United States District Court, C.D. Illinois
MERIT REVIEW ORDER
BILLY McDADE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
proceeding pro se, pursues a § 1983 action for
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and
inhumane conditions of confinement at the Pontiac
Correctional Center (“Pontiac”). The case is
before the Court for a merit review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts
the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in
Plaintiff's favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d
645, 649-51 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements
and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to
“state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d
418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)(citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). While the pleading standard does not require
“detailed factual allegations”, it requires
“more than an unadorned,
Wilson v. Ryker, 451 Fed.Appx. 588, 589 (7th Cir.
2011) quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
alleges that he has been diagnosed Seriously Mentally Ill.
(“SMI”) with Intermittent Explosive Disorder
(“IED”), which causes him to have angry
outbursts. He alleges that he has wrongfully been held in
disciplinary isolation for eight years due to the outbursts
associated with his mental illness. Plaintiff claims that
Defendants Andrea Moss, Dr. Marano, Kelly Haag, Todd Nelson,
Linda Duckworth and Stephan Lanterman, Pontiac mental health
professionals, have failed to provide him a personalized
treatment plan. He also claims that he has not received
psychotherapy since May 27, 2016, and that this has
contributed to his self-mutilation and suicide attempts.
Plaintiff alleges that Warden Melvin has refused to eliminate
or reduce his segregation time and has refused to allow him
outdoor exercise due to his segregation status.
alleges additionally, that Defendants Moss was aware that he
was suicidal, but refused to see him. He also alleges that
Defendant Moss wrongfully placed on suicide watch. Plaintiff
alleges that inmates are “required” to
self-mutilate or threaten suicide simply to be seen by a
mental health professional. He alleges that Defendants
Melvin, and Kennedy have been deliberately indifferent by not
allowing him to possess an inhaler. Plaintiff claims that he
is asthmatic and that Defendant Melvin and Kennedy's
refusal to allow segregation inmates to possess an inhaler is
“unfair and dangerous”.
also alleges inhumane conditions of confinement. He claims
that in June 2016, Defendants Melvin and Kennedy had a
Plexiglas covering placed over his perforated steel door,
resulting in inadequate airflow. Plaintiff alleges that this
has exacerbated his asthma and further affected his mental
state. He also claims that the lack of airflow has caused
mold to develop in his cell.
has disclosed that he is a 3-striker. The Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. section 1915(g), commonly
referred to as the "three strikes" law, bars a
prisoner or detainee from bringing a civil action if he has
on three or more occasions, while incarcerated, brought an
action or appeal in federal court that was dismissed a
frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted unless the prisoner/detainee is
"under imminent danger of serious physical injury."
Plaintiff was assessed a strike in Sanders v. Pouk,
No. 14- 1066 (C.D.Ill., dismissed March 21, 2014);
Sanders v. Hamilton, No. 15-1236 (C.D.Ill.,
dismissed July 14, 2015) and Sanders v. Malkowski,
No. 10-4685 (N.D.Ill., dismissed August 16, 2010). Since
Plaintiff has three strikes, he may proceed in forma pauperis
only if his pleadings establish that he is under imminent
danger of serious physical injury. He has failed to
accomplish this. The only allegation remotely probative is
his self-serving statement that inmates are
“required” to self-mutilate or threaten suicide
simply to be seen by a mental health professional.
alleges that he has threatened suicide but that he has
wrongfully been placed on suicide watch. He also alleges that
he has been held in disciplinary isolation for eight years
due to the outburst associated with his mental illness, the
only claim clearly associated with his mental illness.
Plaintiff claims the self-mutilation was done so that he
would receive mental health treatment. The most reasonable
inference arising from the gestalt of these allegations is
that Plaintiff's self-mutilation is volitional and unlike
his alleged outbursts, not caused by his mental illness. As
unfortunate as it is, Plaintiff has chosen to self-mutilate
to get the attention of a mental health professional, this
does not establish that he is in imminent danger.
order to meet the imminent danger requirement of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g), the “threat or prison condition [must
be] real and proximate.” Lewis v. Sullivan,
279 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2002). Allegations of past harm
do not suffice; the harm must be imminent or occurring at the
time the complaint is filed. Heimermann v. Litscher,
337 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2003). Smith v. Alvarez, 898
F.Supp.2d 1057, 1063 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (“where an inmate
is the cause of the conditions about which he complains, any
constitutional claim is rendered tenuous.”) Here,
Plaintiff's claims of self-mutilation are volitional and
do not meet the imminent danger requirement of §
Plaintiff's October 6, 2016, grant of in forma
pauperis status is REVOKED. Plaintiff will have 21 days
in which to pay the $400 filing fee or this case will be
Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel  is
DENIED as Plaintiff has provided no evidence that he
attempted to obtain counsel on his own. See Pruitt v.
Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2007). In the event
Plaintiff renews his motion for appointment of counsel, he
should list the attorneys to whom he wrote and should attach
any letters sent to or received from those attorneys.
Plaintiff's motions for status ,  and motion for
merit review hearing ...