United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
W. DARRAH United States District Court Judge
Noble Richard Martin, brought suit, pro se, in this
court against several individuals, alleging various claims
stemming from his arrest and subsequent trial. Defendants
filed Motions to Dismiss, and Plaintiff filed no responses.
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint was dismissed on
September 30, 2014. Plaintiff then filed an Application to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis and a Motion for
Appointment of Counsel, which were granted on December 2,
2014. Plaintiff, through his attorney, filed a Third Amended
Complaint. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the Third
Amended Complaint were granted with prejudice, except as to
two counts which were dismissed without prejudice. After that
ruling, Plaintiff's appointed attorney moved to withdraw,
which was granted. Plaintiff filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the dismissal of his Third Amended
Complaint. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration was
denied. Plaintiff then filed a Fourth Amended Complaint
pro se. Another attorney was appointed but did not
file an amended complaint. Defendants filed the present
Motions to Dismiss [130, 139]. After the present motions were
filed, Plaintiff's appointed attorney moved to withdraw
and requested that all pending motions be stayed or
continued. The motion to withdraw was granted, but the
request to stay the Motions to Dismiss was denied. For the
reasons discussed below, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
[130, 139] are granted.
is a resident of Illinois. (FAC ¶ 2.) Defendants Officer
Jason Torres and Officer Megan Leonard were police officers
with the City of Chicago Police Department. (Id.
¶ 3.) Defendant City of Chicago is a municipal
corporation and the employer and principal of Defendants
Torres and Leonard. (Id. ¶ 4.) Defendant
Assistant State's Attorney Jane Zak was an Assistant
State's Attorney for the County of Cook. (Id.
¶ 5.) Defendant County of Cook is alleged to be the
employer and principal of Defendant Zak. (Id. ¶
November 22, 2010, Defendants Torres and Leonard
(“Defendant Officers”) arrived at 8100 S.
Hermitage, Chicago, Illinois, to respond to an alleged
domestic battery. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff and his
ex-wife, Jacqueline Kennedy, were outside the residence when
the officers arrived. (Id. ¶ 8.) Torres and
Leonard immediately handcuffed the Plaintiff and put him in
the back of their car. (Id. ¶ 9.) She handed a
gun to the officers and told them that her daughter found the
weapon in a dresser drawer. (Id. ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff did not own or possess the gun that was given to
the officers. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff told the
officers that the gun was not his. (Id. ¶ 13.)
officers transported Plaintiff to the police station and
charged him with failure to possess a Fire Owner's
Identification card. (Id. ¶ 14.) While
Plaintiff was at the police station, Leonard left the station
to get Jacqueline Kennedy to sign a complaint for domestic
battery. (Id. ¶ 15.) Leonard returned with a
signed complaint approximately an hour later. (Id.
¶ 16.) The Defendant Officers did not see Plaintiff with
a gun or see Plaintiff striking Kennedy. (Id. ¶
alleges that the officers did not have probable cause to
believe that any criminal activity had taken place and
asserts that he had not broken any laws. (Id.
¶¶ 18-19.) Plaintiff further alleges that Torres
and Leonard wrote false police reports and falsely testified.
(Id. ¶¶ 20, 22-24.) Plaintiff alleges that
Zak put white out through lines of important transcripts
before giving them to him. (Id. ¶ 28.)
Plaintiff also states that the judge in his criminal trial
told Zak to redact discovery before giving it to him.
(Id. ¶ 27.)
November 29, 2010, the domestic-battery charge was dismissed
without a preliminary hearing because Kennedy did not come to
court. (Id. ¶ 29.) After a bench trial on
August 29, 2013, Plaintiff was found not guilty of Felony
Possession of a Weapon and Armed Habitual Criminal.
(Id. ¶ 30.)
12(b)(6) permits a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must allege “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). All well-pleaded allegations are presumed to be true,
and all inferences are read in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Lavalais v. Village of Melrose Park,
734 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2013). “Threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). However, plaintiffs are
not required to “plead the elements of a cause of
action along with facts supporting each element.”
Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago
& Nw. Indiana, 786 F.3d 510, 517 (7th Cir. 2015).
Rather, the complaint must provide a defendant “with
‘fair notice' of the claim and its basis.”
Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.
2008) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) and Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555).
brings one claim for violations of his Fourteenth Amendment
rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant
Jane Zak, Count I, and a claim of indemnity against Cook
County, Count IV.
Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Zak tampered with
transcripts. This claim is barred by the absolute immunity
provided to all prosecutorial actions that are
“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 431 (1976). This immunity is not just a defense to
liability but immunity from suit. See Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). This Court previous
held that ...