United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
B. Gottschall United States District Judge.
Detlef Sommerfield (“Plaintiff”), a patrol
officer in the Chicago Police Department, brought this action
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 against the City
of Chicago (“the City”) and Sergeant Lawrence
Knasiak (“Knasiak”). Plaintiff alleged that
Knasiak repeatedly harassed and otherwise discriminated
against him on the basis of his race, religion, and national
origin, and that Knasiak retaliated against him after he
complained about the harassment. In 2009, the court dismissed
Plaintiff's claims against the City as duplicative of his
claims in an earlier-filed lawsuit against the City.
Sommerfield v. City of Chi., No. 08 C 3025, 2009 WL
500643, Feb. 26, 2009. In 2014, a jury returned a $540, 000
verdict in this case against Knasiak for punitive damages.
(See ECF No. 366 at 1.)
motions filed by Plaintiff are before the court. In the
first, Plaintiff asks the court to reconsider the portion of
the order entered August 14, 2015, (“the August 2015
order”) denying his request for prejudgment interest.
The second is titled “Motion for Judgment” and
asks the court to enter a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58
judgment enumerating all of the categories of damages (and
retaining jurisdiction) to which the plaintiff believes
court's prior orders and opinions amply cover the long
and winding procedural path this case has taken. (See,
e.g., ECF No. 469 at 2-4.) Briefly, and as relevant
here, the parties agreed before trial to leave the
calculation of back pay for the court, if necessary, after
the jury trial. The trial ended more than two-and-a-half
years ago, yet the wrangling over those issues has not
filed a “Motion For Ruling On Certain Issues With
Calculation To Follow After Court's Ruling”
(“Motion for Ruling”) on October 17, 2014. (ECF
No. 397.) He argued that he was entitled to various forms of
relief, including, but not limited to, reimbursement for the
five days of pay that he lost when he was wrongfully
suspended, back pay from December 16, 2006, through the date
of judgment, compensation for the monthly stipend of $175
that he would have received if he had been promoted to the
position of canine handler, promotion to the “D2
position” of canine handler, and prejudgment interest,
among other things. After the motion was fully briefed,
plaintiff sought and obtained leave to supplement that motion
in February 2015. (ECF No. 410.) He sought leave to
supplement a second time in July 2015, but the court denied
his request. (See ECF No. 435 (denying motion to
supplement, ECF No. 431).)
August 14, 2015 decision, the court denied Plaintiff's
Motion for Ruling, concluding that he had failed to show that
he was entitled to the relief he sought, given that the City
had already agreed to provide Plaintiff with more relief than
he could obtain from the court. The court declined to opine
on whether Plaintiff was entitled to receive compensation for
lost wages/back pay and front pay from Knasiak, given that
the City had already agreed to make Plaintiff whole.
moves to reconsider that ruling. He also asks the court to
enter a judgment listing as damages against Knasiak the sums
attributed to back pay the city has paid him on Knasiak's
behalf. In March 2016, the court entered an order denying
Plaintiff's request to amend his complaint to add an
indemnity claim against the City. (ECF No. 469 at 4-5
(finding claim would be moot).) The court stated it
understood that if any dispute remained outstanding, it
pertained to the amount of overtime wages Plaintiff would
have been paid had he been promoted to canine handler in
2008. (Id. at 4.)
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
for reconsideration serve a limited function: to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence.” Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v.
CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Keene Corp. v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co.,
561 F.Supp. 656, 665 (N.D. Ill. 1982)). The losing
party's disappointment with the outcome does not
demonstrate manifest error. Oto v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000).
August 2015 order reads in pertinent part:
Plaintiff did not seek prejudgment interest in his complaint.
See Compl. ¶ 145 (prayer for relief). Nor did
Plaintiff identify prejudgment interest as a remedy he was
seeking in the motion pending before the court. Indeed, the
words, “prejudgment interest, ” did not appear in
connection with Plaintiff's present motion until
Plaintiff filed his second supplement in support of
the motion. And in this document, Plaintiff identified
prejudgment interest as one remedy in a list of remedies he
would like to receive, without providing citations to
authority to support any of them. What is more, Plaintiff
does not clarify whether he is seeking prejudgment interest
(a) on the damages that the jury awarded him or (b) on the
sum he is seeking from Knasiak for lost wages.
As the court sees it, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, used
his Second Supplement to list in scattershot fashion every
possible form of relief he hopes to receive, including
prejudgment interest on a sum he fails to identify.
Plaintiff's unsupported request for prejudgment ...