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AFL-CIO v. Village of Lincolnshire

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

January 7, 2017

International Union of Operating Engineers Local 399, AFL-CIO; International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO; Construction and General Laborers' District Council of Chicago and Vicinity, Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO; and Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Plaintiffs,
v.
Village of Lincolnshire, Illinois; Peter Kinsey, Chief of Police; Elizabeth Brandt, Mayor; and Barbara Mastandrea, Village Clerk, Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

          MATTHEW F. KENNELLY United States District Judge.

         In December 2015, the Village of Lincolnshire adopted an ordinance that imposed new restrictions on labor relations between labor unions, employers, and employees. The plaintiffs, four unions that operate in Lincolnshire (the Unions), challenge the ordinance, alleging that it is invalid under the Supremacy Clause and deprives the Unions of their rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Unions have moved for summary judgment. The defendants have filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, contending that each of the Unions lacks standing to bring at least one of the claims and that the Unions' claims lack merit.

         For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that three of the four unions lack standing to challenge a particular part of the Lincolnshire ordinance and that none of the unions may bring claims under section 1983 but otherwise denies defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court concludes that all four unions have standing to challenge the remaining parts of the ordinance. The Court therefore grants summary judgment on the preemption claims in favor of all four unions, finding that federal law preempts the challenged provisions of the Lincolnshire ordinance.

         Background

         The plaintiffs are four labor organizations that operate within Lincolnshire. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 399, AFL-CIO (Local 399) is the collective bargaining representative for a bargaining unit composed of workers at Colliers International Asset and Property Management, LLC in Lincolnshire. Compl. ¶ 5. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO (Local 150) is the collective bargaining representative for seven separate bargaining units with various businesses in Lincolnshire, including Central Boring, Inc.; Dick's Heavy Equipment Repair; C.R. Nelson Landscaping; Accurate Group, Inc.; D.C.S. Trucking Co.; Johler Demolition Inc.; and Revcon Construction Corp. Id. ¶ 6. Local 150 also alleges that it is the representative for numerous other units of employees who are likely to perform work in Lincolnshire in the future. Id. ¶ 8.

         Construction and General Laborers' District Council of Chicago and Vicinity, Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO (LDC) is party to three collective bargaining agreements that cover employees of employers located in Lincolnshire, including Central Boring, Inc.; Johler Demolition, Inc.; and Revcon Construction Corp. Id. ¶ 9. LDC also alleges that it is the representative for numerous other units of employees who are likely to perform work in Lincolnshire in the future. Id. ¶ 11. Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (CRC) is party to collective bargaining agreements covering units of employees who were scheduled to perform work in Lincolnshire starting in the spring of 2016. Compl. ¶ 13. CRC also alleges that it is the representative for numerous other units of employees who are likely to perform work in Lincolnshire in the future. Compl. ¶ 14.

         Lincolnshire is a "home rule" unit as defined in the Illinois Constitution, meaning that it can "exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs." See Pls.' Corrected Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (Pls.' Opening Brief) at 1; Ill. Const. Art. VII, § 6. In December 2015, Lincolnshire passed Ordinance No. 15-3389-116. Pls.' Opening Br. at 1. In relevant part, the ordinance provides:

         SECTION 4: GUARANTEE OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS

No person covered by the NLRA shall be required as a condition of employment or continuation of employment with a private-sector employer:
(A) to resign or refrain from voluntary membership in, voluntary affiliation with, or voluntary financial support of a labor organization;
(B) to become or remain a member of a labor organization;
(C) to pay any dues, fees, assessments, or other charges of any kind or amount to a labor organization;
(D) to pay any charity or other third party, in lieu of such payments, any amount equivalent to or a pro-rata portion of dues, fees, assessments, or other charges regularly required of members of labor organization; or
(E) to be recommended, approved, referred, or cleared for employment by or through a labor organization.

         SECTION 5: VOLUNTARY DEDUCTIONS PROTECTED

For employers located in the Village, it shall be unlawful to deduct from the wages, earnings, or compensation of an employee any union dues, fees, assessments, or other charges to be held for, transferred to, or paid over to a labor organization unless the employee has first presented, and the employer has received, a signed written authorization of such deductions, which authorization may be revoked by the employee at any time by giving written notice of such revocation to the employer.

         Pls.' Resp. to Defs.' Stat. of Facts, Tab 13 Ex. C, 02475-76.

         The Unions filed suit against Lincolnshire and three Lincolnshire officials in their official capacity: Chief of Police Peter Kinsey; Mayor Elizabeth Brandt; and Village Clerk Barbara Mastandrea. Compl. ¶¶ 15-18. The Unions contend that the quoted portions of the ordinance are preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69, and the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531. See Pls.' Opening Brief at 1, 17- 19. In particular, the Unions contend that sections 4(A)-(D) of the ordinance prohibit what are known as "union security agreements" and as such are preempted by the NLRA. Compl. ¶¶ 32-37. In count 2, the Unions allege that section 4(E) of the ordinance prohibits what are known as "hiring hall provisions" and that this section is likewise preempted by the NLRA. Id. ¶ 38. Finally, the Unions allege in count 3 that section 5 restricts what are known as "check-off provisions" and is preempted by the NLRA and the LMRA. Id. ¶ 40. On all three counts, the Unions request declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages and attorneys' fees as authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Id. ¶¶ 37, 39, 41.

         Discussion

         The Unions have moved for summary judgment, arguing that the quoted provisions of the Lincolnshire ordinance are preempted by federal law and that the Unions are entitled to judgment on the merits. Lincolnshire[1] has cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Unions lack standing to bring these claims and that all four Unions' claims lack merit. The Court first addresses the issue of standing and the viability of the Unions' claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and then addresses the preemption issue, which is argued in both sides' motions.

         In considering each side's motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the moving party and draws reasonable inferences in that party's favor. See Calumet River Fleeting, Inc. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO, 824 F.3d 645, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., and its Local 2343 v. ZF Boge Elastmetall LLC, 649 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2011).

         I. Standing

         In order to bring a claim in federal court, a plaintiff must have standing as required by Article III of the Constitution. Diedrich v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 839 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 2016). To have standing, a plaintiff must have "(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Id. at 587-88 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)). In response to a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing by setting ...


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