United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
KYU Y. ANDERSON, Plaintiff,
LAW OFFICES OF IRA T. NEVEL, LLC Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Robert Blakey, United States District Judge
Kyu Y. Anderson (“Plaintiff”) alleges that
Defendant Law Offices of Ira T. Nevel, LLC
(“Defendant”) violated the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”) by threatening to seek an
in personam judgment against Plaintiff during the
pendency of Plaintiff's bankruptcy. Defendant insists
that its actions were explicitly authorized by a prior order
of the bankruptcy court, and now seeks to dismiss
Plaintiff's claim. For the reasons explained below,
Defendant's motion is granted.
April 1, 2015, U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee and
successor in interest to Wachovia Bank, National Association,
as Trustee for Banc of America Funding Corporation Mortgage
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-D (“U.S.
Bank”) initiated a foreclosure action on
Plaintiff's property at 52 Brookston Drive, Unit D1,
Schaumburg, Illinois 60193 (the “Property”). 
at 1. On May 2, 2016, the Property was sold at judicial sale
to U.S. Bank. Id.
initiated a Chapter 13 bankruptcy action on May 27, 2016.
See In re Kyu Y. Anderson, 16-bk-40950, Dkt. 1
(Bankr. E.D. Tex.). Plaintiff listed U.S. Bank on his
bankruptcy schedules.  at 2.
August 19, 2016, NationStar Mortgage, LLC, servicing agent
for U.S. Bank, filed a Motion for Relief from Stay of Act
Against Property and Relief from Codebtor Stay (the
“Motion for Relief”). See In re Kyu Y.
Anderson, 16-bk-40950, Dkt. 28 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.). The
Motion for Relief explained that: (1) U.S. Bank is the holder
of the Note on the Property; (2) U.S. Bank has not received
payments due on the Note; (3) and, most importantly, U.S.
Bank now “seeks relief from the automatic stay pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) and from the codebtor stay
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1301(c).” Id.
U.S. Bank also “specifically request[ed] permission
from this Honorable Court to communicate with Debtor(s) and
Debtor(s)' counsel to the extent necessary to comply with
applicable non-bankruptcy law.” Id. The Motion
for Relief was unopposed. See generally In re Kyu Y.
Anderson, 16-bk-40950 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.).
September 6, 2016, United States Bankruptcy Judge Brenda
Rhoades granted the Motion for Relief (the “September 6
Order”).  at Ex. A. The September 6 Order
specifically provided as follows:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Relief from Stay
of Act Against Property and Relief from Codebtor Stay filed
by Movant on August 19, 2016, is hereby GRANTED so as to
authorize Movant, its successors and/or assigns, to
exercise any rights granted to it by the parties' loan
documents with respect to the real property located at
52 Brookston Drive Dl, Schaumburg, Illinois 60193 including,
but not limited to, the execution of a non-judicial
foreclosure sale of the Property.
Id. (emphasis added).
October 4, 2016, U.S. Bank, by and through Defendant, filed a
Notice of Motion in the Circuit Court of Cook County (the
“October 4 Notice”). [1-3] at 1. The October 4
Notice reflected that Defendant intended to move for
“an order approving the May 2, 2016 sale, for an in
personam judgment against Kyu Y. Anderson in the amount
of $37, 184.20, and to grant an order for possession against
the Defendants, ” including Mr. Anderson. Id.
The October 4 Notice was eventually withdrawn on October 19,
2016.  at Ex. C.
survive Defendant's motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the Complaint must “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Yeftich
v. Navistar, Inc., 722 F.3d 911, 915 (7th Cir. 2013). A
“claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. This Court must
construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, accept as true all well-pleaded facts, and draw
all reasonable inferences in its favor. Id.;
Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th
Cir. 1999). Statements of law, however, need not be accepted
as true. Yeftich, 722 F.3d at 915. Rule 12(b)(6)
limits this Court's consideration to “allegations
set forth in the complaint itself, documents that are
attached to the complaint, documents that are central to the
complaint and are referred to in it, and information that is
properly subject to judicial notice, ” which includes
information contained in the public record. Williamson v.
Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2013).
only claim for relief alleges that the October 4 Notice
constituted a violation of both the automatic stay imposed by
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and 15 ...