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Greene v. Sears Protection Co.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

March 27, 2017

NINA GREENE and GERALD GREENE, Plaintiffs,
v.
SEARS PROTECTION COMPANY, SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO., and SEARS HOLDINGS CORPORATION, Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          JORGE L. ALONSO United States District Judge

         Before the Court is the defendants' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Counts III and IV of plaintiffs' First Amended Class Action Complaint as well as defendant Sears Holdings Corporation [54], which is granted in part and denied in part for the reasons explained below. Also before the Court are plaintiffs' objections [116] to Magistrate Judge Mason's rulings on two of plaintiffs' discovery motions, which are overruled for the reasons explained below.

         BACKGROUND

         In this action, plaintiffs Nina Greene and Gerald Greene, who are Pennsylvania residents, complain that from 1994 to 2014, they entered into and paid for several appliance-service agreements with the Sears, Roebuck and Company and Sears Protection Company that did not actually cover the service on their products. Plaintiffs also sue Sears Holdings Corporation (“Sears Holdings”). Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' previous complaint was granted in part and denied in part. The Court granted the motion as to Sears Holdings and dismissed it from this suit. The Court also granted the motion as to plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (“ICFA”), which were dismissed without prejudice.

         Plaintiffs subsequently filed the First Amended Class Action Complaint, which asserts claims for breach of contract (Count I); unjust enrichment (Count II); violation of the ICFA (Count III); and violation of Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“PCPL”) (Count IV). (ECF No. 51, Compl.)

         DISCUSSION

         A. Motion to Dismiss 1. Legal Standards

         When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court construes it in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, accepts as true all well-pleaded facts therein, and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 946 (7th Cir. 2013). “[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations” but must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

         2. Sears Holdings Corporation

         The Court previously dismissed Sears Holdings as a defendant because plaintiffs' allegations established that it was not a party to the service agreements and plaintiffs offered no other basis for holding it liable. That remains the case with the amended complaint. Plaintiffs argue that they have stated unjust enrichment and consumer fraud claims against Sears Holdings. The Court disagrees. Although plaintiffs have added allegations about Sears Holdings' employees' general involvement in drafting, pricing, marketing, and handling claims related to service protection agreements, as well as Sears Holdings' operation of call centers that handle questions about products and services, plaintiffs do not allege any facts from which it can be reasonably inferred that Sears Holdings retained any benefit as a result of plaintiffs' agreements. Plaintiffs therefore fail to state an unjust enrichment claim against Sears Holdings. See Galvan v. Nw. Mem'l Hosp., 888 N.E.2d 529, 541-42 (Ill.App.Ct. 2008) (affirming dismissal of unjust enrichment claim where plaintiff did not allege that defendant had unjustly retained any benefit).

         As for the consumer fraud claims, plaintiffs fail to allege any facts from which it can be inferred that Sears Holdings, in particular, made any misrepresentations to them or otherwise engaged in deceptive practices. Accordingly, plaintiffs also fail to state consumer fraud claims against Sears Holdings. See Lagen v. Balcor Co., 653 N.E.2d 968, 976-77 (Ill.App.Ct. 1995) (stating that a plaintiff must “allege some sort of deception by the defendant to avoid dismissal” of an ICFA claim); Garczynski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.Supp.2d 505, 512-13 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (dismissing PCPL claim against mortgage lender where the only misrepresentation plaintiffs alleged was by a different defendant and the claim against the lender was merely a threadbare recital of the claim's elements). The Court therefore dismisses Sears Holdings as a defendant. Defendants seek a with-prejudice dismissal. Because plaintiffs do not seek leave to amend in the event of Sears Holdings' dismissal, and plaintiff were previously given the opportunity to replead claims against Sears Holdings and still have failed to do so, the dismissal is with prejudice. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 347 (7th Cir. 2012) (leave to amend need not be granted when a party has had multiple opportunities to amend but failed to cure a defective claim).

         3.Count III (Illinois Consumer Fraud Act)

         As the Court set out in its previous opinion and order, the Seventh Circuit has said that a nonresident plaintiff may sue under the ICFA only if the circumstances relating to the alleged fraudulent transaction occurred mostly in Illinois. Crichton v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801, 853-54 (Ill. 2005)). The Court dismissed plaintiffs' ICFA claim, noting that it was alleged or reasonable to infer from the allegations that although Sears is in Illinois, plaintiffs live in Pennsylvania; they entered into the agreements with Sears and thus were allegedly deceived in Pennsylvania; they called from Pennsylvania to request service on their treadmill; they were in Pennsylvania when they learned that their products were not covered by the agreements; and the appliances that were the subject of the agreements are in Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 48, Mem. Op. & Order at 6.) Because the allegations suggested that most of the circumstances underlying the alleged fraud occurred in Pennsylvania, the Court concluded that plaintiffs do not have statutory standing to sue under the ICFA.

         In the First Amended Complaint, plaintiffs add allegations about general operations and procedures concerning service agreements, which take place at Sears's headquarters in Illinois. Much of the alleged conduct (such as the handling of claims under the agreements and the maintenance of databases used to input customer claims) has nothing to do with the allegedly deceptive conduct, and the remaining alleged conduct is not specific to plaintiffs; as defendants point out, none of plaintiffs' new allegations address the circumstances under which plaintiffs purchased their service agreements or when they learned that their purchases were not covered. The new allegations at most support an inference that the alleged deceptive course of conduct emanated from Illinois, but that is insufficient to support an ICFA claim. See Avery, 835 N.E.2d at 855 (no ICFA claim where the only connection with Illinois is the defendants' headquarters or the fact that a scheme “emanated” from Illinois). Plaintiffs' allegations still suggest that most of the ...


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