United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Robert Blakey United States District Judge.
Helen Kim Hopfauf (“Defendant”) allegedly
employed Plaintiff Jae Hwang Kim (“Plaintiff”) at
Sunshine Cleaners in Grayslake, Illinois. Plaintiff claims
that Defendant failed to pay him proper wages and thus
Plaintiff filed suit under both the Fair Labor Standards Act,
29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (“FLSA”),
and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS § 105/1,
et seq. (“IMWL”). Defendant has moved
for partial summary judgment, arguing that this Court is not
empowered to consider Plaintiff's FLSA claims.  at
1-2. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's motion
ostensibly worked for Defendant at Sunshine Cleaners in
Grayslake, Illinois from February 2015 through October 2015.
[23-2] at 1. It is undisputed that in 2015, Sunshine Cleaners
had a gross sales volume less than $500, 000. [23-3] at 2.
claims that his job responsibilities included operating the
cash register, regularly processing customers' credit
cards, and telephonically ordering “dry cleaning
supplies 2-3 times from Cleaner's Supply in Conklin, New
York.” [23-2] at 2. Plaintiff also alleges that he
received the material ordered from Cleaner's Supply, and
regularly used those materials while employed at Sunshine
judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Spurling v. C
& M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir.
2014). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if
“the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The
party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists, this Court must construe all facts and
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. See CTL ex rel. Trebatoski v. Ashland
Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff's Interrogatory Response
argues that when analyzing the present motion, the Court
should not consider Plaintiff's allegations regarding his
interactions with Cleaner's Supply in New York, because
Plaintiff failed to relay those contentions during discovery.
Defendant's argument relies upon the following
interrogatory: “With respect to paragraph 20 of the
Plaintiff's Complaint, what is the basis of your
allegation that the Sunshine Cleaners was engaged in
interstate commerce?” [22-3] at 5. Plaintiff's
response, in full, reads: “Because it accepts credit
card [sic].” Id. Plaintiff has never amended
this response. Id.
general purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to
promote liberal discovery in an effort to narrow the issues
for trial and to prevent unfair surprise. To advance this
purpose, Rule 26(e)(1) imposes a duty upon all parties to
amend and supplement previous discovery responses if a prior
response is known to be incomplete or incorrect. No motion to
compel is necessary to trigger this obligation to supplement.
See, e.g., Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d
1425, 1436 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Rule 26 imposes no
requirement, express or implied, that a motion to compel
precede a court's imposition of a sanction . . . for
failure to supplement.”). A party need not supplement
its answers to prior discovery, however, if the information
has “otherwise been made known” during the
discovery process. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(1)(A).
failure to supplement his interrogatory responses is
inconsistent with the spirit of Rule 26. That said, Defendant
already had access to this information, because Defendant
(not Plaintiff) previously produced the Cleaner's Supply
invoice Plaintiff now relies upon. Because the information at
issue had “otherwise been made known” to
Defendant, the Court will consider Plaintiff's
interactions with Cleaner's Supply when evaluating
Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
employee can fall under the purview of the FLSA in multiple
ways, but Plaintiff concedes that only one of these
possibilities is implicated here: “individual” or
“traditional” coverage. Under this standard, the
FLSA covers an employee if that employee is “engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.”
29 U.S.C. § 207(a). Plaintiff further acknowledges that
he was not engaged in ...