United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
NATHANIEL R. LEGORE, # M24396, Plaintiff,
COUNSELOR ALLSUP, SGT KROUSY, COUNSELOR COWAN, DEBBIE KNAUER, OFFICER DEATHROW, and UNKNOWN PARTY, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MICHAEL J. REAGAN Chief Judge United States District Court
Nathaniel LeGore, an inmate who is currently incarcerated at
Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brings
this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for the deprivation of his constitutional rights at Menard.
Plaintiff claims he is disabled and is suffering as a result
of his medical needs not being appropriately addressed at
Menard in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 1, pp.
7-31). This case is now before the Court for a preliminary
review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
(a) Screening - The court shall review,
before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as
practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal - On review, the
court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint-
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an
objective standard that refers to a claim that any reasonable
person would find meritless. Lee v. Clinton, 209
F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of
entitlement to relief must cross “the line between
possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557. At
this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se
complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v.
Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir.
careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits,
the Court concludes that the Complaint survives preliminary
is a disabled veteran with a degenerative spinal disease,
left shoulder instability, chronic left wrist strain, neck
strain, and depressive disorder. (Doc. 1, p. 19). At times,
his back “goes out, ” leaving him bedridden for
weeks at a time. (Doc. 1, pp. 10-12, 22). According to the
Complaint, Plaintiff has difficulty getting into the top
bunk, particularly because there is no stepstool or ladder,
and his efforts to do so cause stress on his shoulders and
back. (Doc. 1, p. 22). Plaintiff possesses a lower bunk
permit for his disability. (Doc. 1, p. 7). However, he has
not been assigned a lower bunk in conformity with the permit,
despite repeated protests to and/or grievances filed with
Deathrow, Krousy, Allsup, Cowan, Knauer, and Menard's
Medical Director. Id. Plaintiff was instead assigned
an upper bunk at Menard on February 1, 2016. Id.
times, when his back “goes out, ” Plaintiff
alleges that “food is not brought to [him].”
(Doc. 1, p. 22). He is forced to eat whatever food may be in
his “property box.” Id. In addition,
Plaintiff has been denied appropriate pain medication and has
instead only been provided with ibuprofen, which is
ineffective. Id. Plaintiff has also filed at least
one grievance alleging some officers do not double cuff him
despite his double cuff permit. Id.
now sues Deathrow (Peace Officer), Krousy (Sergeant), Allsup
(Counselor), Cowan (Counselor Supervisor), Knauer
(Administrative Review Board), and Menard's Medical
Director for violating his constitutional rights. He seeks
monetary damages and injunctive relief in the form of a court
order requiring his transfer to a cell where he can sit up on
his bunk and requiring prison staff to adhere to his low-bunk
and double cuff permits. (Doc. 1, p. 9).
Court finds it convenient to divide the Complaint into the
following enumerated counts. The organization of these counts
should not be construed as an opinion regarding their merits.
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all
future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a
judicial officer of this Court.
Count 1:Defendants exhibited deliberate
indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment when they refused to honor
his low bunk permit, assigned him to a top bunk without a
ladder or steps beginning February 1, 2016, failed to provide
him with appropriate pain medications, and refused to honor
his double cuff permit.
Count 2:Defendants violated the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101 et seq., and/or Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794-794e, by
failing to accommodate Plaintiff's disability-related
needs by assigning him to a top bunk without a ladder or
steps despite his disability and low bunk permit, refusing to