment.” Ienco v. Angarone, 429 F.3d 680,
683 (7th Cir. 2005). Probable cause to arrest is an absolute
bar to a Section 1983 claim for false arrest. Neita v.
City of Chicago, 830 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 2016);
Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749, 756 (7th
Cir. 2013); Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d
544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006). Also, “[w]here ‘the
arresting officer witnessed the crime and the conviction
[was] based on his testimony, proof of the crime is ipso
facto proof of probable cause.'” Puch v.
Vill. of Glenwood, No. 05 CV 1114, 2012 WL 2502688, at
*4 (N.D.Ill. June 27, 2012) (quoting Patterson v.
Leyden, 947 F.Supp. 1211, 1217 (N.D.Ill. 1996)); see
also King v. Goldsmith, 897 F.2d 885, 886-87 (7th ...