United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
International Union of Operating Engineers Local 399, AFL-CIO; International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO; Construction and General Laborers' District Council of Chicago and Vicinity, Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO; and Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Plaintiffs,
Village of Lincolnshire, Illinois; Peter Kinsey, Chief of Police; Elizabeth Brandt, Mayor; and Barbara Mastandrea, Village Clerk, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
MATTHEW F. KENNELLY United States District Judge.
December 2015, the Village of Lincolnshire adopted an
ordinance that imposed new restrictions on labor relations
between labor unions, employers, and employees. The
plaintiffs, four unions that operate in Lincolnshire (the
Unions), challenge the ordinance, alleging that it is invalid
under the Supremacy Clause and deprives the Unions of their
rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Unions have
moved for summary judgment. The defendants have filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment, contending that each of
the Unions lacks standing to bring at least one of the claims
and that the Unions' claims lack merit.
reasons stated below, the Court concludes that three of the
four unions lack standing to challenge a particular part of
the Lincolnshire ordinance and that none of the unions may
bring claims under section 1983 but otherwise denies
defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court
concludes that all four unions have standing to challenge the
remaining parts of the ordinance. The Court therefore grants
summary judgment on the preemption claims in favor of all
four unions, finding that federal law preempts the challenged
provisions of the Lincolnshire ordinance.
plaintiffs are four labor organizations that operate within
Lincolnshire. International Union of Operating Engineers,
Local 399, AFL-CIO (Local 399) is the collective bargaining
representative for a bargaining unit composed of workers at
Colliers International Asset and Property Management, LLC in
Lincolnshire. Compl. ¶ 5. International Union of
Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO (Local 150) is the
collective bargaining representative for seven separate
bargaining units with various businesses in Lincolnshire,
including Central Boring, Inc.; Dick's Heavy Equipment
Repair; C.R. Nelson Landscaping; Accurate Group, Inc.; D.C.S.
Trucking Co.; Johler Demolition Inc.; and Revcon Construction
Corp. Id. ¶ 6. Local 150 also alleges that it
is the representative for numerous other units of employees
who are likely to perform work in Lincolnshire in the future.
Id. ¶ 8.
and General Laborers' District Council of Chicago and
Vicinity, Laborers International Union of North America,
AFL-CIO (LDC) is party to three collective bargaining
agreements that cover employees of employers located in
Lincolnshire, including Central Boring, Inc.; Johler
Demolition, Inc.; and Revcon Construction Corp. Id.
¶ 9. LDC also alleges that it is the representative for
numerous other units of employees who are likely to perform
work in Lincolnshire in the future. Id. ¶ 11.
Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America (CRC) is party to
collective bargaining agreements covering units of employees
who were scheduled to perform work in Lincolnshire starting
in the spring of 2016. Compl. ¶ 13. CRC also alleges
that it is the representative for numerous other units of
employees who are likely to perform work in Lincolnshire in
the future. Compl. ¶ 14.
is a "home rule" unit as defined in the Illinois
Constitution, meaning that it can "exercise any power
and perform any function pertaining to its government and
affairs." See Pls.' Corrected Br. in Supp.
of Mot. for Summ. J. (Pls.' Opening Brief) at 1; Ill.
Const. Art. VII, § 6. In December 2015, Lincolnshire
passed Ordinance No. 15-3389-116. Pls.' Opening Br. at 1.
In relevant part, the ordinance provides:
4: GUARANTEE OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
No person covered by the NLRA shall be required as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment with a
(A) to resign or refrain from voluntary membership in,
voluntary affiliation with, or voluntary financial support of
a labor organization;
(B) to become or remain a member of a labor organization;
(C) to pay any dues, fees, assessments, or other charges of
any kind or amount to a labor organization;
(D) to pay any charity or other third party, in lieu of such
payments, any amount equivalent to or a pro-rata portion of
dues, fees, assessments, or other charges regularly required
of members of labor organization; or
(E) to be recommended, approved, referred, or cleared for
employment by or through a labor organization.
5: VOLUNTARY DEDUCTIONS PROTECTED
For employers located in the Village, it shall be unlawful to
deduct from the wages, earnings, or compensation of an
employee any union dues, fees, assessments, or other charges
to be held for, transferred to, or paid over to a labor
organization unless the employee has first presented, and the
employer has received, a signed written authorization of such
deductions, which authorization may be revoked by the
employee at any time by giving written notice of such
revocation to the employer.
Resp. to Defs.' Stat. of Facts, Tab 13 Ex. C, 02475-76.
Unions filed suit against Lincolnshire and three Lincolnshire
officials in their official capacity: Chief of Police Peter
Kinsey; Mayor Elizabeth Brandt; and Village Clerk Barbara
Mastandrea. Compl. ¶¶ 15-18. The Unions contend
that the quoted portions of the ordinance are preempted by
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-69, and the Labor-Management Relations Act
(LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531. See
Pls.' Opening Brief at 1, 17- 19. In particular, the
Unions contend that sections 4(A)-(D) of the ordinance
prohibit what are known as "union security
agreements" and as such are preempted by the NLRA.
Compl. ¶¶ 32-37. In count 2, the Unions allege that
section 4(E) of the ordinance prohibits what are known as
"hiring hall provisions" and that this section is
likewise preempted by the NLRA. Id. ¶ 38.
Finally, the Unions allege in count 3 that section 5
restricts what are known as "check-off provisions"
and is preempted by the NLRA and the LMRA. Id.
¶ 40. On all three counts, the Unions request
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages and
attorneys' fees as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Id. ¶¶ 37, 39, 41.
Unions have moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
quoted provisions of the Lincolnshire ordinance are preempted
by federal law and that the Unions are entitled to judgment
on the merits. Lincolnshire has cross-moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the Unions lack standing to bring
these claims and that all four Unions' claims lack merit.
The Court first addresses the issue of standing and the
viability of the Unions' claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and then addresses the preemption issue, which is argued
in both sides' motions.
considering each side's motion for summary judgment, the
Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
moving party and draws reasonable inferences in that
party's favor. See Calumet River Fleeting, Inc. v.
Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150,
AFL-CIO, 824 F.3d 645, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2016). Summary
judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine dispute
regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Int'l Union, United
Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., and
its Local 2343 v. ZF Boge Elastmetall LLC, 649 F.3d 641,
646 (7th Cir. 2011).
order to bring a claim in federal court, a plaintiff must
have standing as required by Article III of the Constitution.
Diedrich v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 839 F.3d 583,
587 (7th Cir. 2016). To have standing, a plaintiff must have
"(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3)
that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision." Id. at 587-88 (citing Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)). In
response to a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing standing by setting ...