United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Springfield Division
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
MYERSCOUGH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at Cook County
Jail, brought the present lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging Eighth Amendment claims for events that
allegedly transpired during his incarceration at Pontiac
Correctional Center. The matter comes before this Court for
ruling on the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment.
(Doc. 48). The motion granted in part and denied in part.
Motion to Compel (Doc. 44)
filed a Motion to Compel (Doc. 44) seeking the Court to order
the Defendants to (1) provide the identity of Defendant John
Doe #5, and (2) answer a set of interrogatories Plaintiff
sent “prior to the November 2, 2016 discovery
Court previously ordered Defendants to provide Plaintiff with
the names of the two (2) Doe defendants Plaintiff named in
his Complaint. See Text Order entered January 15,
2016. Defendants filed a Notice of Compliance (Doc. 39)
indicating that two medical technicians (a male and a female)
were working at Pontiac at the time Plaintiff identified. As
to the second Doe defendant, Defendants indicated that
Plaintiff had not provided a date or time for the alleged
encounter Plaintiff had with the Doe correctional officer.
Defendants indicated that between 50-125 correctional
officers were assigned to the Maximum Security Unit during
Plaintiff's 27-day incarceration in that unit, and,
without more information, Defendants could not sufficiently
identify the officer in question.
the interrogatories, Plaintiff states in his motion that he
served the interrogatories on March 28, 2016, four days
before discovery was then set to close. See (Doc. 44
at 3); Text Order entered January 15, 2016 (“Discovery
shall be completed by April 2, 2016.”). Per the
Court's Scheduling Order, “[w]ritten discovery
requests must be mailed to a party at least 30 days before
the discovery deadline.” (Doc. 23 at 8, ¶ 17).
Court's Scheduling Order also required that Plaintiff
file a motion to compel within 14 days of receiving an
unsatisfactory response and to attach copies of the disputed
discovery requests. Id., ¶ 19. Plaintiff did
neither. Plaintiff, instead, waited more than eight (8)
months from the date of the Defendants' alleged response,
and two (2) weeks after discovery closed to file the present
motion. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion is denied. See
Flint v. City of Belvidere, 791 F.3d 764, 768
(7th Cir. 2015) (noting that discovery must have
an endpoint and “district courts are entitled to-indeed
they must- enforce deadlines.”).
Motion to Substitute Defendant (Doc. 45)
filed a motion seeking to substitute Jennifer Tinsley in
place of John Doe #2. (Doc. 45). Plaintiff filed this motion
after discovery closed despite the fact that he has had this
information since February 2016. Plaintiff does not explain
why he waited approximately eight (8) months to file this
motion. The Court finds that allowing Plaintiff to substitute
a Doe defendant at this stage of the proceedings would unduly
prejudice the Defendants. Plaintiff had ample opportunity to
file this motion prior to the close of discovery and prior to
his own deposition. See (Doc. 49-1 at 3)
(Plaintiff's deposition taken October 25, 2016).
Plaintiff did not do so. Plaintiff's motion is denied.
judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). All facts must be construed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable
inferences must be drawn in his favor. Ogden v.
Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In order to be a
“genuine” issue, there must be more than
“some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “Only disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
29, 2011, Plaintiff was transferred to Pontiac Correctional
Center (“Pontiac”). During the transfer, a
correctional officer from the former prison hit Plaintiff one
time in the head with a baton. The strike caused a painful
lump on Plaintiff's head and the record suggests that
Plaintiff's head was not bleeding. Plaintiff also lost
his pair of shoes during the transport.
requested medical treatment upon arrival at Pontiac. Medical
records indicate that Plaintiff received some type of medical
screening at that time, but the extent of such is not clear.
Pl.'s Dep. 22:9-20 (“I said…I need a doctor,
my head hurt, my feet hurt, you know.”); (Doc. 49-5 at
2) (Offender Health Status Transfer Summary indicating
Plaintiff had no current complaints). Plaintiff was taken to
a holding cell where he did not inform any other prison
officials about his injury. Id. 24:2-3 (“I sat
there and followed the instructions. I kept my mouth
shut.”); 25:17 (“I kept my head down and my mouth
was housed in the segregation wing. Upon arrival,
Plaintiff's cell smelled like urine, had water on the
floor, a clogged sink, and a dirty toilet. Plaintiff's
requests for cleaning supplies were denied. Plaintiff used
his jumpsuit to clean up the water, removed the water in the
sink with an empty milk carton from a meal tray, and was able
to clean his toilet with soap particles Defendant
Best, a correctional officer, allowed him to
collect from the shower area. Pl.'s Dep. 31:16-17
(“I took the jumpsuit off, and I used it to pick up the
water.”); 32:3-5 (“I used the milk carton [to
scoop the water] out of the sink and poured it into the
toilet.”); 53:3-4 (“[Defendant Best] gave me a
chance to collect as much ...