United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
W. DARRAH United States District Court Judge
27, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, alleging: retaliation
for engaging in protected activities under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et
seq., the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et
seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et
seq., in Count I; racial discrimination pursuant to
Title VII in Count II; and a claim for hostile work
environment under Title VII, the FMLA, and the ADA in Count
III. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III
 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. For
the reasons discussed below, Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss  is denied.
City of Chicago (the “City”) is a municipal
corporation organized in Cook County, Illinois. (Compl.
¶ 3.) Plaintiff is an African-American female who began
working for the City on or about January 1, 1996.
(Id. ¶ 8.) At the time relevant to this
Complaint, Plaintiff was working as a Collection
Representative. (Id.) Plaintiff has been diagnosed
with chronic asthma, which, when active, prevents Plaintiff
from breathing and causes chest pains and respiratory
problems. (Id. ¶ 10.) In 2012, Plaintiff filed
a lawsuit against the City, alleging retaliation for
requesting intermittent leave under the FMLA. (Id.
¶ 11.) That lawsuit was resolved around February 2014.
(Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that, shortly
thereafter, Plaintiff's supervisor, Eugenia Iskos, a
white female, began to retaliate against Plaintiff.
(Id. ¶ 13.) Iskos issued suspensions, followed
Plaintiff around work on a daily basis, issued
pre-disciplinary notices with false allegations about
Plaintiff's conduct at work, and sent disparaging emails
to Plaintiff's supervisors with false allegations.
(Id.) Iskos also used racially charged language when
describing Plaintiff's interactions with coworkers and
described Plaintiff's tone as “speaking like a loud
person.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Iskos did not follow
any of Plaintiff's non-African-American coworkers or use
similar language when describing the activities of
non-African-American employees. (Id. ¶¶
January 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination
with the Illinois Department of Human Rights, which stated:
I was hired by Respondent on or about January 2014. My most
recent position is Collection Representative. During my
employment, I filed two EEOC charges of discrimination . . .
. Subsequently, I have been harassed and subjected to
I believe I have been discriminated against because of my
race, Black, and retaliated against for engaging in protected
activity, in violation of the [sic] Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
I also believe I have been discriminated against because of
my disability, and retaliated against for engaging in
protected activity, in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended.
12-1, p. 9.) A right-to-sue letter was issued by the
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the
“EEOC”) on April 4, 2016. (Id. p. 10.)
January 19, 2015, Plaintiff attempted to use her approved
FMLA leave but was issued a pre-disciplinary notice by Iskos
for failing to submit the request to her direct supervisor.
(Compl. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff's request was given to a
supervisor in the same department, and Plaintiff's direct
supervisor was not working on the date of the request.
(Id.) The pre-disciplinary notices were used to
support a one-day suspension for Plaintiff on February 10,
2015. (Id. ¶ 17.) On July 2, 2015, Plaintiff
filed an internal complaint with the City of Chicago
Department of Human Resources Diversity and Equal Employment
Opportunity Division. (Id. ¶ 18.) The internal
complaint alleged harassment based on race and retaliation
for the 2012 lawsuit. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that
this did not affect the harassment and resulted in further
received further pre-disciplinary notices on June 3, 2015,
and July 21, 2015. (Id. ¶ 19.) The
pre-disciplinary notices contained false allegations.
(Id.) Plaintiff was issued a three-day suspension on
August 24, 2015. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff's
physician issued a letter that stated Plaintiff could not
return to work at the Department of Finance due to
stress-triggered asthma and phobia of the workplace.
(Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff took a forced, unpaid
leave of absence from August 24, 2015, until December 16,
2015, when she was transferred to the Department of
Transportation. (Id. ¶ 22.)
12(b)(6) permits a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must allege “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). However,
plaintiffs are not required to “plead the elements of a
cause of action along with facts supporting each
element.” Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of
Greater Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 517
(7th Cir. 2015). Rather, the complaint must provide a
defendant “with ‘fair notice' of the claim
and its basis.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526
F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting ...