United States District Court, S.D. Illinois
KENJI L. HALEY, Plaintiff,
RAVYN OLIN, ALAN MONTGOMERY, and DENNIS LARSON, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
J. ROSENSTENGEL United States District Judge.
Kenji L. Haley, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this
lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging that his
constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated
at Big Muddy River Correctional Center (“Big
Muddy”). In his amended complaint, Haley alleges that
he was provided medication for treatment of an eye condition
to which he had a known allergy, causing him to suffer an
allergic reaction. Following a screening of his amended
complaint, Haley was allowed to proceed on a claim of
deliberate indifference against Defendant Ravyn Olin, the
nurse who allegedly dispensed the medication to which Haley
was allergic, Dr. Alan Montgomery, the ophthalmologist who
prescribed the medication, and Dr. Dennis Larson, the medical
director at Big Muddy, for approving disbursement of the
the screening of Haley's amended complaint, Defendants
Larson and Montgomery filed motions for summary judgment
arguing Haley failed to exhaust the claims against them prior
to filing his lawsuit as required by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq.
(see Docs. 67 and 70). Defendants' motions are
now before the Court.
only relevant grievance before the Court is dated January 13,
2014 (see Doc. 68-1, pp. 3-4). In this grievance,
Haley complains about his November 18, 2013 appointment with
Defendant Olin. Specifically, Haley's grievance reads, in
pertinent part, as follows:
On November 18, 2013, I (Haley) was being seen by nurse/sick
call because I had a stye [sic] in my right eyelid. At 1 p.m.
that day, Nurse Olin identified it as a stye [sic] and said
that she was going to treat me with either an eye drop or an
antibiotic. I told her that I was allergic to “sulfur
something but I am not sure of the chemical name.” Then
she stated that she needed to see the eye doctor (Dr. Larry
Montgomery) to see what he recommended as treatment. At 2
p.m. that day, the nurse came back to 2 house, called for me
and gave me the medication (Bactrim). She gave it and I did
as I was told and took the medicine. 24-hours later, I was
having an allergic reaction to the medication, I had deep red
rashes on my feet, arms, neck, stomach and back … As
it turned out the doctor who prescribed the medicine and the
nurse who sent it to me, gave me the same medication that I
was allergic to.
(Doc. 68-1, p. 3-4).
there was no written response from Haley's counselor, the
grievance officer considered this grievance on the merits on
March 2, 2014 and recommended that it be affirmed, finding
that the “inmate did receive medication he was allergic
to” (see Doc. 68-1, p. 2). The warden
concurred with the grievance officer's response on March
18, 2014. Soon thereafter, Haley appealed the grievance to
the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”). The ARB
received the grievance on March 25, 2014, and provided its
response on the merits on August 23, 2014, with the IDOC
Director's concurrence on October 1, 2014. Thereafter, on
April 28, 2015, Haley filed this lawsuit.
judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). See also
Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions,
Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005); Black
Agents & Brokers Agency, Inc. v. Near North Ins.
Brokerage, Inc., 409 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2005). The
moving party bears the burden of establishing that no
material facts are in genuine dispute; any doubt as to the
existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against the
moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 160 (1970). See also Lawrence v. Kenosha
County, 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004). A moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where the
non-moving party “has failed to make a sufficient
showing on an essential element of her case with respect to
which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex,
477 U.S. at 323. “[A] complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's
case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”
Id. The Seventh Circuit has stated summary judgment
“is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a
party must show what evidence it has that would convince a
trier of fact to accept its version of the events.”
Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Hammel v. Eau Galle Cheese Factory, 407
F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir. 2005) (other citations omitted)).
Requirements under the PLRA
Prison Litigation Reform Act provides:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under Section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such ...