from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, No. 16-OP-48; the
Hon. Suzanne Patton, Judge, presiding.
Brown, of Peoria, appellant pro se.
Erin Lynn, of Peoria, appellee pro se.
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
1 Respondent, Adrian Brown, appeals from the trial
court's entry of a plenary order of protection. Brown
argues the court erred in entering the plenary order of
protection because he was not allowed to present evidence at
the hearing that led to the order. We affirm.
3 On January 15, 2016, petitioner, Erin Lynn, filed a
petition for an order of protection against respondent. The
petition alleged that Lynn and Brown had a dating
relationship and a child together. In the description of the
incident that led to the petition, Lynn stated that Brown had
sent aggressive and threatening text messages for
approximately one week. Eventually, Lynn allowed Brown to
have visitation with the parties' child provided that
Brown ceased the aggressive behavior. When Brown arrived to
retrieve the child, he and Lynn argued. The argument
escalated and Brown forced Lynn to the ground. While Brown
held Lynn in a choke hold, Brown instructed his friend to
take the child to his vehicle. Lynn also alleged that Brown
was abusive and she had ended her three-year relationship
with Brown to protect the parties' child. Following the
filing of the petition, the court entered an emergency order
of protection against Brown.
4 On February 1, 2016, the court entered a plenary order of
protection. In the written order, the court made the
following findings: venue was proper; Brown had abused Lynn
and/or the child; the conduct or actions of Brown, unless
prohibited, will likely cause irreparable harm or continued
abuse; and it was necessary to grant the requested relief to
protect Lynn. The plenary order prohibited Brown from further
acts or threats of abuse against Lynn and the child and
ordered Brown to stay at least 300 feet away from Lynn and
the child. The plenary order of protection was ordered to
remain in effect until January 31, 2018. The order also
documented that Lynn and Brown appeared in court at the time
the order was entered. On the same date, the parties were
ordered to participate in mediation to resolve visitation,
scheduling, transportation and location issues. The mediation
review was ordered for February 17, 2016.
5 On February 17, 2016, after the filing of the February 3,
2016, notice of appeal, the parties entered an agreed order
for visitation. The order provided for three visitations per
week and included overnight stays. The order stated that
Frank Carrillo would transport the child for parenting time,
and the parties agreed to communicate through Carrillo. The
parties also agreed to share parenting time on major
holidays. The visitation agreement and order of February 17,
2016, stated that it was "made a part of the plenary
order of protection" entered February 1, 2016.
7 Brown argues the court erred in entering the plenary order
of protection because he was not allowed to present evidence
that established that he was not the aggressor in the January
2016 incident. Brown also expresses concern that the plenary
order of protection will prevent him from having a
relationship with the parties' child. Lynn has not filed
a brief, however, we elect to decide the merits of the appeal
because the record is simple and the claimed errors can
easily be decided without the aid of an appellee's brief.
First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction
Corp., 63 Ill.2d 128, 133 (1976).
8 We review the trial court's issuance of a plenary order
of protection for an abuse of discretion. Lutz v.
Lutz, 313 Ill.App.3d 286, 289 (2000). A trial court
abuses its discretion only where no reasonable person would
take the view adopted by the court. Id.
9 Initially, we note that our review of the record is limited
as Brown did not file a transcript of the order of protection
hearing and the common law record does not include the docket
entries, which would summarize the in-court proceedings.
Therefore, we resolve any doubts arising from the
incompleteness of the record against Brown, and we presume
that the order entered by the trial court conformed to the
law and had a ...