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Olliee v. Davis

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois

March 17, 2017

ROBERT OLLIE, Plaintiff,
v.
RYAN DAVIS, Defendant.

          MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

          MICHAEL J. REAGAN Chief Judge

         Introduction

         Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pro se Plaintiff Robert Ollie, currently an inmate at Hill Correctional Center, brought claims against Ryan Davis for actions that occurred while Plaintiff was housed at Menard Correctional Center. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Davis retaliated against him by writing two false disciplinary reports in response to Plaintiff filing grievances against Davis (Count 1) and intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Plaintiff by issuing the false disciplinary reports (Count 4). This matter is before the Court on Defendant Davis's motion for partial summary judgment (Docs. 51 and 52), which seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Plaintiff has filed a response to the motion (Doc. 54) as well as a supplement to that response (Doc. 56).

         Factual Background

         Plaintiff's complaint alleges two claims against Defendant Ryan Davis, but Davis seeks summary judgment solely on Plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (Docs. 51 and 52). Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim stems from two disciplinary tickets he received from Davis. Plaintiff was written a disciplinary ticket on September 15, 2013, following a confrontation that led to Plaintiff being taken to segregation. (Doc. 52-1, p. 23-24).

         On September 15, Plaintiff was watching another inmate have a discussion with a medical technician when Davis walked up and started being rude. Id. at 7. At some point, Davis turned to Plaintiff and asked what he was looking at, and Plaintiff told him he was being rude. Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff testified that Davis threatened to send him and the other inmate to segregation. Id. at 8. Plaintiff had a verbal back and forth with Davis and then began writing a grievance about the incident. Id. at 8, 15. Davis returned later and asked Plaintiff if he was writing a grievance. When Plaintiff responded that he was, Davis told him that he was not going to get his lunch. Id. at 16. Plaintiff testified that Davis wanted to argue, but Plaintiff told him he would not argue with him. Id. Davis then accused Plaintiff of threatening him. Id. Plaintiff testified that at some point during their conversation Davis told him he would put Plaintiff somewhere where he could not write grievances. Id. at 19.

         Ten minutes later, several officers came and escorted Plaintiff to segregation. Id. at 16-17, 22. He was placed in investigative status and charged with intimidation and threats and with disobeying a direct order. (Doc. 52-1, p. 36, 37; Doc. 1-2, p. 23, 28). Plaintiff was found guilty of both charges by the adjustment committee. (Doc. 52-1, p. 36-37). He was sentenced to six months in segregation. (Doc. 1-2, p. 23). Plaintiff was in segregation on that charge when he again encountered Davis.

         On September 23, 2013, Plaintiff was being taken to the yard from segregation. (Doc. 52-1, p. 38). He walked past Davis on the way to the yard. Id. at 40. Plaintiff testified that Davis told him he bet Plaintiff was not writing any “grievances behind that thing, ” and Plaintiff countered with a question whether Davis was “still on that crap, ” and told him, “forget you, man.” Id. Davis then denied Plaintiff access to the yard and sent him back to his cell. (Doc. 52-1, p. 33, 40-41, 43). Plaintiff asked a sergeant to get a lieutenant because he was tired of Davis's harassment, and Davis came up and told him to shut his mouth before Davis shut it for him. Id. at p. 33-34, 41, 48. When Plaintiff got back to his cell, he began writing a grievance. Id. at 35. Plaintiff was written a second disciplinary ticket by Davis for the September 23, 2013, incident for assaulting an officer and for intimidation and threats. (Id. at 49; Doc. 1-2, p. 29). Plaintiff was found guilty and sentenced to one year in segregation. (Doc. 1-2, p. 22, 24).

         Plaintiff testified that he spent sixteen months in segregation. (Doc. 52-1, p. 55). Plaintiff testified that he did not get much food in segregation, and, as a result, he lost weight. Id. Plaintiff testified he lost at least 22 pounds. Id. at 57. He also testified that he was a spiritual person who attended many church events at the prison but could not do so while in segregation. Id. at 56. Plaintiff testified that as a result of his placement in segregation he could not sleep and suffered from anxiety. Id. at 57. Plaintiff offered medical records to show that he suffered from depression, though the Court notes that those records are from 2016, which is not the time period in which he was housed in segregation as a result of the disciplinary tickets at issue in this case. (Doc. 54-1, p. 1-11). Plaintiff testified that he spoke with mental health professionals while in segregation at Pontiac Correctional Center and at one point was denied a request to be seen because the mental health professional were backed up (Doc. 52-1, p. 59). Plaintiff testified that he still suffers from anxiety and depression. Id. at 60-61.

         Legal Standards

         A. Summary Judgment Standard

         Summary judgment is proper only “if the admissible evidence considered as a whole shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Dynegy Mktg. & Trade v. Multi Corp., 648 F.3d 506, 517 (7th Cir. 2011)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)); see also Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating-based on the pleadings, affidavits, and/or information obtained via discovery-the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

         After a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2)). A fact is material if it is outcome determinative under applicable law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Ballance v. City of Springfield, Ill. Police Dep't, 424 F.3d 614, 616 (7th Cir. 2005); Hottenroth v. Vill. of Slinger, 388 F.3d 1015, 1027 (7th Cir. 2004). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. On summary judgment, the Court considers the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and adopts reasonable ...


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