United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
PHIL GILBERT DISTRICT JUDGE
matter comes before the court on Defendants' Motion [Doc.
197] to Revoke Plaintiff's IFP status. Plaintiff filed a
response [Doc. 205] and defendants filed a reply citing
exceptional circumstances as required by Local Rule 7.1. As
such, the Court will consider the defendants' reply.
procedural history with regard to the plaintiff's IFP
status is extensive. As set out in a previous order:
Throughout this litigation, Plaintiff Robert Miller has
attempted to “pay” the Court's filing fee via
two financial instruments-a $7 million Illinois court
judgment and a $10 million Alabama perfected claim. On June
22, 2015, the Court rejected Miller's effort to pay via
these methods and ordered him to either file a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis or pay the filing fee
outright. (Doc. 43.) On July 1 and July 2, 2015, Miller filed
a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, along with
several other motions. (Docs. 48-49, 50-51.) The other
motions opposed any “encumbrances” on his trust
account and took umbrage with the Court's refusal to
accept his instruments as payment. (Docs. 48-49 & 51.) On
July 8, 2015, the Court again rejected Miller's efforts
to pay via his instruments and explained that garnishment
from the trust account was part-and-parcel of pauper status.
(Doc. 53.) The Court ordered Miller to finalize his pauper
application by consenting to garnishment or to pay the filing
fee outright; if he did not choose one of those options, his
case would be dismissed for failure to follow a court order.
On July 20, 2015, Miller submitted yet another spate of
filings linked to the Court's effort to work out the
filing fee matter. First, Miller filed a consent form related
to his pauper motion, agreeing to permit the Court to garnish
his trust fund account. (Doc. 58.) The consent form included
a page attached to it, again asserting that payment was
proper via Miller's default judgment and perfected claim.
Second, Miller filed a motion requesting to give security,
again seeking to use his default judgment and perfected claim
as payment for the filing fee. (Doc. 61.) . . .
Next up are Miller's renewed efforts to pay with his
default judgment and claim instruments: he has filed a
“final” motion requesting the Court to accept his
instruments as payment for the filing fee, and has also
attached minutiae to his pauper consent form that reference
those instruments. The Court will construe these motions as
an attempt to seek reconsideration of the Court's Order
of June 22, 2015, which rejected these instruments as payment
of the filing fee. As the Court explained then, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1914 speaks of straightforward payment of a filing fee
and not the use of default judgments or perfected claims in
lieu of payment. For that reason and the other reasons put
forth in the Court's June 22 Order rejecting payment via
Miller's judgment and perfected claim, these motions must
That leaves the Court with the matter of the filing fee.
Pursuant to the Court's Order of July 8, 2015, Miller had
the option of submitting a consent form to finalize his
pauper application or to pay the Court's filing fee
outright. He has elected the former and submitted a consent
form authorizing payment from his trust account, so his
motion for pauper status will be granted. Subsequent orders
of the Court will address the necessary trust fund statements
and the collection of funds through the United States
Penitentiary at Marion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
One closing note is in order concerning the character of
Miller's filings in this case. Miller has adopted the
tactic of filing motion after motion in an effort to goad the
Court into ruling, and then filing multiple motions attacking
the Court's disposition once the Court has ruled. These
filings are often confusing, repetitive, and cite to
irrelevant statutory or Uniform Commercial Code provisions.
His treatment of the filing fee issue is a perfect example:
for that point, he has attacked the Court's refusal to
accept his instruments in repeat motions and filings arguing
that point and others, cited irrelevant law throughout most
of these filings, and then filed a frivolous motion to
interplead this judge and the Acting Clerk of this Court into
this case. These filings are in the nature of
“sovereign citizen” pleadings, and the repetitive
nature of Miller's filings for this point and others is
starting to look a lot like vexatious litigation behavior.
Courts have inherent authority to protect themselves from
this kind of behavior by imposing sanctions. E.g.,
Alexander v. United States, 121 F.3d 312, 315-16
(7th Cir. 1997); Support Sys. Int'l v. Mack, 45
F.3d 185, 186-87 (7th Cir. 1995). Miller has been warned of
this kind of behavior by this Court and others-Miller v.
Walton, No. 13-cv-1307, 2014 WL 1672546, at *1 (S.D.
Ill. Apr. 28, 2014) documents warnings in this Court and
elsewhere-and if he keeps it up here, he will see sanctions
(which could include fines, dismissal with prejudice, or a
Document 73 Filed 08/05/15.
being warned, plaintiff has continued to file motions with
regard to his IFP status (i.e. Motion Contingent Upon Forged
IFP being Voided [Doc. 83] claiming his signature was forged
on the IFP consent and withdraw of this matter until
“security” situation was figured out; Notice of
Criminal Complaint [Doc. 94] claiming criminal conduct by
judge, magistrate judge and clerk of court because
indebtedness should be adequate to post security and threats
to make plaintiff file IFP; and Motion for Accounting [Doc.
105] stating that security can be given instead of filing for
IFP.) The Court acknowledges that these motions were filed
prior to counsel being appointed to represent the plaintiff.
now move to revoke plaintiff's IFP status stating that
the plaintiff, “has not and cannot provide competent
evidence that demonstrates he has ever faced an imminent
threat of physical injury.” Doc. 197, pg. 4. A prisoner
may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment under
28 U.S.C. § 1915 “if the prisoner has, on 3 or
more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any
facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the
United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent
danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g). Section 1915(g) requires that this Court consider
prisoner actions dismissed prior to, as well as after, the
PLRA's enactment. See Evans v. I.D.O.C., 150
F.3d 810, 811 (7th Cir. 1998); Abdul-Wadood v.
Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023 (7th Cir. 1996).
support of their motion, the defendants cite to Magistrate
Judge Wilkerson's Report and Recommendation (“R
& R”)[Doc. 82] which recommended that the
plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief be denied. In
the report, the Magistrate Judge notes that the plaintiff
provided, “only vague, generalized assertions regarding
his fears and has failed to provide any competent evident to
support his proposition.” The Court did not adopt the R
& R finding it moot after appointing counsel for the
plaintiff. However, defendants argue that the Magistrate
Judge's finding still support their position that the
plaintiff was never under imminent danger of serious physical
injury. Further, the defendants have provided several
affidavits that indicate that there is no evidence that there
are “hits” on plaintiff's life.
plaintiff argues that the defendants' motion to revoke
equates to a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60
requesting relief from this Court's order granting
plaintiff IFP status. However, a Rule 60 motion applies to a
final judgment or order is not applicable to an IFP request.
As such, the Court agrees with the defendant's reply that
defendants' motion did not bring their motion under Rule
further responds that, “Miller's imminent threat
allegations surround a ‘hit' that was put out on
his life by an Islamic Extremist inmate around the same time
Miller had been ...