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Johnson v. David

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois

March 23, 2017

MATTHEW JOHNSON, Plaintiff,
v.
ALFONSO DAVID, Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          STEPHEN C. WILLIAMS United States Magistrate Judge.

         Introduction

         Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on April 27, 2015 (Doc. 62) alleging a single claim of violation of the Illinois Gender Violence Act, 740 IlCS 82/1, et seq (hereinafter “the IGVA”) against Defendant Alfonso David. This matter is before the Court on Defendant David's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 102). Plaintiff has filed a response (Doc. 107) in opposition to the motion and Defendant has filed a reply (Doc. 108). Based on the following, the Court DENIES Defendant David's motion for summary judgment.

         Factual Background

         The Court notes that neither side has provided a factual background indicating the relevant facts in this case. As such, the Court has gleaned what it deems the relevant facts from the briefs and the records in evidence.

         Plaintiff attended a physical examination for his employment with IDOC on April 26, 2010 (Doc. 102-3, p. 5, 8). Plaintiff's examination was performed by Dr. David, the medical director of the Health Care Unit (Id. at p. 8-9). Plaintiff had to submit to the evaluation in order to get the job and David provided medical evaluations to determine fitness for the job (Id. at p. 8-9, 18). The administrative directives for pre-employment physical examinations indicate that the examination should include, at a minimum: blood pressure, height and weight, pulse, lab urinalysis, examination of organ symptoms, a test for tuberculosis, a complete blood count, and blood chemistry (Doc. 107-5, p. 4). The pre-employment medical examination form does not include sexually transmitted diseases on the clinical evaluation, nor does it include an examination of the genitalia (Doc. 102-10).

         Plaintiff testified that he consented to the physical examination (Id. at p. 16). As part of that examination, Plaintiff understood that the examination would include his genital area to determine if he had any hernias (Id.). Plaintiff testified that he consented to that part of the examination (Id.). He also testified that he understood that, as a part of that exam, Dr. David would be using his hands to touch Plaintiff's genitals (Id. at p. 19). Plaintiff further testified that during the exam he felt like he was free to leave at any time (Doc. 102-3, p. 22). The door was not locked (Id.). There was no impediment to Plaintiff leaving the room if he chose (Id. at p. 22-23). He testified that he was not restrained to the table and Dr. David could not have kept him in the room if Plaintiff chose to leave (Id. at p. 23).

         At some point during the examination, David asked Plaintiff to pull his pants down (Doc. 102-3, p. 24). Although Plaintiff testified that he did not know why David wanted him to do so, Plaintiff acknowledged that he understood the examination would involve a hernia check and would require David to touch his groin area (Id.). Plaintiff testified that he did not have a problem pulling down his pants for a hernia check and complied with the request (Id. at p. 24-25). Plaintiff testified that he was lying down during this portion of the examination and that David performed an extensive palpitation of his genitals which he repeated four or five times (Id. at p. 25-30). Plaintiff testified that portion of the exam lasted two to five minutes (Id. at p. 33-35). Plaintiff stated that he did not understand this examination to be part of a sexually transmitted disease evaluation or screening and he would have objected to such a test (Id. at p. 31). Nor did he feel that David was checking him for a sexually transmitted disease (Doc. 107-1, p. 4). Plaintiff testified that David did not check him for a hernia (Doc. 102-3, p. 33). He further testified that the exam did not feel right, he had never had an exam like that before, and David never explained what he was doing (Id. at p. 38-39).

         Dr. David testified that as part of the examination, he tells patients that he is going to examine their genitals and check for hernias (Doc. 102-11, p. 2). David palpitates the groin area to feel for any masses (Id. at p. 3-4). David also testified that he checked the penis of all potential male employees for tenderness or abnormalities, as well as for discharge (Doc. 107-8, p. 2). David indicated that portion of the exam was related to the job requirements as pain, or having a discharge which could indicate an infection that causes pain, could affect their ability to perform physical activities (Id. at p. 2). He testified that if there was tenderness, that would mean an abnormality existed which would impact their ability to perform their jobs (Id.). While David acknowledged that he could ask the potential employee if they were suffering from pain, the palpation elicits tenderness which David testified would be different than a patient saying that they are in pain (Id.). David indicated that he performed this test on every pre-employment physical without exception (Id.).

         Summary Judgment Standard

         Summary Judgment is proper only “if the admissible evidence considered as a whole shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Dynegy Mktg. & Trade v. Multi Corp., 648 F.3d 506, 517 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). See also Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating-based on the pleadings, affidavits, and/or information obtained via discovery-the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

         After a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2)). A fact is material if it is outcome determinative under applicable law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Ballance v. City of Springfield, Ill. Police Dep't, 424 F.3d 614, 616 (7th Cir. 2005); Hottenroth v. Vill. of Slinger, 388 F.3d 1015, 1027 (7th Cir. 2004). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “A mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmovant's petition is insufficient; a party will be successful in opposing summary judgment only when it presents definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion.” Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 931-32 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted).

         On summary judgment, the Court considers the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009). The Court adopts reasonable inferences and resolves doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Id.; Nat'l Athletic Sportswear, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co.,528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2008).Even if the facts are not in dispute, summary judgment is inappropriate when the information before the court reveals that “alternate inferences can be drawn from the available evidence.” Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 935 ...


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