United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MICHAEL J. REAGAN Chief Judge
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pro se Plaintiff Robert
Ollie, currently an inmate at Hill Correctional Center,
brought claims against Ryan Davis for actions that occurred
while Plaintiff was housed at Menard Correctional Center.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Davis retaliated against
him by writing two false disciplinary reports in response to
Plaintiff filing grievances against Davis (Count 1) and
intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Plaintiff by
issuing the false disciplinary reports (Count 4). This matter
is before the Court on Defendant Davis's motion for
partial summary judgment (Docs. 51 and 52), which seeks
summary judgment on Plaintiff's intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim. Plaintiff has filed a response to
the motion (Doc. 54) as well as a supplement to that response
complaint alleges two claims against Defendant Ryan Davis,
but Davis seeks summary judgment solely on Plaintiff's
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (Docs.
51 and 52). Plaintiff's intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim stems from two disciplinary tickets
he received from Davis. Plaintiff was written a disciplinary
ticket on September 15, 2013, following a confrontation that
led to Plaintiff being taken to segregation. (Doc. 52-1, p.
September 15, Plaintiff was watching another inmate have a
discussion with a medical technician when Davis walked up and
started being rude. Id. at 7. At some point, Davis
turned to Plaintiff and asked what he was looking at, and
Plaintiff told him he was being rude. Id. at 7-8.
Plaintiff testified that Davis threatened to send him and the
other inmate to segregation. Id. at 8. Plaintiff had
a verbal back and forth with Davis and then began writing a
grievance about the incident. Id. at 8, 15. Davis
returned later and asked Plaintiff if he was writing a
grievance. When Plaintiff responded that he was, Davis told
him that he was not going to get his lunch. Id. at
16. Plaintiff testified that Davis wanted to argue, but
Plaintiff told him he would not argue with him. Id.
Davis then accused Plaintiff of threatening him. Id.
Plaintiff testified that at some point during their
conversation Davis told him he would put Plaintiff somewhere
where he could not write grievances. Id. at 19.
minutes later, several officers came and escorted Plaintiff
to segregation. Id. at 16-17, 22. He was placed in
investigative status and charged with intimidation and
threats and with disobeying a direct order. (Doc. 52-1, p.
36, 37; Doc. 1-2, p. 23, 28). Plaintiff was found guilty of
both charges by the adjustment committee. (Doc. 52-1, p.
36-37). He was sentenced to six months in segregation. (Doc.
1-2, p. 23). Plaintiff was in segregation on that charge when
he again encountered Davis.
September 23, 2013, Plaintiff was being taken to the yard
from segregation. (Doc. 52-1, p. 38). He walked past Davis on
the way to the yard. Id. at 40. Plaintiff testified
that Davis told him he bet Plaintiff was not writing any
“grievances behind that thing, ” and Plaintiff
countered with a question whether Davis was “still on
that crap, ” and told him, “forget you,
man.” Id. Davis then denied Plaintiff access
to the yard and sent him back to his cell. (Doc. 52-1, p. 33,
40-41, 43). Plaintiff asked a sergeant to get a lieutenant
because he was tired of Davis's harassment, and Davis
came up and told him to shut his mouth before Davis shut it
for him. Id. at p. 33-34, 41, 48. When Plaintiff got
back to his cell, he began writing a grievance. Id.
at 35. Plaintiff was written a second disciplinary ticket by
Davis for the September 23, 2013, incident for assaulting an
officer and for intimidation and threats. (Id. at
49; Doc. 1-2, p. 29). Plaintiff was found guilty and
sentenced to one year in segregation. (Doc. 1-2, p. 22, 24).
testified that he spent sixteen months in segregation. (Doc.
52-1, p. 55). Plaintiff testified that he did not get much
food in segregation, and, as a result, he lost weight.
Id. Plaintiff testified he lost at least 22 pounds.
Id. at 57. He also testified that he was a spiritual
person who attended many church events at the prison but
could not do so while in segregation. Id. at 56.
Plaintiff testified that as a result of his placement in
segregation he could not sleep and suffered from anxiety.
Id. at 57. Plaintiff offered medical records to show
that he suffered from depression, though the Court notes that
those records are from 2016, which is not the time period in
which he was housed in segregation as a result of the
disciplinary tickets at issue in this case. (Doc. 54-1, p.
1-11). Plaintiff testified that he spoke with mental health
professionals while in segregation at Pontiac Correctional
Center and at one point was denied a request to be seen
because the mental health professional were backed up (Doc.
52-1, p. 59). Plaintiff testified that he still suffers from
anxiety and depression. Id. at 60-61.
Summary Judgment Standard
judgment is proper only “if the admissible evidence
considered as a whole shows there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Dynegy Mktg. & Trade v. Multi
Corp., 648 F.3d 506, 517 (7th Cir. 2011)(citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)(citing FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a)); see also Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Info.
Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The
party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of
demonstrating-based on the pleadings, affidavits, and/or
information obtained via discovery-the lack of any genuine
issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the
adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)(quoting
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2)). A fact is material if it is
outcome determinative under applicable law.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Ballance v. City of
Springfield, Ill. Police Dep't, 424 F.3d 614, 616
(7th Cir. 2005); Hottenroth v. Vill. of Slinger, 388
F.3d 1015, 1027 (7th Cir. 2004). A genuine issue of material
fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. On summary judgment, the
Court considers the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-movant and adopts reasonable ...